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ABSTRACT
Essays in Labor Economics
by
Brooke Helppie McFall
Chair: Robert J. Willis
This dissertation is composed of two essays, both which use data from original survey
projects to examine issues related to work choice.
The ﬁrst essay examines the labor supply eﬀects of the wealth losses during the
stock market crash of 2008 and 2009. A life-cycle model incorporating both consump-
tion and retirement timing implies that exogenous wealth losses should delay optimal
retirement timing. Using data from the Cognitive Economics Study and the Health
and Retirement Study, this essay quantiﬁes the wealth losses suﬀered by older Ameri-
cans in terms of the additional length of time they would have to work to maintain the
pre-crash consumption plan implied by their wealth holdings and expected retirement
timing. Using these measures, Tobit regressions and a novel method for reducing the
impact of error-ridden observations are used to examine the relationship between this
measure of wealth loss and retirement planning. Several potential sources of hetero-
geneity in individuals' reactions to the crash are also examined. Results imply that
wealth losses of 2008 and 2009 are associated with an increase in planned retirement
age on the order of a few weeks to a few months for the average older American, but
up to several months for some segments of the population. These results are consis-
xii
tent with results of recent studies and the life-cycle model, but stand in contrast to
other examinations of wealth shocks on the general population of older Americans.
The second essay is a product of the Job Seekers Study. The essay extends Min-
cer's seminal theory of family migration to allow couples to adjust to migration con-
straints by living apart, and examine the ways in which new PhD economists adjust
to migration constraints imposed on them by their spouses or partners. Both the im-
pact of migration constraints on job outcomes and the impact of job considerations
on relationship outcomes are analyzed. The essay ﬁnds that migration constraints
result in small costs in terms of job outcomes, relative to many existing studies, and
that adjustment through living apart is common. These results imply that existing
studies may overestimate the job impact of migration constraints.
xiii
CHAPTER I
Introduction
This dissertation is composed of two essays. Although each essay falls within the
broad area of labor economics, the greatest commonality between them is that both
use data from original survey projects in which I have played a role. Because the
essays make use of data from surveys that were designed to answer the very research
questions addressed in my essays, the analyses I conduct are quite simple, yet have
direct relationships to economic theory.
In the case of the ﬁrst essay, my involvement in the Cognitive Economics Study
over the recent economic crisis both kindled my interest in the impact of the crisis
on retirement age and allowed me to help gather the data I would later use to study
this issue. In this essay, I examine the labor supply eﬀects of the wealth losses during
the stock market crash of 2008 and 2009. A simple life-cycle model incorporating
both consumption and retirement timing implies that exogenous wealth losses should
delay optimal retirement timing. The short time-period over which massive amounts
of wealth were lost presents a natural experiment with which to study the implications
of this model.
Using pre- and post-crash data from the Cognitive Economics Study and the
Health and Retirement Study, I quantify the wealth losses suﬀered by older Americans
in terms of the additional length of time they would have to work to maintain the
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pre-crash consumption plan implied by their wealth holdings and expected retirement
timing. This measure of wealth loss has the intuitive interpretation that, if individuals
cared only to maintain their pre-crash consumption plans, a loss of wealth equivalent
to an additional year of work would result in a one year increase in planned retirement
age. I then use descriptive analysis and Tobit regressions to study the relationship
between this measure of wealth loss and the reported changes in retirement timing.
In extensions of my basic regression analysis, I also examine several potential sources
of heterogeneity in individuals' reactions to the crash. I ﬁnd that the wealth losses of
2008 and 2009 are associated with an increase in planned retirement age on the order
of a few weeks to a few months for the average older American, but up to several
months for some segments of the population. These results are broadly consistent
with the results of other recent studies and life-cycle model, but stand in contrast
to other examinations of actual wealth shocks on the general population of older
Americans, which have tended to ﬁnd little relationship between changes in wealth
and retirement timing.
The Job Seekers Study, a web-based survey project undertaken with Marta Murray-
Close and Robert J. Willis, was developed with the express goal of examining the job
market decisions of economists. The second essay in this dissertation, co-written with
Marta Murray-Close, is the product of more than four years of original data collection
work. In this essay, we examine the ways in which new Ph.D. economists adjust to
migration constraints imposed on them by their spouses or partners.
Mincer's (1978) unitary model of family migration predicts that a couple will either
move together to a location that maximizes the members' joint utility or break up. If
an individual moves to a location that is not the best option for her, individually, she
is said to be a tied migrant. In this essay, we adapt Mincer's theory to allow for a
third margin of adjustment, the choice to live apart, while maintaining a relationship.
By using data from a survey explicitly designed to examine migration decisions, as
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well as job outcomes, break-ups and long-distance relationships, we analyze both the
impact of migration constraints on job outcomes and the impact of job considerations
on relationship outcomes. Using a combination of statistical tests and linear regression
analyses, we ﬁnd that migration constraints result in small costs in terms of job
outcomes, relative to many existing studies. We also ﬁnd that adjustment along the
relationship margin, through decisions to maintain long-distance relationships, are
quite common. Our results imply that, by excluding individuals who adjust along
this margin, existing studies may have resulted in overestimates of the job impact of
migration constraints.
Together, the essays in this dissertation underscore the advantages of using data
gathered to answer speciﬁc research questions. Because the data used in these essays
contain direct measures of variables relevant to my research questions, relatively sim-
ple analyses yielded substantively interesting results about how individuals make life
decisions, including how, when and where to supply their labor.
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CHAPTER II
The Impact of the Great Recession on the
Retirement Plans of Older Americans
2.1 Introduction
On October 1, 2007, the Dow Jones Industrial Average reached the 14,000 mark
to close at a new all-time high. Within two weeks, closing values began a slow decline
that would leave the Dow more than twenty percent lower by the following autumn.
But the real crash was yet to come, as the weakening real estate market and the
resulting failure of major banks in September and October 2008 sent stock values
into a series of steep declines. It was ﬁve more months before the stock market hit
bottom: on March 9, 2009, the Dow closed at 6,547.05, less than half of its October
2007 peak, and on par with closing prices from a decade earlier. For older Americans,
whose stock holdings had grown to more than ﬁfteen percent of total assets by 2006
(Gustman, Steinmeier and Tabatabai, 2010, p. 311), the stock market crash of 2008
caused large, unanticipated, and widespread losses of wealth over a period of just a
few months.
In addition to its role in bank failures and the stock market crash, the weak real
estate market directly impacted households, reducing housing prices by more than
thirty percent from their peak in the ﬁrst half of 2006 through early 2009 (S&P/Case-
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Shiller). Between September 2008 and May 2009, the national unemployment rate
increased by more than ﬁfty percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population
Survey), providing a further threat to older Americans' ﬁnancial stability through
erosion of employment security and earnings.
An intertemporal budget constraint from a simple, dynamic life-cycle model of
consumption and labor supply dictates that if even a portion of the wealth losses of
2008 and 2009 are permanent, those who lost wealth must increase future earnings,
decrease future consumption, or both. Since one way to increase earnings is to work
longer, retirement timing is an important margin along which individuals might adjust
to wealth losses.
In this paper, I use data from two nationally-representative studies the Cognitive
Economics Study and the Health and Retirement Study to examine the impact of
recent wealth losses on the retirement plans of older Americans. I begin by quantifying
the wealth losses suﬀered by older Americans in terms of the additional length of
time they would have to work to maintain the pre-crash consumption plan implied
by their wealth holdings and expected retirement timing. This measure of wealth
loss has the intuitive interpretation that, if individuals cared only to maintain their
pre-crash consumption plans, a loss of wealth equivalent to an additional year of
work would result in a one year increase in planned retirement age. I then use
descriptive and regression analysis to study the relationship between this measure
of wealth loss and the reported changes in retirement timing. In extensions of my
basic regression analysis, I also examine several potential sources of heterogeneity in
individuals' reactions to the crash.
My analyses show that older Americans plan to delay retirement in response to
the crash. My preferred estimates imply that the average wealth loss between July
2008 and May 2009 is associated with an increase in expected retirement age of
approximately four months, about 8.6 percent of the adjustment that would be needed
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to fully make up for wealth losses. Additionally, the average wealth loss is associated
with increases in the probabilities that an individual will be working full-time after
reaching age 62 and after reaching age 65.
This paper is the ﬁrst to use new data from pre- and post-crash surveys from the
Cognitive Economics Study (CogEcon) and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
to examine the impact of wealth shocks on the age at which older adults expect to
retire. In many analyses presented in this paper, the association between changes
in wealth and changes in retirement plans are statistically signiﬁcant. Unlike most
previous research, this paper ﬁnds statistically-signiﬁcant evidence of wealth eﬀects
on retirement timing. Moreover, it is the ﬁrst to examine the role of heterogeneity in
reactions to wealth shocks by wealth, time to retirement, expectations about future
economic conditions, cognitive ability, ﬁnancial knowledge, and changes in bequest
plans.
2.2 Background
The classic life-cycle model predicts that optimal consumption from the present
until the end of life should be proportional to net worth, where net worth is deﬁned
as the net value of assets currently held plus the discounted value of future income
(Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954/2005). The key components of the model that are
responsible for this prediction are an individual utility function and a basic intertem-
poral budget constraint. The utility function drives individuals' desire to smooth
consumption over time, while the budget constraint requires that the present dis-
counted value of all future consumption must be equal to the sum of current assets
and the expected present discounted value of future income ﬂows. Assuming that in-
dividuals expect to work through the middle of their lives and retire towards the end
of life, the life-cycle model implies that individuals will save while working to fund
a smooth consumption path over the rest of their lives (Modigliani and Brumberg,
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1954/2005).
The classic life-cycle model treats retirement as a period of life during which
individuals do not work, and must live out of savings. The labor supply decision,
including the decision to retire, is not explicitly modeled. Over the last three decades,
however, this life-cycle model has spawned a class of dynamic, structural models in
which retirement is a choice variable, the timing of which is driven by a preference
for retirement leisure, a disutility of work and/or a real wage that declines as workers
age. These models seek to predict how consumption, saving and labor supply decisions
are aﬀected by income, individual preferences, risk, pension and Social Security rules
and other variables of interest in a public policy context (MaCurdy , 1981; Gustman
and Steinmeier , 1986; Kimball and Shapiro, 2003; Blau, 2008; Low et al., 2010).
They conﬁrm the prediction of the basic life-cycle model that permanent increases in
lifetime resources result in increased future consumption, and permanent decreases
in lifetime resources result in decreased future consumption.
Further, when facing an unforeseen negative shock to assets, the intertemporal
budget constraint implies that individuals must increase income, reduce planned con-
sumption or adjust both income and consumption. Similarly, an unforeseen positive
shock must result in increased consumption, reduced income, or a combination of
both. Thus, these dynamic models predict that unexpected changes in wage rates
or other shocks to wealth should aﬀect individuals' labor supply decisions, including
their retirement timing.
Despite widespread use of these models, a large body of literature assessing the
impact of changes in wages on labor supply has not clearly supported the implications
of dynamic life-cycle models. Several papers using experimental data and evidence
from inheritances have found that large, unforeseen monetary gains are associated
with reduced labor supply, often in the form of earlier retirement (Holtz-Eakin et al.,
1993; Imbens et al., 2001; Kimball and Shapiro, 2008). However, empirical studies
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of the impact of broad wealth shocks due to stock market movements in the 1990s
and early 2000s have generally failed to show strong associations with changes in
retirement timing (Hurd and Reti , 2001; Coronado and Perozek , 2003; Kezdi and
Sevak , 2004; Coile and Levine, 2005; Hurd et al., 2009; the main exception is Sevak ,
2002).
While it is possible that the implications of the life-cycle hypothesis on retirement
timing are not borne out in the real world, there are three other possible explanations
that may have contributed to the mixed ﬁndings of broadly-representative empirical
analyses in the past. First, the generally weak results in papers seeking identiﬁcation
based on the impact of broad economic trends may be partially attributable to the
diﬃculty of ﬁnding sources of plausibly exogenous variation in wealth. Second, the
combination of high levels of measurement error in wealth data with the relatively
small changes in wealth most households have experienced in past business cycles
may have caused non-ﬁndings due to attenuation bias. Third, the possibility that
ﬁxed costs and non-linearities in the underlying models may mean that reduced-form
econometric models that ignore these issues have produced unreliable results. My
study has advantages over existing papers in each of these three areas.
First, the economic crisis of 2008 provides a more powerful example of a plausibly
exogenous wealth shock than the 1990s and early 2000s business cycle, the period that
has been the focus of most similar studies. The recent downturn caused losses broadly,
aﬀecting stock values and employment across many industries, as well as the real
estate sector. By contrast, the late 1990s/early 2000s business cycle was based on the
protracted rise and subsequent fall of dot-com industries and their stocks. Because
fewer older households owned signiﬁcant amounts of stock at that time, the impact of
stock prices was also less broad. The growth of deﬁned contribution pension plans has
greatly increased the importance of stock holdings in households' retirement savings
portfolios over the past decade, resulting in non-trivial exposure of more households
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to the stock-market in the more recent downturn. Additionally, as with the early
2000s stock market crash, the most recent crash was largely unanticipated, resulting
in a cleaner quasi-experiment than the protracted stock run-up of the late 1990s.
Indeed, recent papers have suggested that wealth losses in 2008 and 2009 may aﬀect
future retirement behavior (Gustman et al., 2009; Goda et al., 2011) but the authors
have not yet placed much weight on such ﬁndings. Lending support to the ﬁndings of
these recent studies, summary statistics from the Cognitive Economics Study show
that more than forty percent of working respondents reported that their expected
age of retirement had increased as a result of the economic crisis, and most who
reported a change reported an increase of two or more years.
Second, the signal-to-noise ratio in measures of wealth changes I use in this study
may be larger than in prior studies. This is due to a combination of two factors: the
large magnitudes of wealth losses experienced by a large proportion of households
during this economic crisis, and the fact that surveys designed in the wake of the
crisis have yielded data from direct questions about wealth losses for most types
of assets aﬀected by the crisis. The former means that the true wealth changes
tend to be farther from zero than has been the case over other periods. The latter
leads me to believe that my measures of wealth change do not suﬀer from the same
compounded error as true longitudinal data, and are therefore likely to be subject to
less attenuation bias than purely longitudinal wealth measures.
Third, I argue in this paper that it is important to account for ﬁxed costs and
non-linearities in examining the impact of wealth shocks on retirement timing. Pre-
vious studies using reduced-form regression techniques have ignored these issues. My
econometric speciﬁcation takes these into account. I use a corner solution model to ex-
plicitly allow for non-zero adjustments by individuals whose ﬁxed-costs of adjustment
are not outweighed by the potential gains from adjustment, while also estimating the
eﬀect of wealth losses on the size of adjustments for individuals who do report changes
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in retirement timing. Additionally, I employ a quadratic term in my regression anal-
yses to pick up potential non-linearities in the underlying optimization model. In
my analysis, I also discuss the possibility that inclusion of the quadratic term may
strengthen the estimated linear eﬀect of wealth losses by reducing the impact of ob-
servations with implausibly large wealth losses.
2.3 Theoretical considerations
The intertemporal budget constraint in a standard life-cycle model requires that
the expected present discounted value of consumption be less than or equal to the
present value of assets plus the present discounted value of future income ﬂows. In
the simplest case,
T∑
s=τ
Cs
(1 + r)s
= Aτ +
T∑
s=τ
Ys
(1 + r)s
where Cs is consumption at time s, Ys is income at time s, r is the interest rate
and Aτ is assets at the time of optimization (τ). A loss of asset holdings must be
accompanied by a reduction in consumption or an increase in income in order for this
equality to hold. Assuming that individuals will perfectly smooth consumption, let
sustainable consumption, SC = Cs, s ∈ [τ, T ], be the smoothed consumption level
attainable in all periods from the reference period τ until death at time T , given Aτ ,
assets held at the time of optimization, and planned income path Y .
Figure 2.1 uses Modigliani's canonical graph to illustrate the impact of an asset
loss on consumption, holding labor supply constant. Y represents labor earnings, A
is accumulated wealth, and SC is the implied sustainable consumption that can
be supported using accumulated wealth and planned future labor earnings. For a
given income path, a negative asset shock necessarily translates to lower sustainable
consumption. The reduction in sustainable consumption is shown by the drop in SC
from the upper, dotted SC path to the lower SC path.
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Now, brieﬂy consider the implications of allowing labor supply to be a choice
variable. If one assumes for simplicity, as I do in this paper, that an individual's real
wage is a known constant, then labor income is only a function of the quantity of labor
supplied. In theory, individuals may adjust their labor supply along the extensive
margin (i.e., whether to work) or the intensive margin (i.e., how much to work). In
fact, conditional on working, hours worked may be adjustable only to the extent that
workers may choose between employers oﬀering wage packages with diﬀerent hours
(Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999, page 1588). This means that adjustment along the
intensive margin of labor supply may entail signiﬁcant search costs. Empirically,
according to Heckman (1993, page 118) ... the strongest empirical eﬀects of wages
and nonlabor income on labor supply are to be found at the extensive margin at
the margin of entry and exit where the elasticities are deﬁnitely not zero. For
these reasons, this paper focuses exclusively on the extensive margin of labor supply
called retirement. For tractability, I deﬁne retirement as an irreversible, complete
cessation of work for pay.
While development of a dynamic structural model is beyond the scope of this paper
and unnecessary to my empirical analysis, consideration of such a model is useful for
deriving intuition about the expected impact of the economic crisis. In Appendix A.1,
I present a simpliﬁed version of a life-cycle model of consumption and labor supply
developed by Kimball and Shapiro (2008; 2003). Figure 2.2 presents a graphical
representation of the optimal retirement choice problem, based on a life-cycle model
of consumption and labor supply like that in Kimball and Shapiro(2008; 2003), that
might be underlying Modigliani's static model. In this ﬁgure, the upward-sloping
curve represents the marginal disutility of work, per dollar earned. The disutility of
work function incorporates the costs of working associated with distaste for work,
eﬀort costs of work, and/or ﬁxed costs of going to work. The marginal disutility
of work could be increasing with age due to expectations that health will decline
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with age, social norms that one should be retired by a particular age, spousal labor
force status, or other factors. The downward-sloping curve in Figure 2.2 represents
the marginal value of wealth, assuming optimal choice of consumption path for each
possible retirement age along the horizontal axis. An individual will plan to retire
when the marginal utility cost of continued work is expected to exceed the marginal
utility gain from the consumption funded by continued work.
After an unforeseen loss of wealth, however, the marginal value of wealth would
be expected to shift upward, as in Figure 2.3. If retirement must take place at the
originally-planned age, R0, the wealth shock necessitates a lower level of consumption
over the remainder of life. If, however, retirement is a choice variable, it can be
seen that consumption could actually remain unchanged by choosing retirement age
Rsc. The value Rsc represents the constant sustainable consumption retirement age,
or the retirement age that would be necessary to maintain the pre-shock level of
consumption. The optimal post-shock retirement age, however, is at R∗, the new
intersection between the marginal disutility of work per dollar earned and the marginal
utility value of wealth.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the result of optimal retirement choice after an asset loss
within the simple Modigliani framework. Retirement at the originally-planned re-
tirement age, R0, requires that consumption be adjusted to absorb the entire loss of
assets. By contrast, retirement at Rsc requires only that retirement age be adjusted,
leaving consumption unchanged. The new optimal retirement age, R∗, will actually
lie somewhere between R0 and Rsc, depending on the relative slopes in the underlying
optimization problem.
2.4 Empirical framework
In my analyses, I regress measures of the change in expected retirement timing,
4retirement timing, on the change in retirement age that would be necessary if
12
consumption were kept constant at pre-crash levels, Rsc − R0. This implies the base
speciﬁcation
4retirement timingj = α + β1 (Rsc −R0)j + Z ′jγ + εj (2.1)
where R0 is pre-crash retirement age, and Rsc−R0 is the additional number of years
individual j would need to work to maintain his or her pre-crash consumption path,
or the constant sustainable consumption retirement age. The dependent variable,
4retirement timing, diﬀers by dataset, and is discussed in more detail in Section 2.5.
In some speciﬁcations, a vector of variables Z is also included to capture eﬀects related
to preferences and expectations, allowing the β coeﬃcients to reﬂect adjustments due
to the wealth shock. Additionally, some speciﬁcations include interactions of variables
in Z with the wealth losses to explore observed heterogeneity in the relationship
between wealth losses and retirement timing with respect to these variables.
If individuals adjust to wealth shocks solely along the consumption margin, I ex-
pect estimates of β1 to be zero. If individuals adjust along the retirement age margin,
I expect estimates of β1 to be positive. In the extreme case in which individuals
adjust solely along the retirement age margin, the dependent variable is the change
in planned retirement age (in years), and there is no measurement error, the expected
coeﬃcient would be one.
From the earlier discussion of the optimal retirement choice problem it might
seem that, holding all else constant, the change from the originally-planned retire-
ment age, R0, to post-shock optimal retirement age, R
∗, will strictly increase as the
size of the asset loss increases. There are, however, two main reasons this need not
be true: discontinuities in the marginal value of wealth or marginal disutility of work
curves, and ﬁxed costs related to implementation of retirement age adjustments or
re-optimization of retirement age. First, the marginal value of wealth curve need not
be continuous. In particular, factors such as Medicare, Social Security and deﬁned
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beneﬁt pension rules may result in discontinuous jumps at threshold ages or levels of
job tenure. Second, the marginal disutility of work curve may also contain discontin-
uous jumps at particular ages (for example, based on social norms that one should
be retired by a particular age) or at ages when other events are expected to occur
(for example, changes in spousal labor force status). Third, there may be ﬁxed costs
related to implementation of changes in retirement age, especially for those who were
within a few months of retirement before the asset loss. These costs might include
time spent revising Social Security or retirement-related paperwork, eﬀort needed to
train a diﬀerent successor for one's job, or monetary costs related to maintaining
one's primary residence for longer than expected (for example, losing a buyer for
one's primary home or extra repair costs). Finally, there might be eﬀort costs due
to re-optimizing one's retirement age and consumption path, monetary costs due to
hiring help to re-optimize, and emotional costs due to acknowledging the need to
delay retirement. All of these factors would contribute to heaping at the no change
corner solution.1
I primarily focus on results from Tobit regression speciﬁcations in this paper,
since the Tobit model can provide consistent estimates of the relationship between
wealth losses and observed changes in retirement age in the presence of heaping at a
corner solution, at least for individuals who are not at the corner solution. The Tobit
speciﬁcation is:
4retirement timing∗j = α + β1 (Rsc −R0)j + Z ′jγ + εj (2.2)
4retirement timingj = max
(
0,4retirement timing∗j
)
(2.3)
1Indeed, evidence of heaping, seen in my descriptive analysis (Section 2.6.1), suggests that ﬁxed
costs and other discontinuities are important in predicting the adjustment of retirement plans to
wealth losses in 2008 and 2009.
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εj| (Rsc −R0)j , Zj ∼ N(0, σ2) (2.4)
where the latent variable, 4retirement timing∗ can be thought of as the optimal
change in retirement timing that would result in the absence of the ﬁxed costs and
discontinuities.
It is also important to consider that there may be non-linearities in the relation-
ship between changes in retirement age and the relative magnitude of asset losses,
even among individuals reporting non-zero retirement changes. The eﬀect of a small
perturbation in asset holdings on retirement timing may be expected to be well-
approximated by a model that is linear in Rsc − R0. However, the magnitude of the
losses seen in 2008 are likely, at least for some people, to have had a large enough im-
pact on the marginal utility of wealth that the eﬀect is not well-approximated by this
model. Indeed, given that the marginal disutility of work might be increasing at an
increasing rate with age, the marginal change in optimal retirement age may actually
decline as the wealth shock increases. Thus, a squared term is also introduced.
4retirement timingj = α + β1 (Rsc −R0)j + β2 (Rsc −R0)2j + Z ′jγ + εj (2.5)
To implement these analyses, I need measures of planned retirement age as of mid-
2008 (R0), the constant sustainable consumption retirement age (Rsc), measures of
changes in retirement timing (4retirement timing) and variables found in the Z
vector. The next section describes data and measurement considerations related to
these variables.
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2.5 Data
The Cognitive Economics Project2 (CogEcon) and the Health and Retirement
Study3 (HRS) are nationally-representative studies of older Americans, both of which
ﬁelded surveys in 2008 before the crash. After the stock market crash, the researchers
with these studies developed post-crash surveys and ﬁelded these by mid-2009. By
design, the timing and content of these surveys provide excellent data to analyze
the impact of a wealth shock on older Americans' retirement plans. This paper
uses data from the baseline CogEcon 2008 survey, the 2009 Post-Crash CogEcon
survey, the HRS 2006 and 2008 Core interviews, and the HRS 2009 Internet Survey.
These datasets contain detailed, longitudinal data about older Americans' preferences,
expectations, ﬁnancial situations and expected retirement timing, both before and
after the stock market crash.
The CogEcon study has a smaller sample size than the HRS, but was designed to
provide a direct measure of the dependent variable suggested by theory: the change
in expected retirement age. Additionally, the CogEcon data provide detailed mea-
sures of changes in wealth and other impacts of the economic crisis, and access to
restricted geographic data has enabled me to use county-level unemployment rates in
my analyses. By contrast, the dependent variable available for the HRS analysis is
the change in the subjective probability of full-time work after ages 62 and 65, and
the measures of changes in wealth are less complete. However, the HRS oﬀers infor-
mation about Social Security, deﬁned beneﬁt pension wealth, and expected bequests
that is not available in the CogEcon study, and therefore provides better measures
of some aspects of wealth and other margins of adjustment to wealth losses. To take
2The Cognitive Economics Survey is supported by NIA program project 2P01AG026571, Be-
havior on Surveys and in the Economy Using HRS, Robert J. Willis, PI. In addition to Willis,
University of Michigan faculty Gwen Fisher, Miles Kimball, Matthew Shapiro, and Tyler Shumway
and graduate students Brooke Helppie McFall and Joanne Hsu had roles in designing and ﬁelding
the CogEcon study.
3The HRS is sponsored by the National Institute on Aging (grant number NIA U01AG009740)
and is conducted by the University of Michigan.
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advantage of the strengths of both studies, I conduct analyses using both datasets.
2.5.1 Cognitive Economics
The CogEcon study has been designed by a group of economists from the Survey
Research Center at the University of Michigan to explore the relationship between
cognitive measures and a variety of economic variables, including measures of ﬁnancial
knowledge, wealth holdings and how ﬁnancial decisions are made. The ﬁrst CogEcon
survey was ﬁelded in 2008 to 1222 eligible respondents to a partner study, CogUSA.4
The ﬁnal response rate for CogEcon 2008 was 80.8 percent, with 987 respondents
having submitted completed surveys. The Post-Crash survey was ﬁelded to 939 of
these respondents in May and June 2009, and attained responses from 848 responses
(90.2 percent response rate).
For analyses using CogEcon data, I start with data from the 848 CogEcon partic-
ipants who responded to both CogEcon 2008 and the Post-Crash survey.5 I combine
the CogEcon data with demographic and cognitive measures from the CogUSA study.
The ﬁnal analysis sample uses data from the 320 respondents who were working at
the time of the Post-Crash survey, reported planned retirement age as of July 2008
at least as large as their age in July 2008, provided earnings information in either the
2008 or Post-Crash survey, and provided some wealth data.6
4The CogUSA study, formerly NGCS+HRS, was started in 2006 by a cognitive psychologist, John
J. McArdle, with the goal of conducting extensive cognitive tests and gathering rich demographic
and health data on a nationally-representative sample of older Americans. The CogUSA Study
is sponsored by the National Institute of Aging, grant number R37 AG007137, Assessing and
Improving Cognitive Measurements in the HRS, John J. McArdle, PI.
5The ﬁelding timeline of the CogEcon and HRS surveys used in this paper are illustrated in
Figure 2.6. More than ninety percent of CogEcon respondents completed their 2008 (pre-crash)
questionnaires by September 1, 2008, while ninety-ﬁve percent of completed Post-Crash surveys
were submitted by July 1, 2009.
6Non-responses to questions about the value of particular assets are coded as zeroes in the data
used for my analysis. However, item non-response rates were extremely low. For example, only
1.96 percent of respondents in my sample who indicated that they had tax-advantaged retirement
accounts did not give information about the value of these accounts. Because the values of many
diﬀerent types of assets were added together to create the measures of total wealth upon which the
main independent variable of interest is based, the I believe the underestimation of wealth from this
coding is minimal.
17
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics about the sample. The sample is 52% female
and 23% single, with an average age of 60.6 years at the time of the Post-Crash survey.
The average education level of the sample is 14.9 years. Median annual earnings in
2008 were $52,023,7 and the median age at which respondents reported that they had
planned, as of July 2008, to retire completely was 66 years. In some speciﬁcations,
the number of observations is further reduced by nonresponse to additional variables
included in the analyses.
The CogUSA sample is slightly more educated and wealthier, and slightly less
representative of minorities than the general HRS population. To correct for this,
regressions presented in the main paper use weights developed to make inference
with CogUSA data more representative of the general population of older Americans.
2.5.2 Health and Retirement Study
The second dataset used in this paper is from the HRS. The HRS has ﬁelded
Core interviews by telephone or in person in even years since 1992. Roughly every
two years since 2003, some respondents with Internet access have also been asked to
complete web-based surveys. The 2009 Internet survey provides post-crash data for
HRS respondents.
In addition to 2009 Internet survey data, I use RAND HRS data (Version J),, 2008
Tracker data, the Cross-Wave Social Security Wealth File (Version 4.0), Imputations
for Employer-Sponsored Pension Wealth from Current Jobs in 2004 (Version 1.0) and
table data from Gustman et al. (2010a) for pension wealth.
To be included in my sample, respondents must have submitted a 2009 Internet
Survey and have completed their HRS 2008 Core interview prior to September 1,
2008.8 This date restriction ensures that baseline wealth and retirement expecta-
7For some respondents, earnings reported in the 2008 survey, from last year were used. However,
all earnings are converted to 2009 dollars.
8Ninety percent of the 2008 Core Interviews took place prior to September 2008, so a relatively
small number of observations were excluded due to late 2008 Core interview timing.
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tions from 2008 were measured prior to the stock market crash and the other wealth
losses that occurred from fall 2008 through spring 2009. Furthermore, respondents
must have been assigned a non-zero 2008 Core interview sampling weight.9 Respon-
dents must also have been in the labor force (working, on leave or unemployed and
looking for work)10 and under the age of 65 at the time of the 2009 Internet sur-
vey. Unfortunately, because the Internet Survey is only ﬁelded to HRS respondents
who have identiﬁed themselves as internet users in the past, the sample may be less
representative of the general population than the full HRS sample.11
The ﬁnal sample size for the under-62 analyses is 589, while the under-65
sample size is 594. These respondents were in the labor force, answered some questions
about wealth, and responded to the questions about work after age 62 (the under-
62 sample) or age 65 (the under-65 sample) that are used to create the dependent
variables used in my analyses. Table 2 gives some summary statistics for the HRS
sample. At 55% female and 22% single, the composition of the HRS samples are
quite similar to the CogEcon sample. Respondents in the HRS samples are slightly
less educated than the CogEcon sample at the median and have lower mean annual
earnings, but do have quite comparable median earnings. They are also younger, on
average, than the CogEcon sample, because they must have been under 62 or 65 at
the time of the Internet Survey to have answered questions related to my dependent
variables. It might also be noted that the planned retirement ages are younger;
however, most of these values are imputed, and those for whom it is not imputed may
9More than ninety percent of zero sampling weights occur due to age ineligibility. The 2008 HRS
Core interview weights were developed to reweight the HRS sample to mirror the population of
Americans over age ﬁfty in 2004, so respondents who were age 50 or younger in 2004 are assigned
weights of zero.
10Regression results are qualitatively robust to exclusion of those who were temporarily laid oﬀ
or on leave, or unemployed and looking for work at the time of the Internet Survey (approximately
30 observations, depending on the analysis).
11For example, Hsu, Fisher and Willis (2008) ﬁnd that respondents to internet surveys tend to be
younger and of higher cognitive ability, even after controlling for education level, than respondents
to other modes of mixed-mode survey eﬀorts. By contrast, the CogEcon survey was ﬁelded in both
mail and internet modes, allowing individuals who were not internet-users to respond to the survey.
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be diﬀerent from the average person of comparable age.12
2.5.3 Measurement
As discussed in Section 3, the estimation equations I use are linear and Tobit
regressions of the form
4retirement timingj = α + β1 (Rsc −R0)j + Z ′jγ + εj (2.6)
and
4retirement timingj = α + β1 (Rsc −R0)j + β2 (Rsc −R0)2j + Z ′ijγ + εj (2.7)
where R0 is the pre-crash retirement age work variable and Rsc−R0 is the additional
number of years an individual would need to work to attain his or her pre-crash
consumption path, where Rsc is the constant sustainable consumption retirement
age for individual j. In some speciﬁcations, I also interact the Z variables with
the (Rsc −R0) terms to explore heterogeneity in the relationship between wealth and
retirement changes.
2.5.3.1 Dependent variables
The dependent variable used in the analyses, 4retirement timing, diﬀers by
dataset. Because only two years have elapsed since the stock market crash, there
has not yet been time to observe changes in actual retirement behavior. In both the
CogEcon and HRS analyses, I use variables measuring expected changes in retirement
timing.
In the CogEcon data, the dependent variable is R09 − R0, the diﬀerence between
12See the HRS wealth measures section for detail on this.
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the post-crash planned retirement age and the pre-crash planned retirement age.
This variable is derived from a series of questions in the CogEcon Post-Crash Survey
about retirement timing. First, respondents were asked for their current labor force
status.13 If they were not completely retired, they were next asked at what age they
planned to retire completely, yielding R09. Next, respondents were asked As a result
of the economic crisis, has the age at which you plan to retire completely changed
since July 2008? If they indicated a change, they were then asked As of July 2008,
at what age were you planning to retire completely? If no change was reported, R0
was set equal to R09. If a change was reported, the July 2008 planned retirement age
was used for R0.
The dependent variable in the CogEcon analyses has a clear interpretation in the
context of the theoretical framework discussed earlier. A strength of this question
series is that it directly asks respondents to report the causal impact of the economic
crisis on retirement age, and so might capture fewer changes in retirement age that
are unrelated to the economic crisis, compared changes that might be measured by
other surveys. Furthermore, because the labor supply questions were asked toward
the beginning of the survey, before questions about the impact of the crash on their
wealth holdings, the question order probably helped minimize priming bias in the
answers to these questions.
For the HRS data, these variables are based on responses to the probabilistic
expectations questions related to retirement timing in the 2009 Internet Survey,
Thinking about work in general and not just your present job, what do you
think the chances are that you will be working full-time after you reach age
62?
and
13These categories are comparable to those standard in the HRS, and include: working, unem-
ployed, disabled, homemaker, retired, etc. Respondents who selected retired, were then asked if
they were completely retired.
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Thinking about work in general and not just your present job, what do you
think the chances are that you will be working full-time after you reach age
65?
Respondents answer these questions by giving a probability between 0% and 100%.
Parallel questions were asked in the HRS 2008 Core interviews, as well. The dependent
variables for the HRS analyses are 08409Pr(FT62), the change in reported subjective
probability of full-time work after age 62 as of the 2008 HRS Core interview and
the 2009 Internet survey, and 08409Pr(FT65), the change in reported subjective
probability of full-time work after age 65 as of the 2008 HRS Core interview and the
2009 Internet survey.
The obvious beneﬁt of using expectations data over observed behavior is that ﬁrst
diﬀerences speciﬁcations yield a much larger proportion of changes at any particular
point in time, since observed retirement transitions are binary. Expectations data are
particularly useful for studying reactions to shocks, because the eﬀects of a shock on
a broad population may be observed immediately, rather than only after many years
have passed.
One might be concerned about using expectations data to draw conclusions about
actual future behavior, because it is conceivable that expectations are not predictive
of actual behavior. However, research by Manski (2004) suggests that probabilistic
expectations are actually the measures of expectations that are called for by modern
economic theory. While my theoretical framework does not explicitly model un-
certainty, use of dependent variables based on probabilistic expectations may provide
some insight into this issue. Additionally, studies by Hurd and McGarry (1995); Hurd
(2009) have validated that probabilistic expectations data about life expectancy and
retirement age are predictive of actual behavior. Several studies, many using the
HRS, have validated the relationships between probabilistic expectations data and
actual outcomes (Hurd and McGarry , 1995; Dominitz and Manski , 1997; McGarry ,
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2004; Dominitz and Manski , 2005; Hurd , 2009).
Another analysis, by Hurd (2009), compared population averages of full-time work
expectations with actual outcomes, and concluded that the average expected prob-
ability of full-time work after age 62 was closely related to the actual probability
of full-time work after age 62. Additionally, using linear probability model estima-
tions on individual data from the HRS, Chan and Stevens (2004) have shown that
subjective retirement expectations are strongly related to later employment status,
even after controlling for age, health, marital status and education. Both Chan and
Stevens (2004) and Hurd (2009) have found that, as individuals approach a question's
reference age (62 or 65), the predictive value of their expectations grows.
Providing support for the validity of expected retirement age measures, Benitez-
Silva and Dwyer (2005) have shown that expected retirement age in earlier waves of
the HRS are extremely strong predictors of expected retirement age in later waves,
and could not reject that the regression coeﬃcient on previously reported retirement
age is one, after controlling for selection and reporting errors. Thus, they could not
reject that retirement expectations follow the rational expectations hypothesis. They
also examined the role of new information, and concluded that models of perfect
foresight are not rejected with respect to most changes in economic variables.
Using correlations and linear probability models with HRS Core interview data
from the early-to-mid 2000's, I have also conﬁrmed that reported subjective proba-
bilities of full-time work after ages 62 and the expected age of full retirement from
four years before reaching age 62 are strongly predictive of actual full-time work sta-
tus after age 62. The correlation coeﬃcients were 0.38 and 0.24, respectively. A 10
percentage point increase in the subjective probability of full-time work after age 62
was associated with a 4 percentage point increase in the probability that the indi-
vidual was observed to be working full-time after age 62. Each additional expected
year of work was associated with a 3 percentage point increase in the probability of
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full-time work after age 62. All coeﬃcients on the expectations variables were highly
statistically signiﬁcant. Furthermore, the correlation between the two expectations
measures was 0.51. Similar analyses of the relationship between actual full-time work
status after age 65 and the subjective probability of full-time work after age 65 or
expected retirement age, both observed approximately six years before reaching age
65, yielded comparable results.
In sum, I argue that my use of expected retirement age and the subjective prob-
ability of full-time work as proxies for actual future retirement behavior is valid. In
fact, use of expectations may actually be preferable in a natural experiment con-
text because such measures are more directly related to the dynamic programming
problem individuals are thought to solve when planning for retirement. Using expec-
tations data captures the immediate eﬀect of a shock on the maximization problem
with current expected values of future variables. By contrast, retrospective analyses
of the eﬀect of a shock on actual retirement outcomes many years down the line may
be aﬀected by unknown future realizations of variables that are correlated with but
not caused by the initial shock, some of which may be unobserved. Standard estima-
tion procedures using observed retirement outcomes would be likely to yield biased
estimates of the impact of the shock on observed retirement outcomes.
2.5.3.2 Wealth measures
While variables related to expected retirement timing are directly observed in the
data, it is necessary to calculate and annuitize measures of total wealth in order to
derive the constant sustainable consumption retirement age variable (Rsc).
In this paper, I deﬁne total wealth as the discounted sum of expected future
household labor earnings, household ﬁnancial wealth, deﬁned contribution pension
account holdings, deﬁned beneﬁt plan and combination plan wealth, Social Security
wealth, and net equity in homes and other real estate. The counterfactual level of
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total wealth, referred to throughout the paper as pre-crash wealth, is the level of
wealth that would have been held by the household in mid-2009 if the economic
crisis had not happened.14 Total wealth after the onset of the crisis is the level of
wealth held by the household in mid-2009, holding planned retirement age constant
at its 2008 level. All account holdings and income streams used to calculate pre- and
post-crash total wealth are in pre-tax 2009 dollars.15
After calculating the total wealth measures, I divide each observation of total
pre-crash wealth by an individual-speciﬁc annuity price to get the pre-crash level of
annual annuity income that is, the level of sustainable consumption that could be
purchased with the present discounted value of pre-crash wealth in 2009. Similarly,
I use post-crash wealth to calculate the post-crash sustainable consumption level.
These estimates of sustainable consumption are then used to calculate the primary
independent variable of interest in this study, Rsc − R0, the additional number of
years individuals would have to work to make up their losses completely. The details
of this process are described below.
CogEcon total wealth measures I use data from both the 2008 CogEcon sur-
vey and the CogEcon Post-Crash survey to calculate pre- and post-crash household
ﬁnancial wealth. The post-crash data contain information about the levels of wealth
held in tax-advantaged retirement accounts (for example, 401(k) plans and IRAs),
and how much these had changed since July 2008. The surveys similarly solicited
levels and changes of holdings in checking, savings, money market accounts, certiﬁ-
cates of deposit, Treasury bills, cash, credit card debt, and stocks or stock mutual
14Speciﬁcally, the counterfactual level of wealth is calculated as if accumulated ﬁnancial wealth,
pension and Social Security wealth are at their pre-crash (2008) levels, while future earnings are
those expected from 2009 onward.
15Because each individual's Social Security income, deﬁned beneﬁt pension income, and distribu-
tions from non-Roth tax-advantaged retirement accounts are likely to be taxed at diﬃcult-to-predict
marginal income tax rates, I have up-weighted all other assets. These other assets are likely to be
taxed at the capital gains rate (if at all). Speciﬁcally, I multiplied the value of each of these assets by
1/(1− τ), where τ is set at 0.15 (the current capital gains tax rate for most assets) before summing
all assets to calculate total wealth.
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funds held outside of tax-advantaged retirement accounts. For ﬁnancial assets for
which respondents reported Post-Crash levels16 and percent changes, I calculate the
July 2008 values using the 2009 levels and changes as:
value08 =
value09
(1 + (percent change/100))
while, in cases where I have data on levels and the dollar value of the change,17
value08 is calculated as the sum of value09 and the reported change since July 2008.
The value of bonds holdings was only asked in 2008, so this value is assumed constant
from 2008 to 2009.
The pre-and post-crash gross value and changes in the value of real estate holdings
are also available in the post-crash data. Using the reported mortgage balances and
the reported changes in these balances since July 2008, I also calculate pre- and post-
crash net real estate holdings. Values of farm and business equity were only asked in
2008, so these values are assumed constant from 2008 to 2009.
For earnings in 2009, I use the average of inﬂation-adjusted 2007 and 2008 earnings
if the respondent gave dollar values for both, or if the respondent gave range card
answers for both. If the respondent reported a value for either year, but gave a
range card answer or no answer for the other year, that year's earnings was used.
For respondents who did not give a speciﬁc value in either year, I use the mid-point of
2008 earnings if the respondent gave a range answer for that year, and 2007 earnings
16For questions asking for the dollar amounts of earnings, assets or debts, the CogEcon surveys
oﬀered the option to give either a value or a range letter answer. Range letters are from a range
card, which allows respondents to choose from a set of dollar ranges, each represented by a letter.
Respondent answering using a range card are assigned a value corresponding to the midpoint of the
range. For example, respondents who indicate that they hold tax-advantaged retirement assets in
the range $100,000 to $250,000 are assigned a value of $175,000.50. For the highest range, which
is open-ended, the assigned value is 1.4 times the lower bound. Therefore, respondents indicating
that they hold More than $1,000,000 in tax-advantaged retirement assets are assigned a value of
$1,400,000.
17Except in the case of primary home value, questions asking about changes since 2008 gave
respondents the option to answer with a percent or a dollar amount. With respect to changes in the
value of their primary homes, respondents were asked by what percent the value of homes in their
neighborhoods had changed.
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if the respondent gave a range for 2007 earnings but gave neither a range nor a value
for 2008 earnings.
Especially for individuals who are far from retirement, future earnings are an im-
portant component of total wealth. To calculate the expected present discounted
value of future household earnings, it is necessary to assume a path for each respon-
dent's future earnings over his or her life. Ideally, I would know how much paid
work each respondent would be doing in each future year, and the earnings he or she
would receive for that work. Furthermore, because the future is uncertain, I would
also need to account for the probabilities that a person would become unemployed
at a particular time, the amount of time that person would take to ﬁnd a new job,
the probability of re-employment after complete retirement, and so on. Given that
this is a study of older adults, and that studies of the time-path of labor earnings
tend to show that earnings peak around 30 years of experience and may begin a slow
decline thereafter, it is a reasonable simpliﬁcation to assume constant real earnings
from 2009 until retirement. That is, I assume that nominal earnings will grow at the
rate of inﬂation, pi. The expected present discounted value of earnings for individual
j is therefore calculated:
EPDV (earnings)j =
R0∑
s=τ
(
(1− UE ratej)× earn
(1 + r)s
)
(2.8)
where R0 is pre-crash planned retirement age; the real interest rate, r, is 0.03;
18 and
s takes on values from the individual's 2009 age to their pre-crash planned retirement
age. In calculations of pre-crash wealth, UE ratej is the unemployment rate in May
2008 in the county of individual j's residence, taken from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) series and matched to the data
18Following Gustman et al. (2010), who use long-term projections from the Social Security Ad-
ministration for future nominal interest and inﬂation rates. In their study, the nominal interest rate,
i, is 5.8 percent; the inﬂation rate, pi, is 2.8 percent.
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by county-level FIPS code.19 In calculations of post-crash wealth, Equation 2.8 uses
county unemployment rates from May 2009.20 The expected present discounted value
of future household earnings is the sum of respondents' expected present discounted
value of earnings and the expected present discounted value of their signiﬁcant others'
earnings, where relevant.
The CogEcon study does not contain information about Social Security wealth, a
major component of older Americans' wealth. I estimate household Social Security
wealth using the estimated present discounted value of Social Security beneﬁts from
the Cross-Wave Prospective Social Security Wealth Measures of Pre-Retirees (Version
4.0) (Kapinos et al., 2011). These wealth measures are based on data provided by
the Social Security Administration through 2004, and incorporate projected future
earnings based on a weighted average of past earnings if the respondent had not
yet reached normal retirement age by 2004. Assuming that respondents will claim
beneﬁts beginning at their normal retirement age, I estimate Social Security wealth
for the CogEcon respondents using measures of individual Social Security wealth
from HRS respondents of similar age in 2004 to the CogEcon respondents in 2009.
Speciﬁcally, I assign CogEcon respondents the mean value of Social Security wealth
from HRS respondents with the same age group by sex by occupation group. For
coupled CogEcon respondents for whom occupational data are available for their
spouses or partners, I estimate spouse or partner Social Security wealth similarly. I
then sum the Social Security wealth estimates for both members of the household
19County-level unemployment statistics are not seasonally-adjusted, so I use May 2008 unemploy-
ment for pre-crash wealth calculations, and May 2009 unemployment data for post-crash calculations
to net out the seasonal component of unemployment.
20One might worry about this simple way of including employment probabilities, since it doesn't
account for the possibility that the labor market will get better, nor does it account for the fact that
individual unemployment is serially correlated. However, robustness checks, in which analyses were
run without using employment probabilities in calculating the expected present discounted value
of earnings, show that the qualitative results are robust to inclusion or exclusion of these rates in
calculating the present discounted value of earnings. On net, I have chosen to present the results that
do use the local unemployment information, since it seems important to account for the uncertainty
of future income ﬂows.
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to obtain household Social Security wealth. In cases where a spouse's or partner's
occupation or age are unknown, I assign the CogEcon respondent the cell mean of
household Social Security wealth from similar HRS respondents.
The CogEcon data also do not include much information about deﬁned beneﬁt
pension wealth. For those who are not yet retired, the data only contain an indicator
variable that is equal to one if either the respondent or the spouse/partner has a
deﬁned beneﬁt pension. Therefore, I estimate deﬁned beneﬁt pension wealth for the
CogEcon respondents based on deﬁned beneﬁt pension wealth information in the HRS
dataset, Imputations for Pension-Related Variables (Final, Version 1.0) (Health and
Retirement Study , 2009). Appendix A.2 details the estimation procedure.
In sum, 2008 wealth for each individual j is measured as
w08j = FW08,j +NE08,j + SS08,j +DB08,j + EPDV earnings08,j
where FW08 is ﬁnancial wealth in 2008, and includes tax-advantaged retirement
accounts, checking, savings, money market accounts, certiﬁcates of deposit, Trea-
sury bills, cash, credit card debt, stocks or stock mutual funds held outside of tax-
advantaged retirement accounts and bonds. NE08 is net equity in real estate, busi-
nesses and farms in 2008, EPDV earnings08,j is the sum of the respondent's and his
or her signiﬁcant other's present discounted values of future earnings from 2009 until
the age of retirement that was expected as of July 2008, SS08 is estimated Social
Security wealth, and DB08 is estimated deﬁned beneﬁt pension wealth. Similarly,
wealth in 2009 is measured as
w09j = FW09,j +NE09,j + SS08,j +DB08,j + EPDV earnings08′,j
where ﬁnancial wealth and net equity in real estate, businesses and farms reﬂect
the post-crash values of these assets. Social Security and deﬁned beneﬁt pension
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wealth are assumed unchanged. The expected present discounted value of earnings
is unchanged except that the county-level unemployment measure reﬂects May 2009
levels.
Measurement error in these wealth calculations, particularly due to imputation of
Social Security and deﬁned beneﬁt wealth, is likely non-trivial in magnitude. However,
some of this error is likely to be of second order importance because my independent
variables of interest are based on changes in wealth, as opposed to levels of wealth.
Speciﬁcally, the components of wealth that are most likely to be error-ridden, Social
Security and deﬁned beneﬁt pensions, are probably quite constant, so error in these
may only slightly aﬀect the independent variable of interest, Rsc −R0. Additionally,
by relying primarily on retrospective accounts of wealth losses from the Post-Crash
survey, I believe that my change measures are subject to less measurement error than
measures based on true panel data.21 The time to planned retirement is also held
constant in calculating the expected present discounted value of earnings measures
for both my pre- and post-crash wealth measures. This is by design, since I later
compare the reported changes in planned retirement age to the amount by which
labor supply would have to increase to allow respondents to continue consuming on
their pre-crash consumption path.
HRS Wealth Where possible, the HRS wealth measures are calculated in the same
way as the CogEcon measures. As in the CogEcon wealth calculations, all wealth
measures are in pre-tax, 2009 dollars and, following Gustman et al. (2010), income
streams are converted to present discounted values using a real interest rate of 3
percent.
In the HRS data, some measures of ﬁnancial wealth, including wealth held in
21Analyses by members of the CogEcon study team have shown that, while the distributions
of wave to wave wealth changes look quite similar to wealth changes based on the retrospective
accounts, the retrospective changes have lower variance and include fewer highly implausible or
nonsensical changes.
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checking, savings and money market accounts, certiﬁcates of deposit, government
savings bonds or Treasury bills, other government bonds, and debts like credit card
balances or other loans (subtracted), are only available in 2008 Core data. Because
these components of wealth were not asked about in the 2009 Internet Survey, I assume
that these are constant from 2008 through 2009. This assumption seems reasonable
because returns to these types of assets are likely to have been quite stable relative
to stock and real estate assets.
The 2009 Internet Survey did gather information about the value of IRAs and
Keogh accounts, 401(k) and other employer-sponsored retirement saving plans, trusts,
other mutual funds, and other stock holdings. This is important, because these types
of assets are likely to include stock holdings, and were therefore subject to signiﬁcant
change between late 2008 and mid-2009.
As in the CogEcon data, I use the 2009 Internet Survey data to impute the levels
of retirement assets, trusts, mutual funds, and other stock assets, as well as primary
home equity that households held as of August 2008. In particular, the Internet
Survey asks for the 2009 levels of these asset holdings and the percent change since
September 2008.22 Using this information, I calculate the September 2008 value of
these assets as:
value08 =
value09
(1 + (percent change/100))
Thus, ﬁnancial wealth in 2008 is calculated as the sum of wealth held in checking,
savings and money market accounts, certiﬁcates of deposit, government savings bonds
or Treasury bills, other government bonds, minus debts like credit card balances or
other loans, plus the calculated 2008 values of IRAs and Keogh accounts, 401(k) and
other employer-sponsored retirement saving plans, trusts, other mutual funds, and
22As in the CogEcon data, respondents who didn't know or didn't want to report an exact value
or percent change, but who did indicate a range, are assigned the midpoint of this range. For open-
ended range responses (for example, More than $1,000,000 ), the bottom of the range is multiplied
by 1.4 to get the imputed value.
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other stock holdings. Financial wealth in 2009 is calculated as the sum of wealth held
in checking, savings and money market accounts, certiﬁcates of deposit, government
savings bonds or Treasury bills, other government bonds, minus debts like credit card
balances or other loans in 2008, plus the reported 2009 values of IRAs and Keogh
accounts, 401(k) and other employer-sponsored retirement saving plans, trusts, other
mutual funds, and other stock holdings.
The 2009 Internet Survey also contain information about the value of respondents'
primary homes, as well as changes in their value. I use this information to construct
the 2008 and 2009 values of primary home using the same method as was used for
ﬁnancial assets. Using mortgage balance information from 2009 and the 2008 Core
interview, I then calculate primary home equity at each time point. A disadvantage
of the 2009 Internet Survey data, relative to the CogEcon data, is that information
about net real estate equity other than the primary home was not asked, and so must
be imputed. For 2008 second home and other real estate holdings, I am able to use
the net values for second homes and other real estate from the 2008 Core interview.
For 2009, I use the maximum of an estimated net value in 2009 and $0 for each,23
where I estimate the value of real estate assets in 2009 using a Census region-speciﬁc
change factor based on Case-Shiller index data and the net equity in these assets in
2008.
To get the Census region-speciﬁc change factor, I sum the housing stock for the
20 Case-Shiller statistical areas (SAs) by Census region (northeast, midwest, south,
and west). Once I have the total housing stock represented by the Case-Shiller index
in each Census region k, I calculate the relative weight of each statistical area l
within its corresponding Census region in terms of housing stock using the equation
weightlk =
housing stock in SAl
housing stock in regionk
. Next, I multiply the summer 2008 to summer 2009
change for each Case-Shiller SA l, %4 housingl, by the corresponding weight, where
23This is reasonable if one assumes that respondents will strategically default on any mortgage if
they want to be rid of the property and they have negative equity.
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the index value for each summer is the average from June, July and August of that
year. Lastly, I sum this weighted percent change in real estate prices across statistical
areas within each region to get the percent change in home values within each region.
That is, the region-speciﬁc change factor is:
%4housingk =
∑
l
(weightlk ×%4housingl)
I calculate the estimated net value in 2009 by multiplying a Census region-speciﬁc
change factor by the total value of the home in 2008, and then subtracting the balance
of any mortgages or loans using the property as collateral. Thus, the 2009 net value
of ﬁrst and second homes for respondent j in Census region k are calculated as:
net home09j = max{0, (gross home08j × (1 + %4housingk))− home debt08j}
For other real estate, I estimate the net value in 2009 by multiplying a Census region-
speciﬁc change factor by the net value of the asset in 2008.24
Pension wealth estimates for deﬁned-beneﬁt and combination plans are the maxi-
mum of estimates from table data from Gustman et al. (2010a) and regression-based
estimates from the Imputations for Pension-Related Variables (Final, Version 1.0) for
individuals who indicated that they expected to receive deﬁned-beneﬁt or combination
plan beneﬁts in the future. The table data from Gustman, Steinmeier and Tabatabai
(2010) are household-level estimates based on all deﬁned beneﬁt and combination
plan pension wealth accumulated through the HRS 2006 Core interview wave. These
pension data incorporate pensions from current jobs for those working at the time of
the 2006 interview, last jobs for those who had changed jobs since their last interview,
24This is likely to overestimate wealth from other real estate in 2009 in cases where a mortgage
balance exists. However, it can be diﬃcult to qualify for mortgages on additional real estate, and
few individuals have such assets, so the impact of this issue is likely small.
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and all previous jobs for which pensions had been reported. The real value of deﬁned
beneﬁt and combination plan pension wealth is assumed to have been constant since
2006.25 Because the table data are missing for many respondents who stated in the
2008 Core interview that they expected to receive deﬁned-beneﬁt or combination plan
beneﬁts, I also create regression-based estimates of 2008 deﬁned-beneﬁt and combi-
nation plan wealth. For individuals with values from both the table data and an
estimate, I use the maximum of the two estimates.
For Social Security wealth, I created regression-based estimates using the present
discounted value of Social Security beneﬁts from the Cross-Wave Prospective Social
Security Wealth Measures of Pre-Retirees (Version 4.0). It was necessary to estimate
Social Security wealth, rather than using the 2004 estimates directly, to account for
growth in earnings and work tenure that accumulated between 2004 and 2008.
Lastly, it is important to consider future labor earnings, or human wealth, as
a component of household wealth. Because I do not currently have access to the
restricted geographic information about HRS respondents, I cannot use county-level
unemployment rates, as I did in the CogEcon section. Instead, the expected present
discounted value of earnings for individual j is calculated:
EPDV (earnings)j =
R0∑
s=τ
(
(1− UE ratej)× earn
(1 + r)s
)
(2.9)
where, again, R0 is expected age of retirement; the real interest rate, r, is 0.03;
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and s takes on values from the individual's age in 2009 through their pre-crash
planned retirement age. In the HRS data, however, UE ratej is the unemploy-
ment rate in May 2008 (for pre-crash EPDV (earnings)) or May 2009 (for post-crash
25As soon as estimates incorporating data from the 2008 Core interview are available, I will
substitute these into my analyses for the 2006 data. Using the 2006 data likely results in a downward
bias of total pension wealth, since growth above the rate of inﬂation is likely to have occurred between
2006 and 2008.
26Following Gustman et al. (2010), who use long-term projections from the Social Security Ad-
ministration for future nominal interest and inﬂation rates. In their study, the nominal interest rate,
i, is 5.8 percent; the inﬂation rate, pi, is 2.8 percent.
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EPDV (earnings)) in the Census division of individual j's residence, from the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics' Current Population Survey. It is also important to note
that the expected age of retirement, R, is not asked directly of all HRS respondents.
To avoid losing a majority of the size of my HRS analysis sample, I impute this age
for respondents who did not answer this question by combining information from
several variables. The imputation of this variable is described in detail in Appendix
A.3. Overall, I impute or have an actual retirement age for 99.5 percent of the 1563
working respondents in the HRS Internet Survey sample who were aged 64 or younger
at the time of the 2008 Core interview, and who completed the 2009 HRS Internet
Survey. The expected present discounted value of future household earnings is the
sum of respondents' expected present discounted value of earnings and the expected
present discounted value of their signiﬁcant others' earnings, where relevant.
In sum, in the HRS sample, total wealth for both 2008 and 2009 are calculated as
the sum of total ﬁnancial wealth, real estate equity, deﬁned beneﬁt pension wealth,
Social Security wealth, and the expected present discounted value of future household
earnings. Both the CogEcon and the HRS wealth measures aggregate holdings in a
nearly-identical set of asset types, although the way particular asset holdings are
calculated does diﬀer slightly.
Sustainable consumption Under certain conditions, introducing an annuity mar-
ket is equivalent to removing uncertainty about life expectancy from the lifetime
resource allocation problem (Yaari, 1965). This observation provides a convenient
framework for quantifying the impact of a wealth shock in the presence of uncertain
life expectancy. Once I have calculated total wealth as described above, I divide
households' total pre- and post-crash wealth measures by an individual-speciﬁc an-
nuity price to get estimates of sustainable consumption available to each household
before and after the crash. Because it seems reasonable to assume that individuals
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plan for the lifetime consumption of their spouses and partners, as well as themselves,
I calculate the price of an annuity that will pay:
• Households with single individuals $1 per year, in 2009 dollars, until death.
• Households with coupled individuals $1 per year in 2009 dollars until the death
of the ﬁrst member of the couple, after which $0.67 per year will be paid until
the death of the remaining member of the couple.27
The equation used to calculate each individual's annuity price, aj is:
aj = (1 + L)
∞∑
s=1
(
P1P2j,s
(1 + r)s
+ 0.67
(P1j,s) (1− P2j,s)
(1 + r)s
+ 0.67
(P2j,s) (1− P1js)
(1 + r)s
)
where the real interest rate is set at 3 percent. The load factor L, set to 18 percent,
was backed out of estimates by Mitchell et al. (1999) for average annuity payouts per
dollar premium. P1j,s is the probability that respondent j will be alive in s years,
P2j,s is the probability that respondent j's spouse or partner will be alive in s years,
and P1P2j,s is the probability that both members of the couple are still alive in s
years. All survival probabilities are age- and sex-speciﬁc, and are derived from the
Social Security Administration's Period Life Tables (Social Security Administration,
2006).
Change in retirement timing needed to make up wealth losses Changes in
pre- and post-crash sustainable consumption can certainly help illustrate the mag-
nitude of the eﬀect of the crash. However, the theoretical considerations discussed
earlier imply that a particularly interesting measure is how much longer individu-
als would have to work in order to attain the sustainable consumption levels they
27Research by Shapiro (2009), using the HRS, has shown that consumption drops by about a
third upon the death of one spouse. At least initially, this does not appear to be due to resource
constraints, but to an actual decline in costs. Hurd and Rohwedder (2010a) have also used this ﬁgure
in estimating lifetime consumption paths.
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could have maintained if the crash had not happened. To calculate this number, I
ﬁrst deﬁne Rsc as the age until which respondents would need to work to attain the
sustainable consumption paths they would have maintained given pre-crash wealth
levels. Rsc solves the equation:
Rsc∑
s=τ
(
(1− UE ratej,09)× earn
(1 + r)s
)
=
R0∑
s=τ
(
(1− UE ratej,08)× earn
(1 + r)s
)
−(w09−w08)
where τ is the respondent's age in 2009, r = 0.03 is the real interest rate, UE ratej,08
and UE ratej,09 are individual j's county-speciﬁc (in CogEcon) or Census-division
speciﬁc (in HRS) unemployment rates in May 2008 and May 2009, respectively, and
(w09−w08) is the change in total wealth from July 2008 until May 2009, respectively.
Essentially, this equation says that the present discounted value of earnings from
working to Rsc must equal the present discounted value of earnings from working to
R0, plus the amount of wealth lost during the crash. Then, the extra number of years
an individual needs to work to attain her pre-crash sustainable consumption level,
denoted Rsc − R0, is simply the diﬀerence between Rsc and the originally-planned
retirement age, R0.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Descriptive analysis
To provide a sense of the material impact of the shock on sustainable consump-
tion levels, Table 2.2 displays the unweighted mean, 25th percentile, median, and
75th percentile of sustainable consumption for my CogEcon sample and the two HRS
samples.28 The medians look reasonable in magnitude, given that median household
28The mean estimated sustainable consumption levels from CogEcon are higher than those esti-
mated using the HRS data. This is partly due to the fact that the retirement ages I imputed for
use in calculating the present discounted value of earnings in the HRS are, on average, almost three
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income in the United States in 2009 was around $52,000 in 2009 (U.S. Census Bu-
reau). It can be seen that the post-crash distribution of sustainable consumption is
generally lower than the pre-crash distribution, indicating a reduced sustainable stan-
dard of living, holding labor supply constant. The post-crash inter-quartile ranges
have dropped by ten percent in the HRS data and eighteen percent in the CogEcon
data, implying some reduction in inequality.
Table 2.3 illustrates that median losses in sustainable consumption are quite com-
parable between samples, at just under ﬁve percent for all three. The mean loss
observed in the CogEcon sample is 8.7 percent, whereas the HRS samples show mean
losses of about 6.7 percent.29 These losses are not staggering, in that most people
experiencing such losses are not in danger of falling into poverty as a result. However,
a sustained reduction of just ﬁve percent in material quality of life for more than
half of the individuals is not trivial, and a quarter of individuals in each sample would
be facing losses of more than 11 percent of their consumption for the rest of their
lives, all else equal.
Rather than passively accept a reduction in standard of living for the rest of one's
life, some people may prefer to delay retirement. Indeed, out of the CogEcon sample,
128 respondents, or 40 percent of the sample, reported that their planned retirement
age had increased by at least one year, while only ﬁve respondents (1.6 percent) re-
ported a decrease in planned retirement age. Figure 2.7 displays the reported changes
in retirement age since July 2008. The mean change reported by all respondents in
years lower than those reported by the CogEcon respondents. The present discounted value of earn-
ings calculated in the HRS are probably much too low for individuals planning to work much past
66, since the largest imputed HRS retirement age was 70. By contrast, the largest age reported by
HRS respondents who did give retirement age was age 80, and 2.5 percent of CogEcon respondents
reported expected retirement ages of 90 or older before the crash.
29This is partly due to changes in home value. The CogEcon respondents reported mean losses
in the net value of their primary homes of 9.2 percent, around double the mean losses of just 4.4
percent reported in the HRS sample. Additionally, the CogEcon data contain respondent reports of
losses in second home and other real estate wealth that were, at 17 percent of gross value, slightly
higher than the HRS real estate loss estimates based on the Case-Shiller index, which averaged 13.3
percent over the nation as a whole.
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this sample was 1.6 years, with median of 0 years and a change of 3 years at the
75th percentile. In Figure 2.8, I have plotted the cumulative distribution of expected
retirement status over time for the CogEcon sample, with age on the horizontal axis.
Of note here is that the entire distribution of expected retirement ages has shifted to
the right. Whereas half of respondents expected to retire by age 65 as of 2008, the
age at which half of respondents expected to retire was 66 in 2009.
The 2009 HRS Internet Survey data do not contain expected retirement age, but
ask for the subjective probability of full-time work after age 62 and 65. Table 2.5
shows that the mean subjective probability of full-time work after age 62 reported
by the HRS respondents increased by 8.7 percentage points over the two years from
2006 to 2008, but just 3.5 percentage points over the one year between the 2008 Core
interview and the 2009 Internet survey. The median changes in subjective probability
of full-time work after age 62 (4Pr(FT62)) over both periods were zero. At the 75th
percentile, however, the changes in 4Pr(FT62) were 20 percentage points between
2006 and 2008 (2 years), and 19.5 percentage points between the 2008 Core interview
and the 2009 Internet survey (just 1 year). While the lower end and middle of the
distribution of 4Pr(FT62) appear to have followed a similar trend before and after
the crash, the upper end of the distribution indicates that expectations of later work
may have increased more rapidly after the crash.
Similar examination of changes in the probability of full-time work after age 65
show an even stronger trend toward delay of retirement. The mean change in the
subjective probability of full-time work after age 65 was 8.1 percentage points from
2008 to 2009, compared with just 6.5 percentage points from 2006 to 2008. The
median increase was 2 percentage points between 2008 and 2009, compared with a
zero percentage point change from 2006 to 2008. At the 75th percentile, as well, the
change between 2008 and 2009 (25 percentage points) greatly outpaced that between
2006 and 2008 (20 percentage points).
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Next, I examine how the reported changes in retirement age in each sample
(4retirement timing) compare with the extra years respondents would need to work
to attain their pre-crash sustainable consumption paths (Rsc−R0). Table 2.4 presents
summary statistics for Rsc − R0. For each sample, the ﬁrst column gives the statis-
tics for all members of the sample, while the second column is restricted to those
members reporting a non-zero increase in retirement age (CogEcon) or probability
of full-time work (HRS). In the CogEcon sample, the mean of Rsc − R0 is 3.7 years
overall, and 4.1 years for those who reported an increase in their expected age of
retirement. The distributions are both skewed, such that 25th percentile is 0.5 years
for the full sample and 0.9 years for those reporting a change, the median is 1.6 years
for the full sample and 1.7 years for those reporting a change, and the 75th percentile
is 4.1 years for the full sample and 3.9 years for those reporting a change. Similarly,
the means of Rsc − R0 in the HRS samples are 4.9 and 5 years for the full age 62
and age 65 samples, respectively. The 25th percentiles of both full HRS samples are
0.65 years, the medians are 1.9 years, and the 75th percentiles of the distributions
of Rsc are both approximately 4.9 years, as well. Additionally, comparisons between
the ﬁrst and second columns for each of the HRS samples show that respondents who
adjusted their retirement plans tend to be those who would need to work longer to
make up their losses. Despite the diﬀerences in wealth measures between the CogEcon
and HRS, samples, the means and medians are relatively similar across the studies.
Overall, this table shows that the wealth losses from the crash, if permanent, would
require quite large adjustments of retirement timing to fully make up. Furthermore,
respondents who indicate an increase in expected retirement age or in the subjective
probability of full-time work into their 60s tend to be those with larger wealth losses
(as measured by Rsc −R0 ).
Figure 2.9 displays a histogram of Rsc from the CogEcon data, rounded to the
closest integer, and R09, reported post-crash planned retirement ages. In this ﬁgure,
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R09 and Rsc have been top-coded at age 90. Ignoring the spikes due to top-coding,
the modes of both distributions are at age 65, with spikes at ages 62 and 66 and some
evidence of focal answers at 60, 65, 70, 75, 80, and 85. There is a signiﬁcant spike
at 90. This is induced by top-coding, but is more signiﬁcant for Rsc than R09. The
implication of this spike is that a non-trivial percentage of respondents would have
to work beyond age 90 to fully recoup losses sustained between 2008 and 2009.
Figure 2.10 uses CogEcon data to compare Rsc − R0, the extra number of years
of work needed to maintain pre-crisis standards of living, and R09−R0, the reported
change in planned retirement ages. The distributions look relatively similar. However,
the distribution of reported changes in retirement age is compressed toward zero,
relative to Rsc − R0. The compressed distribution provides suggestive evidence that
the cost of adjusting retirement age may grow with the size of adjustment. This
could be true, for example, if the marginal disutility of work increases non-linearly
with age, making increasing one's retirement age beyond 65 or 70 less attractive than
accepting a somewhat lower material standard of living. Alternatively, the compressed
distribution is also consistent with the possibility that particularly large values of
Rsc −R0 are more likely to be the result of measurement error, and therefore do not
result in large observed changes in reported retirement age. The incidence of reported
changes of one year are much lower than might be expected, given the relatively large
number of observations for which Rsc − R0 is equal to one. The gap at one year
suggests that a ﬁxed cost of adjusting retirement age may exist, as was suggested in
Section 2.4.
In this section, I have established that the impacts of the asset losses between 2008
and 2009 are non-trivial. I have also shown evidence that retirement expectations in
my sample have shifted toward later retirement. Next, I turn to regression analysis
to examine the relationship between these phenomena.
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2.6.2 Regression analysis
As discussed in Section 2.3, the life-cycle model featuring choice of retirement
timing and consumption implies that asset shocks will aﬀect the chosen retirement
age, level of sustainable consumption, or both. Moreover, if retirement leisure is
a normal good, the model implies that individuals will adjust to asset shocks, at
least somewhat, along the retirement age margin. Using the empirical framework
presented in Section 2.4, I test this implication by regressing the observed change in
retirement timing (4retirement timing) on the change in retirement age that would
be necessary to restore the pre-crash sustainable consumption level (Rsc−R0). Based
on my discussion in Section 2.4 about the possibility that both measurement error
and non-linearities in the underlying optimization problem may aﬀect the regression
estimates, I also include the square of (Rsc − R0) in some regressions to relax the
restriction that large values of Rsc − R0 have the same estimated marginal eﬀect as
more moderate values.
In the discussion of the empirical framework (Section 2.4), I have pointed out that
there may be ﬁxed costs associated with changing retirement plans, and that non-
linearities in the underlying optimization problem may result in heaping at the zero
adjustment margin. Consistent with this observation, I have shown in Section 2.6.1
that there are large numbers of respondents in both samples for whom no change in
the retirement timing variable is observed. In the case of a mass at zero adjustment,
estimates from corner solution models are more likely to be consistent than ordinary
least squares estimates. The Tobit model is more restrictive than many other econo-
metric models for corner solutions, but provides eﬃciency gains over multi-equation
models. Because speciﬁcation tests discussed in Section 2.6.2.4 do not provide signif-
icant cause for concern about the Tobit speciﬁcation, most analyses presented in this
paper use the Tobit speciﬁcation.
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2.6.2.1 CogEcon base regressions
Table 2.6 presents the main regression results from the CogEcon sample, in which
the dependent variable is the reported change in expected retirement age, R09 − R0.
In these regressions the independent variable of interest is the change in retirement
age that would be needed to make up wealth losses, Rsc − R0. The ﬁrst column
of Table 2.6 presents the results from an ordinary least squares regression using the
CogEcon data.30 As predicted by theory, the coeﬃcient on Rsc −R0 is positive. The
coeﬃcient of 0.058 (s.e. 0.042) implies that, for each year individuals would have to
work to make up wealth losses, on average they only increase expected retirement
age by 0.058 years, or about three weeks. For individuals with an average value of
Rsc −R0 (3.7 years), this translates to a predicted change in retirement age of about
two and a half months. However, as is the case with many studies of the impact of
wealth changes on retirement timing (McGarry , 2004; Chan and Stevens , 2004; Hurd
et al., 2009), the eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In Column
2, I include the variable (Rsc −R0)2, to allow for possible non-linear eﬀects of the
independent variable. Here, the coeﬃcient on the linear term is virtually unchanged
(0.057, s.e. 0.038), and the coeﬃcient on the squared term is virtually zero (0.0003,
s.e. 0.0009) and imprecisely estimated, but the F-test does suggest that this model
improves the ﬁt. Taking into account both the linear and squared terms, the marginal
eﬀect of Rsc−R0 on the predicted change in retirement age is 0.059 years (s.e. 0.044),
virtually unchanged from the linear model.
Use of the Tobit model, rather than ordinary least squares, may allow for con-
sistent estimation in the presence of a spike at zero. Columns 3 and 4 present the
results from Tobit regressions with censoring at zero.31 In Column 3, where Rsc−R0
30As in all regressions using the CogEcon sample, I use CogUSA sampling weights and report
robust standard errors.
31Setting the censoring point at one results in qualitatively similar estimates, but reduces the
uncensored sample size. Thus, I present all results with the censoring point at zero.
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enters the regression only linearly, the coeﬃcient on Rsc−R0 is 0.109 and statistically
insigniﬁcant. The average marginal eﬀect of Rsc −R0 on retirement timing for those
who reported a change,
∂E(4retirement timing|Rsc −R0,4retirement timing > 0)
∂(Rsc −R0)
is 0.042 (s.e. 0.036), slightly smaller than that implied by the OLS regression. It
implies a retirement age eﬀect of just under two months for a respondent with the
average value of Rsc −R0.
In Column 4, results are shown from a Tobit regression including (Rsc −R0)2.
While we might expect the coeﬃcient on this squared term to be positive as a result
of picking up a threshold eﬀect, the Tobit regression speciﬁcation explicitly models
the threshold. It seems that the addition of this squared term serves, instead, to
minimize the eﬀect of very largeand possibly error-riddenvalues of Rsc − R0 on
the main estimated eﬀect of Rsc−R0. Indeed, the coeﬃcient on Rsc−R0 is 0.311 years
(0.163), much larger than in ﬁrst three speciﬁcations, and statistically signiﬁcant at
the 5 percent level. The coeﬃcient on the squared term is -0.010 years (0.008), which
is not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, but appears to have improved
the ﬁt, nonetheless. Accounting for both the linear and squared terms, the average
marginal eﬀect of Rsc−R0 is 0.086 years (s.e. 0.043), indicating an adjustment of just
over one month for each additional year or work needed to make up wealth losses.
Given that the average of Rsc − R0 is 3.7 years, this works out to just under 3.9
months of additional work for an individual with the average increase in work years
needed to attain pre-crash sustainable consumption levels.
Results from the speciﬁcation used in Column 4 are also presented in graphical
form in Figures 2.11 and 2.12. In Figure 2.11, the predicted the probability of an
increase in retirement age (based on the Tobit regression) and the proportion of
respondents actually reporting an increase in expected retirement age are plotted over
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bins corresponding to ranges of the continuous variable, Rsc−R0. The predicted and
actual probabilities of adjustment are of comparable magnitudes, and the patterns
are reasonably similar. In Figure 2.12, the predicted increase in retirement age (based
on the Tobit regression) and the average reported increase in expected retirement age
are plotted over the bins. Here, it can be seen that the Tobit regression under-predicts
the size of the reported changes. This is consistent with the results we would expect
if attenuation bias due to measurement error in Rsc −R0 is a signiﬁcant problem.
2.6.2.2 HRS base regressions
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 present the results from Tobit regressions like those in Columns
3 and 4 of Table 2.6, but using the HRS sample. To reduce the number of regressions
presented, I restrict results presented in the rest of this paper to Tobit speciﬁcations.
These are more likely to provide consistent estimates, given the spike of observations
at zero, compared to linear regression speciﬁcations. In general, the implied eﬀects
from the OLS regressions on the HRS sample are very imprecisely measured and have
smaller or comparable magnitudes to those estimated using the Tobit speciﬁcations.
In Table 2.7, the dependent variable is 08409Pr(FT62), while in Table 8 the
dependent variable is 08409Pr(FT65). The coeﬃcient sizes and marginal eﬀects
are not directly comparable to the CogEcon results. To provide a crude basis for
comparison of the magnitudes of the CogEcon and HRS results, I have used 2006
and 2008 Core data to estimate the average eﬀect of a percentage point increase
in the probability of full-time work on the change in age at which HRS respondents
planned to stop work completely.32 A one percentage point increase in the probability
of full-time work after reaching age 62 is associated with about a one week increase
in the planned age of retirement. Similarly, a one percentage point increase in the
probability of full-time work after reaching age 65 is associated with an increase of
32See Appendix A.4 for the results from these regressions.
45
about six days in the planned age of retirement.
The ﬁrst column of Table 2.7 presents the results from a Tobit regression of
08409Pr(FT62) on Rsc − R0. The coeﬃcient on Rsc − R0 is 0.193 (s.e. 0.267). This
translates to an average marginal eﬀect of 0.079 (s.e. 0.109), meaning that a one year
increase in the number of years an individual would need to work to make up losses is
associated with less than a 0.1 percentage point increase in the probability of full-time
work after age 62. At the mean of Rsc − R0 (4.9 years) the implied eﬀect of wealth
losses on retirement age is about three days. In addition to being very small, this
estimate is very imprecisely estimated. Column 2 shows that including the squared
term of Rsc − R0 in the regression increases the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on the
linear wealth loss measure (Rsc−R0). The average marginal eﬀect of Rsc−R0 is now
0.245 (s.e. 0.224). This is still very small and statistically insigniﬁcant, however; it
implies that a wealth loss that would take an extra year of work to make up is only
associated with a quarter of a percentage point increase in the probability of full-time
work after age 62. At the mean of Rsc − R0, the implied eﬀect is a retirement delay
of just ten days in response to a wealth loss that would take 4.9 years to make up.
Results from the speciﬁcation used in Column 2 are also presented in graphical
form in Figures 2.13 and 2.14. Figure 2.13 illustrates the predicted and observed
adjustments along the extensive margin. The predicted and actual probabilities of
adjustment are of comparable magnitudes, and the patterns are reasonably similar.
Figure 2.14 illustrates the predicted and observed adjustments along the intensive
margin. Here, it can be seen that the shape of the line representing the reported
increases is diﬀerent from the line representing predicted increases, implying that the
model may not ﬁt the data particularly well in this case. Additionally, the under-
prediction of adjustments by the Tobit may be indicative that measurement error is
causing signiﬁcant attenuation bias.
Due to the fact that most respondents' retirement ages are imputed, measurement
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error in Rsc−R0 may be an even larger concern in the HRS data than in the CogEcon
data. Speciﬁcally, if retirement age is imprecisely measured, then both the earnings
component of wealth and R0 contain a lower signal-to-error ratio in the HRS for
individuals with imputed values of R0, resulting in less-precise calculated values of
Rsc − R0. It is not clear whether these values are biased, or only subject to random
error. If, however, the error is classical, regression coeﬃcients may be attenuated.
In an attempt to reduce measurement error due to imputation of R0, Column 3
presents the results from conducting the same regression on the subset of the HRS
respondents who did report an expected retirement age in the 2008 Core interview.
Using this restricted sample, the coeﬃcient on Rsc − R0 is 0.49 (s.e. 0.765), and
the average marginal eﬀect is 0.191 (s.e. 0.295). The implied eﬀect at the average
wealth loss is about a week. Column 4 displays coeﬃcients from the regression on
the resticted sample including the squared term of Rsc −R0. The coeﬃcients in this
regression have larger magnitudes than those estimated using the full sample, and are
they are similar in sign and relative magnitude to the CogEcon results, but they are
still very imprecisely estimated. The marginal eﬀect of Rsc−R0 in Column 4 is 0.426
percentage points (s.e. 1.094), implying that at the average wealth loss (in terms of
Rsc−R0) of 4.9 years, the average retirement in retirement age is only about eighteen
days.
In Columns 3 and 4, the estimated marginal eﬀects are larger than the results
from the full sample. This is suggestive that measurement error may be causing
attenuation bias in the full sample regressions. However, it could also be the case, for
example, that respondents who have better-deﬁned retirement plans (and therefore
provided a retirement age) are more reactive to wealth losses. Whether or not classical
measurement error is reduced in this sub-sample, these results continue to imply
much smaller eﬀects than the CogEcon estimates, and the estimated eﬀects are not
statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
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In Table 2.8, in which 08409Pr(FT65) is the dependent variable, the estimates tell
a slightly diﬀerent story. Column 1 reports results from the regression of 08409Pr(FT65)
on the linear measure of the extra number of years an individual would need to work
to make up losses (Rsc−R0), for the full sample. The size of marginal eﬀect, at 0.137
(s.e. 0.121), is almost double that from Column 1 of Table 2.7, but still implies that
the average Rsc − R0 of 5 years is associated with a very small average increase in
retirement age (about ﬁve days). Column 2, in which the square of Rsc − R0 is an
additional regressor, shows that the coeﬃcients on Rsc − R0 and (Rsc −R0)2 have
larger magnitudes than in the other HRS regressions and are statistically signiﬁcant
at the one percent level. The average marginal eﬀect of Rsc−R0 is 0.736 (s.e. 0.235),
or almost three-quarters of a percentage point increase in the probability of full-time
work after age 65 for each extra year of work needed to make up wealth losses. Using
the crude comparison of 6.7 days delay in retirement per percentage point increase in
08409Pr(FT65), the implied average eﬀect at the mean value of Rsc − R0 (5 years)
on retirement age is about three and a half weeks.
Results from the speciﬁcation used in Column 2 are also presented in graphical
form in Figures 2.15 and 2.16. Figure 2.15 illustrates the predicted and observed
adjustments along the extensive margin. The predicted and actual probabilities of
adjustment are of comparable magnitudes, and the patterns are quite similar. Figure
2.16 illustrates the predicted and observed adjustments along the intensive margin.
Again, consistent with the attenuation bias discussion with respect to Figures 2.12 and
2.14, it can be seen that the Tobit regression under-predicts the size of the reported
changes.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.8 repeat the analyses from Columns 1 and 2, but
restrict the sample to respondents who reported an expected retirement age in the
2008 Core interview. In Column 3, the sign on the coeﬃcient on Rsc−R0 is negative.
This is contrary to theoretical predictions, but relatively small and not statistically
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signiﬁcant. In Column 4, the results are very similar to those in Column 2, but are
less statistically signiﬁcant. The average marginal eﬀect of Rsc − R0 is 0.661 (s.e.
0.456), or about two-thirds of a percentage point increase in the probability of full-
time work after age 65 for each extra year of work that would be needed to make up
wealth losses. At the mean of Rsc − R0, this implies an increase of retirement age of
just over three weeks.
These analyses, like those using the CogEcon data, provide some evidence that
wealth losses are associated with delay of retirement. A one or two percentage point
increase in the subjective probability of full-time work at age 62 or 65 may not seem
particularly signiﬁcant in the economic sense, but given that Hurd (2009) has found
that average subjective probabilities reported by HRS respondents are close to the
population average outcomes, the eﬀect of the wealth losses may have meaningful
eﬀects on labor supply in the aggregate. Additionally, to the extent that measurement
error in the HRS data is causing attenuation bias in the analyses, the aggregate labor
supply eﬀects of wealth losses may be much larger.
2.6.2.3 Comparison of CogEcon and HRS ﬁndings
Table 2.9 provides a summary of the regression results from the CogEcon sample
and the two HRS samples. My preferred speciﬁcations, Tobit regressions including
the number of additional years it would be necessary to work to maintain pre-crash
sustainable consumption levels and the square of that number show that changes in
planned retirement age are, indeed, positively associated with the impact of wealth
losses. In particular, the fourth row of Table 2.9 summarizes the results from my
preferred speciﬁcation for the CogEcon sample, and shows that the average marginal
eﬀect translates to an average increase of about four months for individuals who
suﬀered the mean wealth loss, in terms of years of work needed to make up losses
suﬀered in 2008 and 2009. In the HRS data, the marginal eﬀects of average wealth
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losses appear to explain 1 to 2 percentage points of the increase in the probabilities
of full-time work after age 62, and 3 to 4 percentage points of the increase in the
probabilities of full-time work after age 65, at least for those respondents who gave
non-zero changes in retirement timing. In contrast to the results from the CogEcon
regression results, HRS regression results summarized in rows 6, 8, 10 and 12 seem to
imply smaller planned delays of retirement, possibly on the order of 1.5 to 3.5 weeks.
However, these estimates may be attenuated due to measurement error.
Figures 2.17 through 2.22 allow for a visual comparison of the results from the
diﬀerent datasets. Figures 2.17 and 2.18 present the results from the preferred Co-
gEcon speciﬁcation presented in Column 4 of Table 2.6, a Tobit regression including
Rsc − R0 and (Rsc −R0)2. The ﬁrst of these presents a plot of the average marginal
eﬀect of Rsc −R0 within each sub-group of Rsc −R0.
These show that the marginal eﬀect of needing to work an extra year to makeup
losses is relatively ﬂat for low and moderate levels of wealth losses and appears to
decline for the largest losses, relative to the years of work needed to make up losses.
While inclusion of (Rsc −R0)2 in regressions might typically be expected to create
an inverse U-shaped plot of the marginal eﬀects of wealth losses on retirement age,
only very large values of wealth change exhibit the expected pattern. An interesting
interpretation of this pattern is that the turned-down shape exhibited by this graph
may be an illustration of the attenuating impact of measurement error in particularly
large values of this calculated variable. When the quadratic term is included in the
regressions, the largest values of Rsc −R0 receive less weight in the estimation of the
coeﬃcient on the linear measure of wealth loss, thereby reducing attenuation bias in
the estimate of the coeﬃcient on the linear measure of Rsc −R0.
Figure 2.18 plots predicted changes in retirement age over diﬀerent levels of
Rsc − R0. These changes display roughly the expected pattern: smaller increases
for individuals with no or low losses in wealth, somewhat larger increases in retire-
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ment age for those who are more aﬀected by the crash, and then a slight dip in the
predicted eﬀect on those with the largest values of Rsc−R0. Figures 2.19 and 2.20 are
parallel graphs for the preferred full-sample HRS regressions using 08409Pr(FT62)
as the dependent variable, and Figures 2.21 and 2.22 present results from the pre-
ferred full-sample regression using 08409Pr(FT65) as the dependent variable. The
marginal eﬀects graphs are all very similar in shape, as are the predicted outcome
graphs. Overall, the CogEcon and HRS samples appear to tell very similar stories.
However, the predicted outcome graphs also show that wealth losses (in the form of
Rsc −R0) may not be whole story.
2.6.2.4 Comparison of Tobit with Cragg's two-tiered model
The Tobit model is quite restrictive. A single underlying mechanism determines
both the marginal eﬀects of variables at the observed outcome and whether the ob-
served outcome is at a corner solution. Two-tiered models relax this restriction by
allowing diﬀerent equations for the intensive and extensive margins. Cragg (1971)
suggests a two-tiered model consisting of a probit and a truncated normal regression.
While the Tobit model oﬀers greater eﬃciency than a two-tiered modelan important
consideration, given the small sample sizes used in this studyit is not consistent
if misspeciﬁed. Below, I present comparisons between the Tobit, probit and Cragg's
alternative, as well as results from two separate speciﬁcation tests, to aﬃrm my use
of the Tobit model in this paper.
Table 2.10 presents the estimates from Tobit, probit and truncated normal regres-
sions on the CogEcon sample. These estimates allow comparisons between the Tobit
and probit models, and between the Tobit and Cragg models. In both the Tobit
and truncated normal regressions, the dependent variable is censored at zero. For
the probit, the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if planned
retirement age increased, and zero otherwise.
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As with the Tobit, the coeﬃcients on Rsc−R0 are positive in both the probit and
truncated normal regressions, and the coeﬃcients on (Rsc −R0)2 are negative. A sim-
ple test for whether the Tobit may be misspeciﬁed is to compare the Tobit estimates,
normalized by the estimated standard error of the regression, to the probit estimates.
If they are of diﬀerent signs or of very diﬀerent magnitudes, this may suggest that
the Tobit may be inappropriate (Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 533-534). Comparing the
estimated Tobit and probit coeﬃcients, it can be seen that the estimate βTobit
σTobit
for
Rsc−R0, 0.0498 is very similar to the estimate of βprobit, 0.0473. For (Rsc −R0)2, the
comparable estimates are -0.0016 for the Tobit to -0.0021 for the probit.
Table 2.11 presents the results from similar regressions on the HRS samples. In
the 08409Pr(FT62) estimates (Columns 1-3), although none of the coeﬃcients are
distinguishable from zero at standard levels of signiﬁcance, the normalized Tobit
estimates again appear to be somewhat similar to the probit estimates. The estimate
βTobit
σTobit
for Rsc−R0, 0.0222 is similar to the estimate of βprobit, 0.0374. For (Rsc −R0)2,
the comparable estimates are -0.0006 for the Tobit to -0.0014 for the probit. In the
08409Pr(FT65) regressions (Columns 4-6), the coeﬃcient estimates for Rsc−R0 and
(Rsc −R0)2 are statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 1 percent signiﬁcance level,
and of the same signs in both the Tobit and probit speciﬁcations. In the truncated
normal regression, the estimates are also reasonably similar to the Tobit estimates,
but not statistically signiﬁcant. As with the CogEcon results, the normalized Tobit
estimates again appear to be very similar to the probit estimates. The estimate βTobit
σTobit
for Rsc − R0, 0.064, is very similar to the estimate of βprobit, 0.065. For (Rsc −R0)2,
the comparable estimates are -0.0021 for the Tobit to -0.0023 for the probit.
The Cragg model nests the Tobit in the special case that βtruncated
σtruncated
= γprobit. Us-
ing the log-likelihoods from maximium likelihood estimation of the Tobit and Cragg
models, a likelihood-ratio test can be used to test the null hypothesis that the Tobit
is nested in the Cragg model against the alternative that it is not. Rejection of the
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null hypothesis would suggest that the Tobit model is misspeciﬁed. For my preferred
Tobit speciﬁcations, in which I regress retirement timing on Rsc−R0 and (Rsc −R0)2,
this likelihood-ratio test is calculated −2(lnLTobit− (lnLprobit+ lnLtruncated)), and has
a χ2(4) distribution. Because LR statistics based on weighted samples are generally
not valid,33 I conduct LR tests for my preferred speciﬁcations and their Cragg model
alternatives using results from regressions conducted without weights. The full results
from these regressions can be seen in Appendix A.5.
For the CogEcon sample, the χ2(4) test statistic of 1.78 implies a p-value of
0.78, failing to reject the null hypothesis. Similarly, for the HRS analysis with
08409Pr(FT65) as the dependent variable, the χ2(4) test statistic of 5.77 (p-value
0.22) also fails to reject the null. In the case of the speciﬁcation with the weakest
results, the HRS analysis with 08409Pr(FT62) as the dependent variable, the χ2(4)
test statistic is 9.89 (p-value 0.04), rejecting the null hypothesis at the 5 percent sig-
niﬁcance level. Despite the rejection of the null in the last of these tests, I continue
to present Tobit results for the 08409Pr(FT62) analyses to maintain comparability
with other results in this paper.
Together, the proportionality results and likelihood-ratio tests do not raise sig-
niﬁcant concern that the Tobit model is misspeciﬁed. Furthermore, the imprecisely-
estimated truncated normal regression results underscore the importance of the eﬃ-
ciency gain from the Tobit in yielding precise estimates for the small samples used in
this study.
2.6.2.5 Robustness of estimates to alternate measures of total wealth
The approach used in wealth calculation to this point implicitly assumes that
individuals optimize retirement and consumption plans subject to the constraint that
they decumulate household assets down to zero by the time of death. However, Hurd
33See Wooldridge (2002) page 539.
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and Smith (2002) estimated that the median HRS respondent of a decade ago would
leave between $50,000 and $100,000 in the form of bequests. Not surprisingly, their
estimates of mean expected bequests were even higher, ranging from $165,000 for
individuals born before 1924 to more than $250,000 for those born between 1942 and
1947. Furthermore, research by Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) has shown that a vast
majority of HRS homeowners do not think it likely that they will sell their homes to
ﬁnance retirement, implying that respondents expect to retain a signiﬁcant amount
of primary home equity.
In Tables 2.12 and 2.13, I present the results from robustness checks, in which my
preferred baseline regressions34 are run using Rsc − R0 that have been calculated
with alternate measures of total wealth. In Table 2.12, I present results based on
exclusion of primary home equity.
In Table 2.13, I have excluded estimated expected bequests.35 While neither
the CogEcon study nor the HRS gather expected bequests directly, the HRS Core
interviews ask probabilistic expectations questions about the probability of leaving
at least $10,000 (Pr(B ≥ $10k)) and at least $100,000 (Pr(B ≥ $100k)). The
2009 Internet Survey also asked about the probability of leaving at least $500,000
(Pr(B ≥ $500k)). I generated point estimates of expected bequests in 2008, and
subtracted this amount from both the 2008 and 2009 wealth ﬁgures before calculating
Rsc −R0.
The general story told by my baseline results is unchanged under these alternate
speciﬁcations.
34Tobit regressions of change in retirement timing on Rsc − R0 and (Rsc −R0)2. For the HRS
analyses, I use the full samples.
35The generation of point estimates for expected bequests is described in detail in Appendix A.6.
54
2.6.2.6 Heterogeneity
I next explore heterogeneity in individuals' responses to wealth losses, and to the
crash in general. In this section, I explore several possible ways in which individuals'
reactions to a similar wealth loss may diﬀer. First, rates of time preference and risk
aversion may have aﬀected the magnitudes of wealth levels, but are also likely to
be associated with the reactions to wealth losses. Thus, it is interesting to explore
the relationship between wealth levels and reactions to wealth losses. Second, diﬀer-
ent retirement horizons carry diﬀerent implications for the costs of changing (or not
changing) retirement plans. Speciﬁcally, those closest to retirement have less time
over which to smooth consumption, and may be more likely to delay retirement due
to the crash. Third, optimal reactions to comparable losses of wealth may diﬀer by
individual according to expectations about the economic recovery. Those who think
that the economy will be slow to recover may be more reactive to wealth losses.
Fourth, the eﬀort needed to re-optimize one's retirement and consumption path may
aﬀect both the decision to change retirement age and the precision with which one
calculates a new optimal retirement age. I use measures of ﬁnancial knowledge and
cognitive ability from the CogEcon and CogUSA studies to examine whether these
factors are related to changes in retirement plans. Fifth, if individuals' pre-crash plans
did not involve fully decumulating their assets (that is, if they were planning to leave
a bequest), they may have had an additional margin over which to adjust to their
wealth losses. Using information about expected bequest plans in the HRS, I examine
the relationship between expected bequests, wealth losses and retirement plans. The
ﬁndings in this section are suggestive that individuals' preferences, expectations and
abilities are important factors to consider when examining the relationship between
wealth losses and retirement plans.
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Wealth levels and changes in planned retirement In an examination of the
role of uncertainty in wealth accumulation in the HRS, Lusardi (1998) has found
empirical support for some of the predictions of a life-cycle model with uncertainty.
In particular, she has found that households that are more risk-averse or have longer
planning horizons (implying lower discount rates) tend to accumulate more wealth. I
expect that levels of wealth and, therefore, the incidence of wealth losses in 2008 and
2009, are correlated with a tendency to make up more of a wealth loss with longer
work, as opposed to lower consumption. At the same time, households with the
highest wealth may be less reactive to losses than those farther down the distribution,
because the marginal value of consumption is likely to be lower for these individuals.
Thus, I expect the marginal eﬀect of my measure of wealth losses on retirement age
to be most pronounced for individuals near the middle of the wealth distribution.
Table 2.14 presents the results from Tobit regressions including pre-crash wealth
terciles. In column 1 are the results from including diﬀerent intercepts for each wealth
tercile in the regression of R09−R0 on Rsc−R0 and (Rsc −R0)2. The coeﬃcients on
the wealth tercile measures are statistically signiﬁcant and of the expected signs. The
large, negative coeﬃcient on the third (highest) wealth tercile implies that wealthier
individuals are less likely to change their retirement plans, compared to households
with less wealth. The marginal eﬀect of Rsc − R0, an extra year of work needed to
attain the pre-crash consumption level, also reﬂects this pattern: at 0.169 (s.e. 0.066)
and 0.181 (s.e. 0.062), the average marginal eﬀects for households in the lowest two
wealth terciles are quite comparable to one another, and much larger than the average
marginal eﬀect among the wealthiest households (0.058, s.e. 0.023). The marginal
eﬀects are equivalent to between 2 and 9 months of adjustment in retirement age for
each year one would have to work to attain one's pre-crash sustainable consumption
level. Additionally, these are all statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5
percent level or the 1 percent level, as well as diﬀerent from across terciles (χ2(2) =
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6.29, p-value=0.04).
In column 2, I also interact the pre-crisis wealth terciles with the Rsc−R0 terms.
Now the coeﬃcients are much more imprecisely estimated, and the coeﬃcients on the
Rsc−R0 variables are virtually zero. However, the average marginal eﬀects are similar
in magnitude to those in column 1 and are, again, statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from one another across terciles (χ2(2) = 5.31, p-value=0.07). For the lowest two
wealth terciles, these eﬀects are equivalent to about between 2 months of adjustment
in retirement age for each year one would have to work to attain one's pre-crash
sustainable consumption level; for the top wealth tercile, the average marginal eﬀect
implies a change in retirement age of about three weeks for each year of Rsc −R0.
The results presented in Table 2.14 provide some support for the hypothesis that
those at the top of the wealth distribution are less reactive to wealth losses, possibly
because of a lower marginal value of wealth.
Expectations and changes in planned retirement A recent structural life-cycle
model by Low et al. (2010) illustrates the importance of incorporating risk into life-
cycle models. Their model predicts that increased job destruction and wage variation
have strong impacts on welfare, and that individuals are willing to pay signiﬁcant
amounts to avoid these risks. In the option value framework of Stock and Wise
(1990), low expectations or uncertainty about the future increase the option value
of continued work, resulting in later planned retirement. In their analysis of the
determinants of retirement expectations, Chan and Stevens (2004) include controls
for future expectations about job losses to try to control for changes in the probability
of full-time work due to factors outside of individuals' control. They ﬁnd that the
ease of ﬁnding a new job is positively related to the subjective probability of full-time
work after reaching age 62 or 65.
The option value of continuing work beyond one's originally planned retirement
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age may be highest for individuals who were already close to retirement in 2008.
Those who are closest to retirement are likely to be the most reactive to their wealth
losses, since uncertainty about when and to what extent the stock, labor and housing
markets would rebound may lead these individuals to continue working until the
uncertainty surrounding the recession has been resolved. I do, however, expect that
uncertainty about future labor market, stock market and real estate returns will still
be related to changes in retirement age, even for those not close to planned retirement,
because continued work provides insurance against negative asset shocks regardless of
time to retirement. Tables 2.15, 2.16 and 2.17 present results from Tobit regressions
of R09−R0 on Rsc−R0, (Rsc −R0)2, and several variables related to the option value
of continued work.
In column 1 of Table 2.15, indicators of time from 2009 to individuals' pre-crash
retirement ages (less than two years, two to ﬁve years, ﬁve to ten years and more
than ten years) are included in the base regression. At 0.316 (s.e. 0.17) and -0.011
(s.e. 0.01), the coeﬃcients on Rsc − R0 and (Rsc −R0)2 are similar to the preferred
estimates in column 4 of Table 2.6. However, the coeﬃcients on the indicators of time
to retirement show that, the farther away from one's 2008 planned retirement age,
the smaller the change in planned retirement age. Although the average marginal
eﬀects of Rsc−R0 are not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one another across
groups, these do decline monotonically as time to retirement increases, dropping from
0.119 (s.e. 0.06), or around 44 days per year of Rsc−R0 for those within two years of
retirement, to 0.056 (s.e.0.03), or around 20 days per year of Rsc−R0 for those more
than ten years from retirement.
In column 2, these indicator variables are interacted with Rsc−R0 and (Rsc −R0)2.
The coeﬃcient on Rsc−R0 is now larger, at 0.584 years (s.e. 0.24), while the coeﬃcient
on (Rsc −R0)2 is similar to the other analyses, at -0.02 (s.e. 0.01). However, the
interaction terms with the indicators of years to retirement negate this eﬀect for all
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but those closest to retirement. The average marginal eﬀect of Rsc − R0 is 0.216
(s.e. 0.07) for those closest to retirement, equivalent to about 2.6 months, but much
smaller and very imprecisely estimated for the other groups. Thus, those closest to
retirement are reacting the most (2.5 months) to each year of work needed to attain
pre-crash consumption, while those farther from retirement may be reacting to the
asset losses by delaying retirement by just a few days (for those 2 to 5 years out) to a
month (for those 5 to 10 years out) per year needed to attain pre-crash consumption.
In Table 2.16, column 1 displays the results of the Tobit regression of R09 − R0
on Rsc − R0, (Rsc −R0)2 and variables indicating stock market, labor market and
housing market optimism.36 The coeﬃcients on Rsc−R0 and (Rsc −R0)2 are similar
but smaller in magnitude than in the base speciﬁcation (Table 2.6, column 4), but
labor market and stock market optimism are associated with much smaller changes
in retirement age. In this regression, the average marginal eﬀect of Rsc − R0 is 0.05
(0.035), or about 2 weeks' increase in retirement age, compared to optimism about the
labor and stock markets being associated with 0.427 (s.e. 0.41) and 0.73 (s.e. 0.38)
year decreases in retirement age, respectively. The coeﬃcient on housing market
optimism is close to zero.
Interacting the stock market optimism variable with Rsc − R0 and (Rsc −R0)2
yields the results seen in column 2. The coeﬃcient on Rsc − R0 is larger than in
previous speciﬁcations, at 0.39 (s.e. 0.14), but the average marginal eﬀect is 0.05 (s.e.
36Stock market optimism is coded as one if a respondent answers that there is more than a 50%
chance to the question By next year at this time, what are the chances that mutual fund shares
invested in blue chip stocks like those in the Dow Jones Industrial Average will be worth more
than they are today? and zero otherwise. Labor market optimism is coded as one if a respondent
answers that there is more than a 50% chance to the question Two years from now, what is the
percent chance that jobs will be easier to ﬁnd than they are right now? Similarly, the housing
market optimism variable is from the question We are interested in how the value of your home will
change in the future. What is the percent chance that one year from now your home will be worth
more than today? The results of the regressions are very similar when using the 0% to 100% scale
instead of the indicator variables, but the optimism indicator variables are slightly more powerful.
Given the rounding common in subjective probability questions, and the frequency of focal answers
at 50%, I think the indicator variables are also easier to interpret and less subject to measurement
error.
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0.04), or 2 weeks, slightly smaller than in other speciﬁcations. However, the average
marginal eﬀect of Rsc−R0 among those who are not optimistic about the stock market
is 0.13 (s.e. 0.04), or an increase in retirement age of 1.5 months per year of Rsc−R0
. This is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the average marginal eﬀect for those
who are optimistic (-0.11, s.e. 0.076). That is, individuals who were more certain
that the stock market would be higher in one year were much less reactive to wealth
losses.
Including labor market optimism instead of stock market optimism yields sub-
stantively similar results, though these are not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent by
group. See column 3 of Table 2.16 for details. Housing market optimism, by contrast,
is virtually unrelated to the reported changes in retirement age (see column 4).
In addition to labor market optimism, an additional measure that might be related
to the option value of keeping one's job is the local unemployment rate: if the local
unemployment situation worsens, especially contemporaneously with ﬁnancial and
real estate asset losses, the option value model predicts that the value of continued
work will increase. Table 2.17 presents results from regressions including a categorical
variable for the change in county unemployment rate between May 2008 and May
2009.37 The labor market performed extremely poorly over the year ending in May
2009: just 39 percent of the CogEcon sample resided in counties that experienced an
increase in the unemployment rate of less than 3 percentage points, while 21 percent
resided in counties that experienced increases in unemployment of 3 to 4 percentage
points, and 40 percent resided in counties that experienced increases in unemployment
of more than 4 percentage points. I created a categorical variable for the change in
unemployment rate to reﬂect each of these three groups. Column 1 presents results
from a regression in which the categorical change in unemployment variable is added
37Because county-level unemployment data are not seasonally-adjusted, I have used unemployment
rates from exactly one year apart, with the end date coinciding with the CogEcon 2009 survey
ﬁelding.
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to the base speciﬁcation. Indicators for this variable are not statistically signiﬁcant,
and do not greatly change the results from the base speciﬁcation (Table 2.6, Column
4). Indeed, the average marginal eﬀect of one year of Rsc − R0 is 0.08 (s.e. 0.04),
implying that a wealth loss that would take one year to make up is associated with
an increase in retirement age of about one month; the average marginal eﬀects are
extremely similar across categories of the unemployment variable. The eﬀects of
the categorical variable are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. In
Column 2, the interaction of the change in unemployment rate indicators with Rsc−R0
and (Rsc −R0)2 does change the coeﬃcients somewhat from the base speciﬁcation.
However, the average marginal eﬀect of wealth loss is still virtually unchanged from
the base speciﬁcation, though it is no longer statistically signiﬁcant, and the average
marginal eﬀects are neither substantively nor statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
one another across categories of the unemployment variable.38
In this section, I have shown that those closer to retirement are likely the most
reactive to wealth losses from the crash. Stock and labor market expectations are also
related to reported changes in retirement age, with greater pessimism being associated
with a stronger relationship between wealth losses and changes in retirement age.
However, and perhaps surprisingly, changes in the local unemployment rate do not
appear to change individuals' reactivity to wealth losses. In the next set of regressions,
I turn to the roles of ability and knowledge in determining individuals' reactions to
wealth shocks.
Cognitive ability, knowledge and changes in planned retirement In a 2008
book chapter, Clark and D'Ambrosio assert that developing a retirement plan requires
understanding of certain ﬁnancial relationships. Two relationships that they claim
are easy to understand are that for a given desired consumption level, retiring earlier
38Results from parallel analyses using a continuous measure of change in unemployment rate
yielded similar (non-)results. Given the small sample size and the clear interpretation of a categorical
variable, I have opted to not to present these.
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requires greater saving, and that for given retirement timing, individuals must save
more to attain higher income in retirement. However, they note that some decisions,
such as deciding on required saving levels and portfolio allocation, require diﬃcult
calculations. They assert that most workers do not have adequate ﬁnancial knowledge
to choose the retirement age and consumption and savings paths that maximizes
lifetime utility. The CogEcon data contain measures that allow me to test whether
responses to the wealth shock are related to ﬁnancial knowledge or cognitive ability.
First, the CogEcon data contain a measure of ﬁnancial knowledge from a battery of
25 questions. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2.18 show the Tobit results from a regression
of R09 −R0 on Rsc −R0, (Rsc −R0)2 and ﬁnancial knowledge indicators for whether
the respondents' scores on this battery were in the bottom, middle or top tercile.
In the ﬁrst column, it can be seen that the coeﬃcients on Rsc−R0 and (Rsc −R0)2
are largely unchanged, relative to the baseline speciﬁcation in (Table 2.6, column 4).
Additionally, being in the highest ﬁnancial knowledge tercile is associated with a
2.5 year smaller change in retirement age, compared to those in the lowest ﬁnancial
knowledge tercile.
In column 2, ﬁnancial knowledge indicators are interacted with the other variables.
Those who are least ﬁnancially knowledgeable appear to be most reactive to each
additional year of work needed to attain pre-crash sustainable consumption. Indeed,
the average marginal eﬀect of Rsc−R0 is 0.344 years (s.e. 0.039) for the lowest tercile
of ﬁnancial knowledge, 0.093 years (s.e. 0.052) for the middle tercile, and -0.019 years
(s.e. 0.042) for the highest tercile. It should be noted, however, that the level of
wealth and the level of ﬁnancial knowledge are positively correlated with one another
(correlation coeﬃcient is 0.13), so it is not clear whether ﬁnancial knowledge or wealth
is behind this association.
Second, the CogUSA data that are linked to the CogEcon data contain a measure
of ﬂuid intelligence called the number series score. In columns 3 and 4, I present
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the Tobit results including indicators for whether respondents' scores on the number
series test are in the bottom, middle or top tercile. Fluid intelligence does not appear
to be related to reactions to the shock. The marginal eﬀects of Rsc−R0 do not diﬀer
substantively or statistically by number series tercile.
While ﬁnancial literacy and ability may both aﬀect basic ﬁnancial planning de-
cisions, I do not ﬁnd evidence that ability aﬀects reactions to the economic crisis in
a systematic way. Better ﬁnancial literacy is associated with less drastic reactions
to wealth losses, but the interpretation of this ﬁnding is unclear because ﬁnancial
knowledge is also correlated with both pre-crash wealth and the incidence of the
crash.
Expected bequest behavior If individuals were planning to leave a bequest before
the crash, they may have had an additional margin over which to adjust to their wealth
losses. If bequests are a normal good that enter directly into the utility function,
one might expect that individuals who planned to leave a bequest might reduce the
bequest they expected to leave in reaction to the crash. If however, individuals do
not view bequests as fungible, we might expect a larger change in retirement age for
individuals who do not revise their bequest downward.
In Tables 2.19 and 2.20, I use categorical variables representing the change in the
probability that a respondent will leave a bequest of at least $100,000 to examine
the relationship between expected bequests, wealth losses and retirement plans. The
CogEcon dataset does not contain data on expected bequests, so I conduct these
analyses using the HRS samples.
In Table 2.19, I present results from regressions including indicators for whether
the subjective probability of leaving a bequest of $100,000 or more decreased, re-
mained unchanged, or increased between the 2008 Core interview and the 2009 Inter-
net Survey. In column 1, I simply add these indicators of change in bequest plans to
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the base speciﬁcation (Table 2.7, column 2). The estimated coeﬃcients on Rsc − R0
and (Rsc −R0)2 are virtually identical to those in the base HRS age-62 estimates,
as are the average marginal eﬀects and implied change in the probability of full-time
work after age 62. However, unchanged or increased probabilities of leaving at least
$100,000 as a bequest are actually negatively related to the change in probability
of full-time work after age 62, indicating that respondents who adjust their work
expectations are also likely to adjust their bequest intentions. Rather than being
substitutable margins of adjustment, individuals who react to the crash appear to
adjust along both margins. In column 2, the indicator variables are also interacted
with Rsc − R0 and (Rsc −R0)2, and yield similar results. In columns 3 and 4, the
dependent variable is the change in the probability of full-time work after age 65.
Results from these regressions tell a similar story.
Table 2.20 repeats the analyses in Table 2.19 using a binary indicator for whether
the probability of leaving a bequest of $100,000 or more decreased by at least 15
percentage points. These results tell a similar story to those in Table 2.19. These
results show that individuals who adjust their work expectations also tend to alter
their bequest intentions. However, individuals who alter their bequest intentions do
not tend to be more reactive to wealth losses, in terms of the way they adjust their
work plans (that is, the average marginal eﬀects do not diﬀer across groups).
These analyses seem to suggest that individuals who react to the crash in terms
of their labor supply plans also tend to adjust their bequest intentions. That is, they
are re-optimizing along both bequest and retirement age margins.
2.7 Conclusion
Economists have theorized that a negative income or wealth shock will cause in-
dividuals to re-optimize their consumption and retirement plans. In particular, a
negative wealth or income shock is expected to produce a delay in expected retire-
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ment timing. In contrast to the clear predictions of most life-cycle models, many
researchers have summarized empirical estimates of the impact of cyclical wealth
eﬀects on retirement timing as providing mixed or weak evidence with respect to
these predictions (Coile and Levine, 2005; Hurd et al., 2009; Goda et al., 2011). It
is certainly the case that analyses of boom years in Hurd and Reti (2001), Coile
and Levine (2006) and Hurd, Reti and Rohwedder (2009) show little to no impact of
wealth changes on retirement timing. However, results presented in this paper and
the results of other recent studies, plus work by Sevak (2002), Coronado and Perozek
(2003), and analyses of bust years both in Coile and Levine (2006) and Hurd, Reti
and Rohwedder (2009) all provide some support for the life-cycle model.
Based on existing empirical evidence and the analyses presented in this paper, I
conclude that there is a positive relationship between wealth losses and retirement age
consistent with the implications of life-cycle models. It is likely that the weak-to-zero
estimated eﬀects seen in many studies stem from measurement problems, failure to
take into account the ﬁxed costs of adjusting retirement plans and, possibly, asymme-
tries in the eﬀects of wealth losses versus gains due to non-linearities in the underlying
choice problem. Through use of novel data and improved econometric speciﬁcation,
this paper improves on each of these factors. Additionally, results in this paper show
that it is interesting to consider the role of heterogeneity in preferences, expectations
and other individual characteristics in examining the role of exogenous wealth shocks
on retirement timing, as the estimated wealth eﬀects often diﬀer between individuals
in expected ways.
This paper uses quasi-experimental pre- and post-crash data from the Cognitive
Economics and Health and Retirement Studies to examine the impact of wealth losses
between summer 2008 and summer 2009 on the retirement plans of older Americans.
Calculations based on new survey data estimate that the stock and housing crises, to-
gether with rapidly rising unemployment, reduced the sustainable material standard
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of living of the typical (median) pre-retirement older American by about 5 percent
between summer 2008 and summer 2009; average losses were almost twice as large.
The additional number of years the median respondent would need to work to make
up these losses is 1.6 years in the CogEcon data and 1.9 years in the HRS dataset,
while the average increases needed to make up losses are 3.7 years in the CogEcon
data and 4.9 to 5 years in the HRS data. Descriptive analyses show that the eco-
nomic crisis did result in increases in planned retirement age: just over 40 percent of
respondents in the CogEcon sample reported changing the age at which they planned
to retire completely by at least a year as a result of the economic crisis, while HRS
respondents' probabilities of full-time work in their sixties also increased appreciably
between 2008 and 2009. This ﬁnding is consistent with the ﬁnding of a 2009 Center
for Retirement Research at Boston College survey, which found that 40 percent of
workers age 45 to 59 reported that they were planning to retire later than they had
planned prior to the downturn (Sass, Monk and Haverstick, 2010). If one believes
that CogEcon respondents were able to correctly answer how their retirement plans
had changed as a result of the economic crisis, the CogEcon data imply that the
economic crisis caused large increases in planned retirement age.
Consistent with the implications of the life-cycle hypothesis, Tobit regressions
yield statistically-signiﬁcant estimates reﬂecting a positive association between wealth
losses and increases in expected retirement age. These estimates of the impact of
wealth losses on retirement age, while not clearly causal, compare favorably with
other recent studies. Estimates from my baseline reduced-form regression speciﬁcation
using the CogEcon data show that a loss in wealth that would take one additional year
of work to regain is associated with an average of about a month's change in retirement
age. For an older American with an average wealth loss, in terms of the number of
years of work it would take to make up the loss from the crash, my estimates imply
about that about four months' increase in retirement age may be attributable to the
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wealth loss. These estimates are roughly in line with simulation results presented in
Gustman et al. (2009), which predicts an average increase in retirement age on the
order of one and a half months as a result of wealth losses during the economic crisis.
Estimation results using Health and Retirement Study data also show an asso-
ciation between wealth losses and retirement expectations, with the average wealth
loss implying a 1 and 1/4 percentage point increase in the probability of full-time
work after age 62, and an increase of about 4 percentage points in the probability of
full-time work after age 65, the latter statistically-signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
These estimates are similar to results from Goda, Shoven and Slavov's (2010) analysis
based on HRS data from 2006 and 2008, which imply that a 40 percent decline in
the S&P 500 (the average decline between the HRS 2008 Core and the 2009 Internet
Survey) would be associated with a 5 percentage point increase in the probability of
full-time work after age 62 or just over 1/2 percentage point increase in the probabil-
ity if full-time work after age 65, the former statistically-signiﬁcant at the 5 percent
level. While emphasizing that wealth eﬀects are likely outweighed in aggregate by
the increased retirement rates of older unemployed workers, recent studies by Coile
and Levine (2009) and Bosworth and Burtless (2010) have also found a negative
relationship between recent wealth losses and retirement rates.
While my estimates of the impact of wealth losses on retirement timing are almost
certainly subject to signiﬁcant attenuation bias due to measurement error, the gap
between the average reported change in retirement age in the CogEcon data (1.6 years)
and the much smaller amount that can be explained by wealth losses also implies
that heterogeneity in preferences, expectations about the future and other individual
characteristics may also be important in determining the impact of wealth losses on
changes in planned retirement age. My analyses suggest that wealth eﬀects may be
larger for individuals with moderate levels of wealth, and smaller for those with the
highest levels of wealth. For individuals close to their pre-crash planned retirement
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ages, a year needed to regain lost wealth is associated with a larger increase in planned
retirement age than for individuals who are farther from retirement. Additionally,
individuals who are more optimistic about the rebound of the stock and labor markets
over the next 1-2 years are less reactive to wealth losses and the crash, and individuals
with more ﬁnancial knowledge are less reactive to wealth losses than those with less
ﬁnancial knowledge. Interestingly, I did not ﬁnd evidence that individuals in the
worst labor markets were more likely to plan to hold on to their jobs for longer than
individuals in better labor markets. It also appears to be the case that individuals
are adjusting along more than one margin: respondents who adjusted their labor
supply expectations were also likely to report decreased probabilities of leaving large
bequests.
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2.8 Figures and tables
Figure 2.1: Life-cycle saving and consumption
Figure 2.2: Optimal retirement choice
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Figure 2.3: Optimal retirement choice after a wealth shock
Figure 2.4: Life-cycle saving and consumption with variable retirement timing
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Figure 2.5: Dow Jones Industrial Average closing values
Source: Yahoo! Finance
Figure 2.6: Timeline of surveys and the Dow Jones Industrial Average
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Figure 2.7: Changes in retirement age owing to crash (CogEcon sample)
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Figure 2.8: Cumulative distribution of expected retirement ages (CogEcon sample)
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Figure 2.9: Comparison of retirement age needed to attain pre-crash consumption
path and planned post-crash retirement age (CogEcon sample)
Figure 2.10: Comparison of changes in retirement age needed to attain pre-crash
consumption path and reported changes (CogEcon sample)
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Figure 2.11: Extensive margin: Tobit prediction versus observed probability of in-
crease in planned retirement age (CogEcon sample)
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Notes: Horizontal axis categories are bins representing diﬀerent wealth eﬀect sizes
(in terms of Rsc − R0). Vertical axis is probability of an increase in the planned age
of retirement. Lines are plotted by connecting the average for each bin.
Figure 2.12: Intensive margin: Tobit prediction versus observed increase in planned
retirement age (CogEcon sample)
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Notes: Horizontal axis categories are bins representing diﬀerent wealth eﬀect sizes
(in terms of Rsc − R0). Vertical axis represents years of increase in the planned age
of retirement. Lines are plotted by connecting the average for each bin.
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Figure 2.13: Extensive margin: Tobit prediction versus observed probability of in-
crease in Pr(FT62) (HRS <62 sample)
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Notes: Horizontal axis categories are bins representing diﬀerent wealth eﬀect sizes
(in terms of Rsc − R0). Vertical axis is probability of an increase in the subjective
probability of full-time work after age 62 per year of Rsc − R0. Lines are plotted by
connecting the average for each bin.
Figure 2.14: Intensive margin: Tobit prediction versus observed increase in Pr(FT62)
(HRS <62 sample)
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Notes: Horizontal axis categories are bins representing diﬀerent wealth eﬀect sizes
(in terms of Rsc − R0). Vertical axis is the increase in the subjective probability of
full-time work after age 62 per year of Rsc −R0. Lines are plotted by connecting the
average for each bin.
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Figure 2.15: Extensive margin: Tobit prediction versus observed probability of in-
crease in Pr(FT65) (HRS <65 sample)







	

        






	










	
						

 !
"#
 !
Notes: Horizontal axis categories are bins representing diﬀerent wealth eﬀect sizes
(in terms of Rsc − R0). Vertical axis is probability of an increase in the subjective
probability of full-time work after age 65 per year of Rsc − R0. Lines are plotted by
connecting the average for each bin.
Figure 2.16: Intensive margin: Tobit prediction versus observed increase in Pr(FT65)
(HRS <65 sample)
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Notes: Horizontal axis categories are bins representing diﬀerent wealth eﬀect sizes
(in terms of Rsc − R0). Vertical axis is the increase in the subjective probability of
full-time work after age 65 per year of Rsc −R0. Lines are plotted by connecting the
average for each bin.
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Figure 2.17: Average marginal eﬀects by Rsc −R0 group (CogEcon sample)
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Notes: Horizontal axis categories are bins representing diﬀerent wealth eﬀect sizes
(in terms of Rsc −R0). Estimates based on results from regression shown in Column
4 of Table 2.6.
Figure 2.18: Average predicted change in retirement age by Rsc−R0 group (CogEcon
sample)
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Notes: Horizontal axis categories are bins representing diﬀerent wealth eﬀect sizes
(in terms of Rsc −R0). Estimates based on results from regression shown in Column
4 of Table 2.6.
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Figure 2.19: Average marginal eﬀects by Rsc −R0 group (HRS <62 sample)
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Notes: Horizontal axis categories are bins representing diﬀerent wealth eﬀect sizes
(in terms of Rsc − R0). Vertical axis is percentage point change in the probability
of full-time work after age 62 per year of Rsc − R0. Estimates based on results from
regression shown in Column 2 of Table 2.7.
Figure 2.20: Average predicted change in probability of full-time work by Rsc − R0
group (HRS <62 sample)
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Notes: Horizontal axis categories are bins representing diﬀerent wealth eﬀect sizes
(in terms of Rsc − R0). Vertical axis is percentage point change in the probability
of full-time work after age 62 per year of Rsc − R0. Estimates based on results from
regression shown in Column 2 of Table 2.7.
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Figure 2.21: Average marginal eﬀects by Rsc −R0 group (HRS <65 sample)
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Notes: Horizontal axis categories are bins representing diﬀerent wealth eﬀect sizes
(in terms of Rsc − R0). Vertical axis is percentage point change in the probability
of full-time work after age 62 per year of Rsc − R0. Estimates based on results from
regression shown in Column 2 of Table 2.8.
Figure 2.22: Average predicted change in probability of full-time work by Rsc − R0
group (HRS <65 sample)
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Notes: Horizontal axis categories are bins representing diﬀerent wealth eﬀect sizes
(in terms of Rsc − R0). Vertical axis is percentage point change in the probability
of full-time work after age 62 per year of Rsc − R0. Estimates based on results from
regression shown in Column 2 of Table 2.8.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
CogEcon sample (N=320) Mean Median St. Dev.
Proportion Female 0.52  
Proportion Single 0.23  
Education (years) 14.93 16 2.01
Annual Earnings $79,880 $52,023 $238,967
Age at Post-Crash Survey 60.61 59.88 6.30
Planned Retirement Age as of 2008 67.79 66 9.30
HRS <62 sample (N=589) Mean Median St. Dev.
Proportion Female 0.55  
Proportion Single 0.22  
Education (years) 14.62 15 1.99
Annual Earnings $59,943 $46,000 $69,216
Age at Post-Crash Survey 58.44 58.41 1.80
Planned Retirement Age as of 2008
(imputed)
64.34 65 2.66
Planned Retirement Age as of 2008
(not imputed, N=136)
63.57 64 3.15
Sample: HRS <65 (N=594) Mean Median St. Dev.
Proportion Female 0.55  
Proportion Single 0.22  
Education (years) 14.60 15 1.99
Annual Earnings $59,886 $46,000 $69,966
Age at Post-Crash Survey 58.50 58.50 1.86
Planned Retirement Age as of 2008
(imputed)
64.38 65 2.66
Planned Retirement Age as of 2008
(not imputed, N=136)
63.63 64 3.12
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Table 2.2: Sustainable consumption levels, pre- and post-crash
Pre-Crash Sustainable Consumption
Sample: CogEcon HRS <62 HRS <65
Mean $99,071 $78,015 $77,660
25th % $40,083 $41,954 $41,826
Median $63,112 $63,639 $63,853
75th % $99,101 $94,092 $94,557
Post-Crash Sustainable Consumption
Sample: CogEcon HRS <62 HRS <65
Mean $90,523 $71,288 $70,939
25th % $37,351 $40,268 $40,099
Median $58,440 $58,702 $58,806
75th % $91,994 $87,726 $87,726
Observations 320 589 594
Table 2.3: Changes in sustainable consumption levels, 2008 to 2009
Sample: CogEcon HRS <62 HRS <65
Mean -8.65% -6.67% -6.70%
25th % -13.65% -11.02% -11.02%
Median -4.62% -4.96% -4.97%
75th % -1.86% -1.99% -1.99%
Observations 320 589 594
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Table 2.4: Extra work years needed to make up lost wealth (Rsc −R0)
Sample: CogEcon HRS <62 HRS <65
All 4R>0 All 4Pr(FT62)>0 All 4Pr(FT65)>0
Mean 3.72 4.10 4.92 5.02 4.99 4.84
25th % 0.52 0.89 0.65 0.74 0.65 0.74
Median 1.64 1.66 1.88 1.98 1.88 2.06
75th % 4.11 3.90 4.91 5.44 4.95 5.15
St. Dev. 7.49 6.17 7.99 7.80 8.09 7.52
Table 2.5: Changes in subjective probabilities of full-time work in HRS, 2006-2008
and 2008-2009
4Pr(FT62) 4Pr(FT65)
2006 to 2008 2008 to 2009 2006 to 2008 2008 to 2009
Mean 8.7 p.p. 3.5 p.p. 6.5 p.p. 8.1 p.p.
Median 0 p.p. 0 p.p. 0 p.p. 2 p.p.
75th % 20 p.p. 19.5 p.p. 20 p.p. 25 p.p.
Observations 580 580 585 585
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Table 2.6: Impact of wealth losses on retirement age (CogEcon sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Speciﬁcation: OLS OLS Tobit Tobit
Rsc −R0 0.058 0.057 0.110 0.311*
(0.043) (0.038) (0.091) (0.163)
(Rsc −R0)2  0.000  -0.010
 (0.001)  (0.008)
Constant 1.434*** 1.422*** -2.184*** -2.384***
(0.224) (0.241) (0.829) (0.861)
Sigma   6.258*** 6.245***
  (0.947) (0.950)
Observations 320 320 320 320
Number uncensored obs.   128 128
R2 0.017 0.017  
Pseudo-R2   0.003 0.006
Log-Likelihood   -459.90 -458.70
F-test (H0 : Coefs. jointly
0)
1.89 3.30 1.45 1.89
Prob >F 0.17 0.04 0.23 0.15
Marginal eﬀect at 0.058 0.059 0.043 0.086**
mean of Rsc −R0 (3.721) (0.042) (0.044) (0.036) (0.043)
Notes: Dependent variable is reported change in retirement age. All analyses include
CogUSA sampling weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The censoring point for Tobit regressions is 0.
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Table 2.7: Impact of wealth losses on probability of full-time work after age 62 (HRS
<62 sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Speciﬁcation: Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Rsc −R0 0.193 0.871 0.494 1.474
(0.267) (0.854) (0.765) (2.596)
(Rsc −R0)2 -0.025 -0.032
(0.030) (0.081)
Constant -10.28*** -11.46*** -18.96** -21.20**
(2.733) (3.076) (8.733) (10.670)
Sigma 39.13*** 39.15*** 56.68*** 56.75***
(2.357) (2.367) (5.725) (5.720)
Observations 589 589 139 139
Number uncensored obs. 247 247 56 56
Pseudo-R2 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
Log-Likelihood −1.24×107 −1.24×107 −2.99×107 −2.99×107
F-test (H0: Coefs. jointly
0)
0.524 0.618 0.417 0.283
Prob >F 0.470 0.539 0.519 0.754
Marginal eﬀect at 0.079 0.246 0.191 0.426
mean of Rsc −R0 (4.919) (0.109) (0.224) (0.295) (0.651)
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in the probability of full-time work after age
62, 08409Pr(FT62). Censoring point is zero in all regressions. All analyses include
2008 Core sampling weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.8: Impact of wealth losses on probability of full-time work after age 65 (HRS
<65 sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Speciﬁcation: Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Rsc −R0 0.276 2.291*** -0.168 2.210
(0.243) (0.757) (0.415) (1.451)
(Rsc −R0)2 -0.0743*** -0.0797*
(0.026) (0.045)
Constant -1.673 -5.044* -1.068 -6.360
(2.368) (2.735) (4.639) (5.850)
Sigma 36.08*** 35.78*** 35.62*** 35.52***
(1.797) (1.823) (3.928) (4.031)
Observations 594 594 140 140
Number uncensored obs. 298 298 73 73
Pseudo-R2 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.003
Log-Likelihood −1.44×107 −1.44×107 −3.39×106 −3.38×
10−6
F-test (H0: Coefs. jointly
0)
1.286 4.578 0.164 1.803
Prob >F 0.257 0.011 0.686 0.169
Marginal eﬀect at 0.137 0.736*** -0.08 0.661
mean of Rsc −R0 (4.989) (0.121) (0.235) (0.198) (0.456)
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in the probability of full-time work after age
65, 08409Pr(FT62). Censoring point is zero in all regressions. All analyses include
Core 2008 sampling weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.10: Comparison of Tobit, probit and Cragg models (CogEcon sample)
(1) (2) (3)
Speciﬁcation: Tobit Probit Truncated
Dependent variable: 4R I4R>0 4R
Rsc −R0 0.311* 0.047* 0.575
(0.163) (0.025) (0.680)
(Rsc −R0)2 -0.010 -0.002* -0.005
(0.008) (0.001) (0.023)
Constant -2.384*** -0.339*** -6.463
(0.861) (0.108) (15.633)
Sigma 6.245*** 7.003
(0.950) (4.894)
Observations 320 320 128
Log-Likelihood -458.7 -187.5 -268.3
Notes: Dependent variable in Tobit and truncated normal speciﬁcations is reported
change in retirement age. In probit speciﬁcation, dependent variable is an indicator
that is equal to one if retirement age increased, and zero otherwise. Censoring point
for Tobit and truncated regressions is 0. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.12: Robustness check excluding primary home from total wealth
(1) (2) (3)
Sample CogEcon
sample
HRS <62
sample
HRS <65
sample
Dependent variable R09 −R0 4Pr(FT62) 4Pr(FT65)
Speciﬁcation: Tobit Tobit Tobit
Rsc −R0 0.203 0.560 1.911**
(0.143) (1.114) (0.902)
(Rsc −R0)2 -0.006 (0.009) -0.069**
(0.006) (0.038) (0.031)
Constant -2.343*** -10.92*** -3.041
(0.874) (3.120) (2.631)
Sigma 6.270*** 39.16*** 35.97***
(0.956) (2.344) (1.868)
Observations 320 591 595
Number uncensored obs. 128 248 299
Pseudo-R2 0.003 0.001 0.002
Log-Likelihood -459.7 -1.25×107 -1.44×107
F-test (H0 : Coefs. jointly 0) 1.09 0.61 2.57
Prob >F 0.34 0.54 0.08
Mean of Rsc −R0 5.14 3.96 4.01
Avg. marginal eﬀect at mean 0.054 0.197 0.674
(0.035) (0.321) (0.324)
Implied p.p. change at mean  0.78 2.70
Implied change in retirement age
(in days) at mean
100.97 6.63 18.11
Notes: CogEcon analyses include CogUSA sampling weights; HRS analyses include
2008 Core sampling weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The censoring point for all regressions is 0.
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Table 2.13: Robustness check excluding expected bequests from total wealth
(1) (2)
Sample HRS <62
sample
HRS <65
sample
Dependent variable 08409Pr(FT62) 08409Pr(FT65)
Speciﬁcation: Tobit Tobit
Rsc −R0 0.832 2.260***
(0.854) (0.757)
(Rsc −R0)2 -0.023 -0.0722***
(0.030) (0.026)
Constant -11.40*** -4.987*
(3.050) (2.716)
Sigma 39.12*** 35.77***
(2.365) (1.817)
Observations 588 593
Number uncensored obs. 247 298
Pseudo-R2 0.001 0.003
Log-Likelihood -1.24×107 -1.44×107
F-test (H0 : Coefs. jointly zero) 0.62 4.48
Prob >F 0.54 0.01
Mean of Rsc −R0 4.76 4.82
Avg. marginal eﬀect at mean 0.242 0.739
(0.226) (0.237)
Implied p.p. change at mean 1.15 3.56
Implied change in retirement age (in
days) at mean
9.79 23.87
Notes: HRS analyses include 2008 Core sampling weights. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The censoring point for all regressions
is 0.
90
Table 2.14: Regressions with wealth terciles (CogEcon sample)
(1) (2)
Wealth Tercile Indicator
2nd 1.52 0.795
(1.08) (1.19)
3rd (highest wealth) -3.532** -2.408
(1.52) (1.66)
(Rsc −R0) 0.489*** 0.0161
(0.19) (0.49)
Wealth Tercile Indicator × (Rsc −R0)
2nd 0.0161
(0.49)
3rd (highest wealth) -0.197
(0.51)
(Rsc −R0)2 -0.0148* -0.0341
(0.01) (0.03)
Wealth Tercile Indicator × (Rsc −R0)2
2nd 0.023
(0.03)
3rd (highest wealth) 0.0165
(0.03)
Constant -2.228** -2.077**
(0.95) (1.01)
Sigma 5.933*** 5.795***
(0.93) (0.93)
Observations 320 320
Number uncensored obs 128 128
Pseudo-R2 0.0272 0.034
Log-Likelihood -448.8 -445.7
F-test: All jointly=0 4.071 2.552
Prob > F 0.003 0.011
Mean of (Rsc −R0), by Wealth Tercile
1st 1.37 1.37
2nd 3.17 3.17
3rd (highest wealth) 6.81 6.81
Marginal eﬀect of 1 yr of (Rsc −R0), by Wealth Tercile
91
Table 2.14: Regressions with wealth terciles (CogEcon sample) (continued)
(1) (2)
1st 0.169** 0.18
(0.066) (0.14)
2nd 0.181*** 0.238***
(0.062) (0.09)
3rd (highest wealth) 0.058** 0.03
(0.023) (0.04)
Notes: Results from Tobit regressions, with dependent variable reported change
in retirement age, censored from below at zero. All analyses include CogUSA
sampling weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. In column 1, marginal eﬀects at each tercile are statistically
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one another at the 5 percent level (χ2(2) = 6.29,
p-value=0.04). In column 2, marginal eﬀects at each tercile are statistically
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one another at the 10 percent level (χ2(2) = 5.31,
p-value=0.07).
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CHAPTER III
Moving Out to Move Up? New Economists Sacriﬁce
Job Opportunities for Proximity to Signiﬁcant
Others and Vice Versa
With Marta Murray-Close
3.1 Introduction
In the past half century, historic increases in women's labor-force participation
have prompted growing interest in the migration decisions of dual-career couples. In
1970, 41 percent of married women in the United States were in the labor force. By
2009, 61 percent of married women were in the labor force, and married couples with
two earners outnumbered married couples with a single earner (United States Census
Bureau, 2010). Unlike couples in which only the husband or, less frequently, only the
wife works for pay, couples in which both partners work must balance the potentially
competing demands of two careers. Career-related migration opportunities, which
can arise for partners at diﬀerent times and in diﬀerent locations, may be a source of
conﬂict for these couples.
How couples respond to conﬂicting locational preferences has implications for their
well-being. On one hand, living together may harm the career prospects of one or
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both partners (Sandell , 1977; Mincer , 1978); on the other hand, living apart may
harm their relationship. Empirical studies suggest that living together constrains the
location choices of married workers (Costa and Kahn, 2000;Gemici , 2008;McKinnish,
2008; Mincer , 1978) and lowers their earnings relative to what they could obtain in
their individually optimal locations (Sandell , 1977; Lichter , 1983; Jacobson and Levin,
1997; Gemici , 2008; Boyle et al., 2001). Because many studies have found that the
negative impact of living together falls disproportionately on women (Mincer , 1978;
Sandell , 1977; Jacobson and Levin, 1997; Compton and Pollak , 2007; Cooke, 2008;
Boyle et al., 2001), some researchers have also suggested that the migration decisions
of couples contribute to the gender gap in earnings and career attainment (Bielby
and Bielby , 1992). On the relationship side of the trade-oﬀ, one study found that
career-motivated migration is associated with higher divorce rates (Gemici , 2008).
Implicit in early theories of family migration was an assumption that couples who
remain together live together (Sandell , 1977; Mincer , 1978). Subsequent empirical
work has shown that this assumption is unwarranted. A number of qualitative studies
outside of economics have identiﬁed long-distance relationships as an alternative to
career sacriﬁces or relationship dissolution for couples with conﬂicting locational pref-
erences (Gerstel and Gross , 1982; Magnuson and Norem, 1999; Gross , 1980; Rhodes ,
2002). These studies have explored the circumstances under which dual-career cou-
ples live apart and have assessed the implications of living apart for the careers and
relationships of couples who choose the arrangement. Because they have relied on
non-representative samples, however, studies of long-distance relationships have not
estimated the prevalence of living apart in the population of dual-career couples. Nor
can we be conﬁdent that the results of these studies generalize to the population.
This paper uses data from original surveys of new entrants to the junior PhD job
market in economics  all of whom have invested heavily in their human capital, most
of whom will move for their ﬁrst job in thier ﬁeld of training, and many of whom have
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highly educated partners  to assess the impact of conﬂicting locational preferences on
a group for whom the problem is likely to be severe. The surveys combine questions
about the job-market decisions and outcomes of new entrants to the junior PhD
job market in economics, hereafter referred to as new economists, with questions
about their partners and living arrangements. In addition, the surveys contain direct
counterfactual questions about the job-market outcomes new economists think they
would have had if they had responded diﬀerently to conﬂicts over location. Using
data from the surveys, we are able to characterize the impact of conﬂicting locational
preferences on the career outcomes of new economists who live with their partner.
We are also able to estimate, for the ﬁrst time, the prevalence and predictors of
long-distance relationships in a known sub-population of dual-career couples.
Our results indicate that the impact of conﬂicting locational preferences on choices
new economists make between job oﬀers is modest. Just 14 percent of the partnered
economists we surveyed had rejected their ﬁrst-choice job oﬀer for the beneﬁt of
their relationship and, among those who had rejected their ﬁrst-choice job oﬀer, the
sacriﬁces entailed were not large. At the same time, 16 percent of the economists
expected to be living apart from their partner in the year after they entered the job
market. Economists who faced large career costs of living with their partner were
the most likely to live apart. In light of these patterns, we argue that long-distance
relationships attenuate the impact of conﬂicting locational preferences on the career
outcomes of new economists.
Our results corroborate several ﬁndings from the qualitative literature on long-
distance relationships. Dual-career couples are motivated to live apart when the
beneﬁts of the arrangement to their careers are large, but they are not primarily con-
cerned with ﬁnancial compensation (Gerstel and Gross , 1982; Gross , 1980;Magnuson
and Norem, 1999). The economists we surveyed were more likely to live apart when
they believed that the arrangement would increase their likelihood of publishing in
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top journals and of having opportunities to move to diﬀerent kinds of jobs; they were
not more likely to live apart when they believed that the arrangement would increase
their lifetime income. Our results also corroborate the ﬁnding that couples are less
likely to live apart when they are parents or expect to become parents (Gerstel and
Gross , 1982; Gross , 1980).
While this paper assesses the impact of conﬂicting locational preferences on the
careers and relationships of new economists, our results have relevance for specialized
professionals more generally. In the contemporary United States, highly educated
men and women tend to marry highly educated partners (Schwartz and Mare, 2005).
Because educational attainment is positively associated with occupational mobility
(McKinnish, 2008), the pairing of highly educated partners is likely to complicate
migration decisions for dual-career couples across the professions.
3.2 Theoretical predictors of living apart
The seminal theoretical work of Jacob Mincer (1978) is the point of departure
for our analysis. Although he ignored the possibility that couples with conﬂicting
locational preferences live apart, Mincer characterized the circumstances under which
they live together and the circumstances under which they break up. Couples in the
Mincer model solve
maximize
xA,xB
GxAA +G
xB
B + IxA=xB · (MA +MB) ,
where xi is the location of partner i; G
xi
i is the utility gain of partner i from locational
amenities and career opportunities in location xi, net of the cost of moving to that
location; Mi is the utility gain of partner i from the couple's relationship; and IxA=xB
is an indicator variable for the relationship.
Let GIA and G
I
B be the net utility gains of the partners from locational amenities
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and career opportunities in the locations that solve
maximize
xi
Gxii
for i = A,B. Let GFA and G
F
B be the utility gains of the partners in the location that
solves
maximize
xA=xB
GxAA +G
xB
B .
Mincer deﬁnes the migration tie of partner i as the diﬀerence between the net utility
gain of partner i from locational amenities and career opportunities in the location
he or she would choose as a single person, GIi , and the utility gain of partner i in the
location that maximizes the joint utility of the couple, GFi :
Ti = G
I
i −GFi .
He predicts that couples live together when the sum of their gains from their rela-
tionship exceeds the sum of their migration ties:
MA +MB > TA + TB. (3.1)
When the sum of their migration ties exceeds the sum of their gains from their
relationship, Mincer predicts that couples break up.
As discussed above, evidence from qualitative studies suggests that some couples
neither move together nor break up. Instead, these couples reconcile conﬂicts between
relationship commitments and career opportunities by maintaining long-distance re-
lationships. To explore the implications of long-distance relationships for relationship
and career outcomes, we develop a simple extension of the Mincer model. We decom-
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pose the gain from a relationship, Mi, into a component that accrues to every person
in a relationship, Ki and a component that accrues only to people who live with their
partners, Hi:
Mi = Ki +Hi.
Because we are interested in relationship stability only to the extent that it is inﬂu-
enced by conﬂicting migration opportunities, we assume that couples maintain their
relationships in the absence of conﬂicting migration opportunities:
MA +MB > 0.
We also assume that couples prefer cohabiting relationships to long-distance rela-
tionships. Given a choice between living together and living apart in separate but
otherwise identical locations, couples choose to live together:
HA +HB > 0.
Finally, we allow for the possibility that some couples would rather live apart than
break up and for the possibility that some would rather break up:
−HA −HB < KA +KB < MA +MB.
In our extension of the Mincer model, couples solve
Maximize
xA,xB
GxAA +G
xB
B + Ir=1 (KA +KB) + Ir=1IxA=xB · (HA +HB) ,
where Ir=1 is an indicator variable for a relationship, either long-distance or cohab-
iting; IxA=xB is an indicator variable for cohabitation; and the other variables are
deﬁned as above.
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For couples who would rather break up than live apart, the predictions of the
extended model coincide with the predictions of the Mincer model. These couples
live together when the sum of their gains from their relationship exceeds the sum of
their migration ties and break up when the reverse is true. Formally, couples with
KA +KB < 0 live together when Equation (3.1) holds, and break up otherwise.
In contrast, for couples who would rather live apart than break up, the predictions
of the extended model and the predictions of the Mincer model diverge. By main-
taining long-distance relationships, these couples can enjoy utility from from their
relationships without sacriﬁcing utility to migration ties. Consequently, it is never
optimal for them to break up. Instead, these couples live together when the sum of
their gains from cohabitation exceeds the sum of their migration ties and live apart
when the reverse is true. Formally, couples with KA +KB > 0 live together when
HA +HB > TA + TB (3.2)
and live apart otherwise.
A comparison of Equations (3.1) and (3.2) indicates that, if there are couples
who would rather live apart than break up, the Mincer model makes incomplete
predictions about their responses to conﬂicting migration opportunities. While the
extended model predicts that couples with
MA +MB > TA + TB > HA +HB (3.3)
and
TA + TB > MA +MB > HA +HB (3.4)
live apart, the Mincer model predicts that the former live together and the latter
break up. Thus, relative to the extended model, the Mincer model posits a stark
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trade-oﬀ between personal relationships and professional success. As a result of this
simpliﬁcation, the Mincer model overstates the negative impact of migration ties
on careers. Depending on the distribution of couples between the circumstances
described in Equations (3.3) and (3.4), the Mincer model may overstate or understate
the negative impact of migration ties on relationships.
3.3 Data
This paper is a product of the Job Seekers Project, a longitudinal survey project
that tracks the professional and personal trajectories of recent entrants to the ju-
nior PhD job market in economics.1 The project combines information from original
web surveys with information from job-placement and professional websites to create
a uniquely rich dataset for the study of work-family trade-oﬀs. Since the 2007-08
academic year, the project has contacted three graduating cohorts of economists
as they enter the job market and has followed up with them several months later
to learn about their professional and personal circumstances. At the same time,
the project has gathered detailed background information about the economists, in-
cluding their demographic characteristics, educational credentials, and professional
accomplishments, from the CVs they post on the job-placement websites of their
graduate departments.
The sampling frame for the Job Seekers Project is comprehensive. We use publicly
available information to compile a list sample of a clearly deﬁned population: job
candidates whose names and contact information appear on job-placement websites
linked by the National Bureau of Economic Research.2 Between the 2007-08 and 2009-
10 academic years, the three job market cohorts included in the Job Seekers sample
1This project is a joint eﬀort between Marta Murray-Close, Robert J. Willis and myself. We
gratefully acknowledge grant funding from the Sloan Foundation.
2The National Bureau of Economic Research posts links to job-placement websites of graduate
departments on their own job-market website: http://www.nber.org/candidates/.
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included 2,756 job candidates from 134 job-placement websites. A large majority
of the job candidates in the sample posted information on websites maintained by
departments of economics (90 percent) and departments in the United States (91
percent); a minority posted information on websites maintained by departments of
business, public policy, or other ﬁelds closely related to economics, or departments in
Canada or Europe.3 We believe that the Job Seekers sample is nearly the universe of
job candidates who expected to participate in ﬁrst-round job interviews at the annual
meetings of the American Economic Association between 2008 and 2010.
We invite job candidates to participate in the pre-market survey in late December,
just before most begin their ﬁrst-round job interviews. The survey is available for job
candidates to complete online during the period leading up to the annual meetings of
the American Economic Association and remains available for several months after
the meetings. While the ﬁelding window for the pre-market survey is long, most
respondents complete the survey in a timely manner. Across all three cohorts, 63
percent of the job candidates who completed the pre-market survey submitted their
responses before the meetings. Eighty-eight percent submitted their responses within
one month of receiving the invitation to participate.
We invite job candidates to participate in the post-market survey approximately
six months after the job market closes, when most have concluded their job search
and know whether and where they will be working in the coming year. For the 2007-
08 and 2009-10 job market cohorts, we sent the invitation to the post-market survey
in August; for the 2008-09 cohort, we sent the invitation in November. Like the
pre-market survey, the post-market survey is available for job candidates to complete
online over a period of several months, and like pre-market respondents, most post-
market respondents complete the survey in a timely manner. Across all three cohorts,
3The sample did not include job candidates from European departments until 2009-10. Prior to
2009-10, 95 percent of the job candidates in the sample were from departments in the United States;
in 2009-10, 84 percent were from departments in the United States.
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79 percent of the job candidates who completed the post-market survey submitted
their responses within one month of receiving the invitation to participate.
The data sources compiled by the Job Seekers project have a number of desirable
features. First, the project's combination of data from web surveys and job placement
websites allows for a detailed analysis of sample selectivity. We are conﬁdent that
the estimates derived from this data are reasonably representative of the population
of new entrants to the new PhD job market in economics. Response rates for the
Job Seekers surveys are comparable or superior to response the response rate for a
typical web survey. Over all cohorts, the response rate for the pre-market survey was
53 percent, and the response rate for the post-market survey was 39 percent. By way
of comparison, a meta-analysis of response rates to web and internet surveys used in
academic studies of well-deﬁnied populations since 1994 found a mean response rate
of 40 percent (Cook et al., 2000).
We supplement the Job Seekers survey with publicly available information from
the job placement websites of graduate departments. Using the ranking of gradu-
ate departments in economics from the US News and World Report, we ranked the
departments of 70 percent of the job candidates in the Job Seekers sample.4 Using
the photographs and CVs that job candidates posted on the job placement websites,
and supplementing with coding based on ﬁrst names, we identiﬁed the gender of 97
percent of the job candidates. From the CVs, we identiﬁed the countries in which
93 percent of the job candidates obtained their undergraduate degrees.5 Finally, also
from the CVs, we obtained information about the doctoral training of job candidates,
4The US News rankings are available at http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-
graduate-schools/top-humanities-schools/economics-rankings. Programs are only ranked through
place 79; only programs in the United States are ranked. Most (66 percent) of job candidates from
unranked departments were from lower-ranked economics departments in the United States. A
sizable minority (30 percent) were from departments outside the United States, and a small number
(4 percent) were from departments in ﬁelds closely related to economics, such as business or public
policy.
5Country of origin is not listed on most CVs, so we use country of undergraduate education as a
proxy for this variable. Data from the web surveys indicate that country of undergraduate education
is a good proxy for the job candidate's country of origin.
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including their research ﬁelds, teaching experience, and research productivity, as well
as information about their previous education.
A second feature of the Job Seekers data is the availability of information about a
wide range of job-market outcomes and expectations regarding future career trajec-
tories. Previous studies of family migration have focused on the current employment
status and earnings of couples likely to face migration ties. This narrow focus is
largely attributable to data limitations. The large-scale datasets most studies have
used do not contain other measures of career attainment. The narrow focus of previ-
ous studies is also a serious limitation. It is likely that specialized professionals  the
group most vulnerable to migration ties  care a great deal about career outcomes
beyond their employment and earnings. Especially at the beginning of their careers,
they are likely to value less tangible aspects of their jobs, such as prestige, and more
forward-looking aspects, such as access to career ladders. To the extent that previous
studies have neglected these other outcomes, they may have misrepresented or un-
derstated the impact of migration ties on highly educated workers. In contrast, the
Job Seekers surveys contain detailed questions about a comprehensive list of career
outcomes and expectations.
A third feature of the Job Seekers data is the combination of information about
relationship status with information about household composition. Previous studies
of family migration have assessed its impact on couples who live together but have
largely ignored couples who live apart. Again, the narrow focus of previous studies
is understandable but unfortunate. Many large-scale datasets contain information
about household composition but not about family members who live outside the
household. Other datasets contain information about spouses or partners but assume
that couples live in the same household. Despite the possibility that dual-career
concerns induce couples to live apart, few datasets contain the information that would
be necessary to study living arrangements as a margin of adjustment to conﬂicting
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migration opportunities. In contrast, the Job Seekers surveys contain questions both
about the partners of new economists and about the living arrangements of couples
in the year after the job market.
A fourth feature of the Job Seekers data, and a key innovation of the project
relative to other studies of family migration, is our use of individual-speciﬁc measures
of job candidates' counterfactual job-market outcomes. The structure of the PhD
job market in economics, where most job candidates submit applications, complete
interviews, travel to ﬂy-outs, and receive job oﬀers during narrow, pre-determined
windows of time, provides job candidates with well-deﬁned choice sets, including
well-deﬁned counterfactual outcomes. The structure of the job market also allows us
to survey job candidates about their choices while their memories of the job market
are fresh. To this end, the post-market survey includes a series of questions about
the outcomes respondents actually had on the job market and the outcomes they
think they would have had under counterfactual scenarios where their responses to
migration ties were diﬀerent.
To determine whether respondents made individually optimal choices on the job
market, and to assess the impact of migration ties on the job placements of those
who did not make individually preferred choices, the post-market survey asks re-
spondents to consider the following counterfactual scenario: Suppose your [hus-
band/wife/signiﬁcant other] could have an equally satisfying professional and per-
sonal life in any location  that is, suppose it would not be a sacriﬁce for [him/her]
to move with you anywhere.6 The survey then asks respondents to describe the
decisions they would have made and the outcomes they think would have had at
each stage of the job market under this scenario. For the remainder of the paper, we
refer to options the respondent would have chosen in the absence of migration ties as
6This is the text that introduced the counterfactual questions in the 2009-10 post-market survey.
The wording of the counterfactual questions has varied slightly over time, but the changes do not
appear to have aﬀected response patterns. The text of the questions from other survey years is
available in the appendix.
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individually preferred, or IP, options.
To determine whether respondents had forgone living with their partner to ac-
cept their individually preferred job, the post-market survey asked respondents who
expected to be living apart the following March to consider a second counterfac-
tual scenario: Please imagine the life you would have had if you and your [hus-
band\wife\signiﬁcant other] were constrained to live together next March (i.e., share
your primary residence or live close enough to each other that you could see each
other after work on weeknights). To assess the impact migration ties would have
had on the job placements of respondents who rejected their jointly preferred option,
had they instead decided to accept it and live with their partner, the survey asks
respondents to describe the outcomes they think they would have had if living apart
were not an option. We refer to options the respondent would have chosen if living
apart were not an option as jointly preferred, or JP, options.7
Each analysis presented in this paper uses slightly diﬀerent sample restriction
criteria. Because changes over time in the survey questions and skip logic mean that
some variables are not available for all respondents in all years, the sample restriction
criteria are formulated to ensure comparability while maintaining as large a sample
as possible. Column headers and footnotes in each table describe the samples used in
each analysis, while the Appendix provides detail about changes in question wording
and response scales between cohorts.
3.4 Results
The Mincer model provides strong reasons to believe that family migration harms
the career prospects of new economists. Like other specialized professionals, economists
participate in national and international labor markets. Their career opportunities
7We added questions about jointly preferred options to the post-market survey in 2009-10. We
do not have information about the jointly preferred options of job candidates in the 2007-08 and
2008-09 job-market cohorts.
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are geographically dispersed. Most economists move for their ﬁrst job, and many
move for subsequent jobs.
At the same time, the Job Seekers data indicate that many new economists
are in relationships with highly educated partners. A majority (73 percent) of the
economists who responded to the Job Seekers surveys were in a relationship at the be-
ginning of their job-market year (Table 3.1). Almost half (48 percent) were married;
another ﬁfth (20 percent) characterized their relationship as marriage-like or com-
mitted. The partners of the economists, like the economists themselves, had strong
educational credentials. More than three quarters (76 percent) of the partners had
earned or were pursuing a graduate degree, and more than one third (40 percent) had
earned or were pursuing a PhD (Table 3.2).
While both male and female economists reported personal circumstances that
made them vulnerable to migration ties, we observe gender diﬀerences in two domains.
On one hand, male economists were more likely than female economists to be in a
relationship during their job-market year. At the time they entered the job market, 76
percent of the men who responded to the Job Seekers surveys were in a relationship,
and 51 percent were married. The comparable ﬁgures for women were 67 percent
and 40 percent. On the other hand, conditional on being in a relationship, female
economists were more likely than male economists to have a partner whose educational
attainment equaled their own. More than half (57 percent) of the women who were
in a relationship during their job-market year had a partner who had earned or or
was pursuing a PhD. The same was true of less than one third (32 percent) of the
men.
3.4.1 Impact of migration ties on career outcomes
The Job Seekers' data show that the impact of migration ties on economists'
choices at the ﬁnal stage of the job market was surprisingly small. Of 631 respondents
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who received at least one job oﬀer and had a relationship that spanned the job-
market months, a large majority (85 percent) reported that they had accepted their
individually preferred job from their ﬁnal choice set. A small number (1 percent)
reported that their individually preferred option had been to reject all of their job
oﬀers and that they had, in fact, rejected all of their oﬀers. Unexpectedly, in a
population theoretically vulnerable to severe migration ties, just 14 percent of these
respondents reported that their job choice would have been diﬀerent in the absence
of relationship-related constraints. These results are summarized in Table 3.3.
Both the Mincer model and the extended model predict that job candidates are
more likely to forgo their individually preferred job for the beneﬁt of their relationship
when the career sacriﬁces involved are small. The 2009-10 post-market survey assessed
the career costs of forgoing an individually preferred job with respect to eight long-
term career outcomes a typical economist might value: earning tenure at a research
university, earning tenure at a four-year college, publishing regularly in top journals,
having opportunities to move to more prestigious jobs, having opportunities to move
to diﬀerent kinds of jobs, having a lifetime income higher than average for their ﬁeld,
ﬁnding their everyday work satisfying, and having plenty of time for life outside of
work. Respondents rated their likelihood of realizing each outcome, in light of the
job they accepted, using a six-point scale that ranged from 1 (extremely unlikely) to
6 (extremely likely).
When respondents faced a trade-oﬀ between their individually preferred job and
their jointly preferred job, the survey also asked them to rate their their likelihood of
realizing the long-term career outcomes under a counterfactual scenario where their
response to the trade-oﬀ was diﬀerent. Respondents who rejected their individually
preferred job rated their likelihood of realizing each outcome under the counterfac-
tual scenario where they accepted it. Respondents who accepted their individually
preferred job rated their likelihood of realizing each outcome under the counterfactual
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scenario where they rejected it in favor of their jointly preferred job.
Finally, to assess the overall impact of rejecting an individually preferred job on
the career outcomes of new economists, the survey asked respondents who faced a
tradeoﬀ between their individually preferred job and their jointly preferred job to
compare their overall career prospects with the prospects they would have had under
the relevant counterfactual scenario. Respondents who rejected their individually pre-
ferred job rated their career prospects at that job, relative to the job they accepted,
using a ﬁve-point scale that ranged from 1 (much better) to 5 (much worse). Re-
spondents who accepted their individually preferred job rated their career prospects
at that job, relative to their jointly preferred job, using the same scale.
Table 3.4 presents mean ratings for the eight speciﬁc outcome measures and the
overall outcome measure, for both the individually preferred job and the jointly pre-
ferred job.8 For each measure, results are presented separately for each of three
groups: partnered job candidates for whom the individually preferred job coincided
with the jointly preferred job (not constrained), partnered job candidates who were
constrained by their partners and accepted the individually preferred job over the
jointly preferred alternative (constrained, accepted IP job), and partnered job candi-
dates who were constrained by their partners and accepted the jointly preferred job
over the individually preferred alternative (constrained, rejected IP job).
On the whole, job candidates in all three groups believed that both their individ-
ually preferred jobs and their jointly preferred jobs would position them to succeed in
their careers. Mean ratings for all of the speciﬁc outcome measures exceed the scale
value corresponding to somewhat unlikely for each group. For job candidates in the
unconstrained group, ratings for the individually preferred job and the jointly pre-
ferred job are, by deﬁnition, identical. For job candidates in the constrained groups,
8The ratings we summarize in this table are ordinal data. We present means rather than ordinal
measures of central tendency, such as medians or modes, because the ratings for most outcomes
cluster at the high end of the scale, and the ordinal measures obscure important variation within
that range.
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the results in Table 3.4 are consistent with the deﬁnition of individually preferred job
as the job that maximizes career-related utility: on average, job candidates believed
that their individually preferred jobs were more likely than their jointly preferred jobs
to produce most of the speciﬁc outcomes we assessed. Job candidates also believed
that their individually preferred jobs oﬀered better overall career prospects than their
jointly preferred jobs. Mean ratings of career prospects with the individually preferred
job, relative to career prospects with the jointly preferred job, fell between the scale
value corresponding to about the same and the scale value corresponding to somewhat
better for both constrained groups.
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 apply sign tests to assess the statistical signiﬁcance of diﬀerences
between the individually preferred and jointly preferred jobs of job candidates in the
constrained groups. Table 3.5 indicates that, among job candidates who rejected
their individually preferred job, the number who reported that their career prospects
had suﬀered from the decision statistically exceeds the number who reported that
their career prospects had improved. Diﬀerences with respect to the speciﬁc career
outcomes are not statistically signiﬁcant for this group.
Table 3.6 indicates that, among job candidates who accepted their individually
preferred job, the number who reported that their career prospects would have suf-
fered from rejecting it statistically exceeds the number who reported that their career
prospects would have improved. Job candidates who accepted their individually pre-
ferred job also reported a statistically signiﬁcant preponderance of diﬀerences favoring
that job in the likelihood of realizing ﬁve speciﬁc career outcomes: earning tenure at a
research university, publishing regularly in top journals, having opportunities to move
to more prestigious jobs, having opportunities to move to diﬀerent kinds of jobs, and
ﬁnding everyday work satisfying. Taken together, the results in Tables 3.5 and 3.6
show that migration ties are a salient issue for some new economists.
Consistent with the predictions of the Mincer model and the extended model,
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job candidates who rejected their individually preferred job  and who therefore
endured the career sacriﬁces associated with their migration ties  described the
decision as less costly than did respondents who accepted their individually preferred
job. While job candidates in both constrained groups believed that their individually
preferred jobs were more likely than their jointly preferred jobs to produce most of
the long-term career outcomes we assessed, the diﬀerences tend to be smaller among
job candidates who rejected their individually preferred job. Returning to Table 3.4,
for most career outcomes, job candidates who rejected their individually preferred
job reported that their individually and jointly preferred jobs were more similar,
on average, than did job candidates who accepted their individually preferred job.
Returning to Tables 3.5 and 3.6, results from the sign tests tell a similar story. Six of
the tests show a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the individually preferred
and jointly preferred jobs for job candidates who accepted their individually preferred
job. Despite a larger number of observations and correspondingly greater power, just
one test shows a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence for job candidates who rejected
their individually preferred job.
While the evidence we have presented to this point suggests that the impact of
migration ties on the career prospects of new economists is modest, two caveats are
in order. First, even if migration ties do not shape outcomes substantially in the
ﬁnal stage of the job market, they may shape outcomes at earlier stages, when job
candidates make decisions about which applications to submit and which interviews
and ﬂy-outs to accept. To the extent that job candidates alter their application,
interview, or ﬂy-outs sets in response to relationship commitments, the job oﬀers
from which they choose in the ﬁnal stage of the job market may diﬀer from the oﬀers
they would have obtained in the absence of migration ties.
Table 3.7 presents evidence that migration ties do, in fact, inﬂuence the decisions
of job candidates with respect to applications, interviews, and ﬂy-outs. A sizable
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minority (44 percent) of Job Seekers respondents with partners reported that they
would have applied to a diﬀerent set of jobs if they had not been constrained by
relationship commitments. Twelve percent reported that they would have accepted a
diﬀerent set of interviews, and 14 percent reported that they would have accepted a
diﬀerent set of ﬂy-outs. By the time they reached the oﬀer stage of the job market,
almost half (49 percent) of job candidates with partners had altered their choices in
some way in response to migration ties.
The results in Table 3.7 suggest that our measure of counterfactual job outcomes
is not accurate in every case. The magnitude of the results, however, suggests that
our measure is accurate in most cases. For example, even among the minority of
respondents who altered their application set in response to migration ties, the median
change in the size of the set was just ﬁve applications withheld. Given that the the
median application set contained 100 applications, changes of this magnitude are
small, and seem unlikely to have shaped the oﬀer sets of respondents in dramatic
ways. Furthermore, at the interviews stage, the median change reported by the 12
percent of respondents who indicated that their interview decisions were inﬂuenced
by their partners was an increase of two interviews accepted.
The second caveat is that the migration ties of new economists may inﬂuence their
job-market outcomes through another indirect channel: the behavior of employers in
the job market. Even if the choices of job candidates are unaﬀected by their rela-
tionship commitments, employers may consider family circumstances when deciding
which candidates to interview, invite for ﬂy-outs, or hire. Employers may learn about
the relationships of job candidates in at least two ways. First, job candidates may tell
employers about their relationships when they meet for interviews or ﬂy-outs. Sec-
ond, academic advisors and other members of the academic community may discuss
the relationships of job candidates in an attempt to facilitate good job matches.
Table 3.7 indicates that, whatever the source of the information, employers are
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likely to learn about the relationships of job candidates before they extend job oﬀers.
Seventy-two percent of Job Seekers respondents with partners said that some or all of
their prospective employers knew about their relationship by the time they completed
their interviews. Eighty-four percent said that some or all of their employers knew
about their relationship by the time they completed their ﬂy-outs. To the extent that
employers learn about the relationships of job candidates from third parties, without
the knowledge of the job candidates, these results may understate the amount of
information available to employers. Because the Job Seekers surveys focus on the
supply side of the job market, we do not know how employers incorporate information
about relationships into their decision making and cannot rule out the possibility
that employer responses shape the oﬀer sets of job candidates in meaningful ways.
In particular, we cannot rule out the possibility that the individually and jointly
preferred jobs we observe are more similar  and the impact of migration ties we infer
less pronounced  than they would be in the true counterfactual situation.
3.4.1.1 Comparing the Job Seekers approach to existing work
Previous studies of family migration have not had access to direct measures of
migration ties. Consequently, previous tests of the Mincer model have relied on
proxies. Most often, studies have assumed the migration ties are more severe among
married men and women, and among men and women with highly educated partners.
These studies have shown that career outcomes theoretically related to being a tied
migrant (for example, reduced earnings or labor supply after a move) are more likely
for married couples  especially married women  and for men and women whose
partners have college or graduate degrees.
The Job Seekers dataset contains uniquely detailed information about the re-
sponses of new economists to migration ties. This information allows us to examine
the association between the proxies previous studies have used and direct measures of
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migration-induced career sacriﬁces. Both the Mincer model and the extended model
predict that job candidates are more likely to reject their individually preferred job
when their migration ties are large and when the value of their relationship is low. Be-
cause previous studies have suggested that migration ties increase with educational
attainment, we expect that new economists whose partners have graduate degrees
are more likely to alter their job-market choices in response to migration than new
economists whose partners have lower levels of education. Because we hypothesize
that the value of relationships usually increases with commitment, we also expect
that new economists in less committed relationships are more likely to alter their
job-market choices than new economists in more committed relationships.
Table 3.8 presents results from probit regressions examining the association be-
tween the probability that job candidates altered their job-market choices in response
to migration ties and the proxies for migration ties that previous studies have used.
In Column 1, the dependent variable takes a value of one for respondents who rejected
their individually preferred job and a value of zero otherwise. In Column 2, the de-
pendent variable takes a value of one for respondents who altered their choice set at
the application, interview, or ﬂy-out stage of the job market and a value of zero oth-
erwise. In Column 3, the dependent variable takes a value of one for respondents who
rejected their individually preferred job, altered their choice set at an intermediate
stage of the job market, or did both, and a value of zero otherwise.
Consistent with our expectations, the results in Table 3.8 suggest that new econo-
mists whose partners have graduate degrees are more likely to reject their individually
preferred job than new economists whose partners have college degrees or less. The
estimates in Columns 2 and 3 are similar in sign and magnitude to the results in
Column 1 but are not statistically signiﬁcant from zero. Also consistent with our
expectations, the negative coeﬃcients on the relationship status indicators for com-
mitted and dating relationships suggest that new economists who are in less formal
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relationship are less likely than new economists who are married to reject their in-
dividually preferred job or to alter their application, interview, or ﬂy-outs sets in
response to migration ties.
In contrast to the large number of studies ﬁnding that family migration imposes
larger costs on women than on men, we observe only minor gender diﬀerences in the
impact of migration ties on new economists. Of 631 job candidates who provided
information about their counterfactual job choices, 17 percent of women and 12 per-
cent of men that they had rejected their individually preferred and had chosen an
option more favorable to their partner. This diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant,
χ2 (1, N = 631) = 2.07, p = 0.15.
On the other hand, women were somewhat more likely than men to report that
migration ties had inﬂuenced their decisions at intermediate stages of the job market.
Fifty-seven percent of women, but just 45 percent of men, reported that migration ties
had shaped the set of applications they submitted, or the set of interviews or ﬂy-outs
they accepted, χ2 (1, N = 631) = 5.51, p = 0.02. Results from the probit regressions
suggest that gender diﬀerences in relationship status and the educational attainment
of respondents' partners do not explain women's greater likelihood of altering job-
market choices in response to migration ties. Controlling for these characteristics,
women were still 9 percentage points more likely than men to report that migration
ties had shaped their application, interview, or ﬂy-out sets (Table 3.8).
3.4.2 Living apart to avoid career sacriﬁces
Results from the Job Seekers surveys indicate that living arrangements are an
important margin of adjustment for couples facing migration ties. Of 454 respondents
who described their expectations for their relationship in the year after the job market,
16 percent reported that a long-distance relationship was the most likely outcome.
The prevalence of long-distance relationships among Job Seekers respondents equaled
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or exceeded the prevalence rejecting individually preferred oﬀers: we saw, in the
previous section, that 14 percent of respondents rejected their individually preferred
job for the beneﬁt of their relationship, and just 7 percent of respondents reported
that a break-up was the most likely outcome for their relationship.
Table 3.10 presents summary results from adjustment along both the relationship
and career outcome margins. Of 360 respondents who were still in their relationships
at the time of the post-market survey and who provided information about both their
counterfactual job outcomes and their expected relationship outcomes, 73 percent
accepted their individually preferred job and expected to be living with their partner
in the year after the job market. (See right panel of Table 3.10.) That economists were
likely to obtain optimal outcomes in both their careers and their relationships suggests
that many couples did not face migration ties or, more likely, that the migration ties of
the economists dominated the migration ties of their partners. In the latter situation,
it would be the partners rather than the economists who rejected their individually
preferred job.
Table 3.11 presents evidence that, as suggested in the previous section, the economists
most likely to live apart from their partners are those whose careers would suﬀer the
most if they lived together. Speciﬁcally, the table presents results from ordinary least
squares regressions of the subjective probability of living apart in the year after the job
market on a series of indicator variables for beneﬁts of the individually preferred job
over the jointly preferred job. We examine the association between living apart and
the belief that the individually preferred job is more likely than the jointly preferred
job to produce each of the long-term career outcomes enumerated in the previous
section: better overall career prospects, tenure at a research university, tenure at a
four-year college, regular publication in top journals, opportunities to move to more
prestigious jobs, opportunities to move to diﬀerent kinds of jobs, a lifetime income
higher than average for their ﬁeld, everyday work that is satisfying, and plenty of
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time for life outside of work.
Column 1 of Table 3.11 presents results from regressions in which each of the
career outcomes enters as the sole regressor. Consistent with the extended model,
the coeﬃcient on overall career prospects, as well as a majority of the coeﬃcients
on other speciﬁc career outcomes, are positive. Respondents who believed that their
individually preferred job was more likely to produce a desirable outcome were more
likely to live apart than respondents who believed that their jointly preferred job
was as likely or more likely to produce the outcome. The two exceptions to this
pattern were a higher-than-average lifetime income and time for life outside of work.
Respondents who believed that their individually preferred job was more likely than
their jointly preferred job to produce these outcomes were no more likely than other
respondents to live apart. The ﬁnding that responses to migration ties were not
sensitive to changes in expected lifetime income is consistent with evidence from
previous studies that couples who choose long-distance relationships pursue career
opportunities not primarily as a source of income, but rather as a central life interest
(Gerstel and Gross , 1982).
Column 2 of Table 3.11 presents results from a regression in which all of the
speciﬁc career outcomes enter together. In contrast to the coeﬃcients estimated for
these variables in Column 1, most of the estimates in Column 2 are statistically
indistinguishable from zero. The estimates that remain statistically signiﬁcant in
the combined regression model suggest that superiority of the individually preferred
job with respect to two speciﬁc career outcomes, publishing regularly in top journals
and having opportunities to move to diﬀerent kinds of jobs, is associated with a
substantially greater likelihood of living apart.
The change in the pattern of estimates between Columns 1 and 2 probably indi-
cates that the eight outcome measures we use tap a smaller number of underlying job
characteristics. Chi-square tests show that, among respondents whose individually
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and jointly preferred jobs were diﬀerent, those who believed that their individually
preferred job was more likely to help them publish regularly in top journals also tended
to believe that it was more likely to help them earn tenure at a research university, to
facilitate moving to more prestigious jobs, and to oﬀer satisfying work (Table 3.12).
Similarly, respondents who believed that their individually preferred job was more
likely to facilitate moving to diﬀerent kinds of jobs also tended to believe that it was
more likely to facilitate moving to more prestigious jobs and to oﬀer satisfying work.
In Table 3.13, we present results from a horserace between the dummy variable
indicating that the overall career prospects are better at the individually preferred
job, relative to the jointly preferred job, and each of the speciﬁc career outcomes. The
ﬁrst row contains estimates from the base case, a linear regression of the probability
of living apart on the dummy variable representing overall career prospects. In each
additional row, we also include one speciﬁc career outcome dummy variable. Column
1 displays the estimated coeﬃcient and standard error from the overall measure, while
Column 2 displays the estimated coeﬃcient and standard error from the speciﬁc career
outcome. For ﬁve of the eight speciﬁc career outcomes, the estimated coeﬃcient on
the speciﬁc outcome is small and statistically insigniﬁcant, and the coeﬃcient on the
overall career prospects measure is virtually unchanged from the base case in which
the overall career prospects measure is the sole regressor. In these cases, the adjusted
R-squared statistic is very close to, or less than, the adjusted R-squared statistic
in the base regression. In the row containing the results from the regression with
the dummy variable for have opportunities to move to more prestigious jobs, the
overall career outcomes coeﬃcient is reduced, and neither coeﬃcient is statistically
signiﬁcant, implying that this variable may be highly correlated with the overall career
outcomes variable. In the row including have opportunities to move to diﬀerent
kinds of jobs, the coeﬃcient on the overall career prospects is similarly reduced,
but the coeﬃcient on the speciﬁc outcome is quite large and statistically signiﬁcant.
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The adjusted R-squared statistic also indicates that the explanatory power of this
regression is also higher. We interpret these results to imply that respondents choosing
to live apart from their partners may particularly value jobs that will give them more
ﬂexibility in employment options in the future. This is consistent with our belief that
living apart is a temporary but important solution to the two-body problem.9
3.4.3 When does it pay to live apart?
Our extension of the Mincer model, which allows for the possibility that couples
with conﬂicting locational preferences live apart, carries predictions that are testable
using data from the Job Seekers project. In the remainder of this section, we assess the
extent to which circumstances in which Job Seekers respondents live apart correspond
to circumstances in which the model predicts that couples live apart. In particular
we estimate ordinary least squares regression models of the form
SPAPARTi = X
′
iβ + i,
where SPAPARTi is the job candidate's subjective probability of living apart in the
year after the job market and Xi contains characteristics of the job candidate, his
or her partner, and their relationship that are theoretically likely to inﬂuence the
couple's response to migration ties. Our focus in these analyses is the choice of living
arrangements by couples who expect to maintain their relationship. Accordingly,
we focus on predictions from Equation (3.2) and exclude from the regression sample
respondents who reported that they were more likely than not to break up with their
partner in the year after the job market.
9Indeed, while discussion of the dynamics of cohabitation and career decision-making are beyond
the scope of this paper, our study has begun to gather data from follow-up surveys to examine these
dynamics.
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Role of partner's career-related utility
Our extended Mincer model assumes that couples consider the migration ties
of both partners when deciding where to live and work. Accordingly, the model
predicts that economists are more likely to live apart from their partner not just when
their own migration tie is large, but also when their partner's migration tie is large.
This prediction is consistent with ﬁndings from qualitative studies of long-distance
relationships, which indicate that the ability of dual-career couples to preserve their
relationship while pursuing desirable career opportunities in separate locations is their
primary impetus for living apart (Gerstel and Gross , 1982).
The Job Seekers data contain several measures of partner migration ties. First, like
most studies of family migration, we use the educational attainment of the partner as
a proxy for labor-force attachment and the possession of specialized human capital.
Second, we ask about the school enrollment of the partner in the year after the
respondent was on the job market. Third, we ask respondents what they think is the
percent chance that their partner will work at least 20, 40, and 60 hours per week over
most of the next ten years. Fourth, we ask respondents how good they thought their
partner's job opportunities would be in the location of their new job, at the time they
accepted the job. Finally, we assess agreement with the following statement: My
[husband's/wife's/signiﬁcant other's] career will not suﬀer if we move to the places
that are best for my career.
Table 3.14 presents results from regressions of the subjective probability of liv-
ing apart on these measures of partner migration ties. Column 1 indicates that, as
expected, higher levels of educational attainment are associated with greater likeli-
hoods of living apart. Economists whose partner had or was pursuing a master's
degree believed they were 9 percentage points more likely to live apart than those
whose partner had no more than a college degree. Economists whose partner had
or was pursuing a PhD believed they were 16 percentage points more likely to live
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apart. School enrollment was also associated with living apart. Economists whose
partner expected to be in school in the year after the job market believed they were
9 percentage points more likely to live apart than economists whose partner did not
expect to be in school.
The results in Column 2 suggest that labor force attachment has little impact on
the likelihood of living apart. The estimated coeﬃcients on the percent chance of
working at least 20 and at least 40 hours per week are small and are not statistically
diﬀerent from zero. The estimated coeﬃcient on the percent chance of working at
least 60 hours per week is also small, but is statistically signiﬁcant. In particular, the
estimate indicates that an increase of 10 percentage points in the percent chance that
the partner will work long hours over most of the next ten years is associated with an
increase of 3 percentage points in the percent chance that the couple will live apart
in the year after the job market.
The quality of the partner's job prospects in the location of the economist's job has
a substantial and statistically signiﬁcant association with the percent chance that the
couple lives apart. The results in Column 3 suggest that, compared with economists
whose partner had good job prospects in the location of their job, economists whose
partner had fair prospects believed they were 11 percentage points more likely to live
apart, and economists whose partner had poor prospects believed they were 33 per-
centage points more likely to live apart. The results in Column 4 are consistent with
the results in Column 3. Economists who agreed that the career attainment of their
partner would not be harmed by following them to their individually preferred loca-
tion believed they were 18 percentage points less likely to live apart than economists
who thought that the career attainment of their partner would be harmed.
On the whole, the estimates from Columns 1 through 4 are robust to the inclusion
of additional variables in the regression model. Column 5 presents estimates from a
regression model that includes all of the measures of partner migration ties. While
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some estimates that were statistically signiﬁcant in the partial models lose signiﬁcance
in the full model, the signs and magnitudes of most estimates change only modestly.
Interestingly, the association between educational attainment and living apart is not
statistically signiﬁcant in the model that includes direct measures of migration ties.
This result suggests that, while education is a reasonable proxy for migration ties in
studies that lack direct measures, it is not itself responsible for the decision to live
apart.
Role of relationship-related utility
The extended model predicts that economists are more likely to live apart when
their value of living together is lower. A reasonable hypothesis is that couples have a
stronger preference for living together when they are more committed to each other
and more satisﬁed with their relationship. On the other hand, qualitative studies of
long-distance relationships have found that couples who live apart are not motivated
to do so by problems in their relationship, and do not expect to break up (Gerstel
and Gross , 1982).
The Job Seekers data contain two measures of relationship satisfaction and com-
mitment. First, we ask respondents to classify their relationship as married, marriage-
like, committed, or dating. Second, we ask them to rate their satisfaction with
the relationship in the months leading up to the job market. In addition, the sur-
veys contain six items designed to assess the relationship-related costs of living apart.
Speciﬁcally, we ask respondents how upset they would be if they were living apart
from their partner in the year after the job market, and we ask them to rate their
agreement with the following statements: (1) It would be possible for me to have
a fulﬁlling relationship while living apart from my [husband/wife/signiﬁcant other],
(2) I would never consider living apart from my [husband/wife/signiﬁcant other],
(3) I would be willing to make a large career sacriﬁce so that I could live with my
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[husband/wife/signiﬁcant other], (4) I would consider jobs that require me to live
apart from my [husband/wife/signiﬁcant other] for up to one year, and (5) I would
consider jobs that require me to live apart from my [husband/wife/signiﬁcant other]
for up to ﬁve years.
Table 3.15 presents results from regressions of the subjective probability of living
apart on relationship commitment, relationship satisfaction, and other relationship-
related cost measures. Column 1 indicates that lower levels of relationship commit-
ment are associated with greater likelihood of living apart. Compared with economists
who were married, those in marriage-like and committed relationships believed they
were between 11 and 33 percentage points more likely to live apart. Column 2 sug-
gests that relationship satisfaction plays a moderately important role in decisions
about living arrangements. Economists who were extremely satisﬁed with their rela-
tionship in the months leading up to the job market believed they were 15 percentage
points less likely to live apart than economists who were less satisﬁed.
Column 3 presents estimates from a regression model that includes dummy vari-
ables indicating that the respondent would be very upset or extremely upset to be
living apart in the year after the job market, along with dummy variables indicating
that the respondent agreed with the statements enumerated above. Surprisingly, just
two estimates in Column 3 are statistically signiﬁcant. Economists who would be
extremely upset to be living apart believed they were 19 percentage points less likely
to live apart than economists who would be less upset. Those who agreed that they
would consider jobs that required them to live apart from their partner for up to ﬁve
years believed they were 19 percentage points more likely to live apart than those
who disagreed that they would consider such jobs.
Column 4 presents estimates from a model that includes all of the relationship-
related cost measures. The estimates in this column are comparable to estimates in
the preceding columns. Economists who are less committed to their relationships are
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more likely to live apart than those who are more committed, and economists who
report a strong preference for living together are less likely to live apart than those
who report a weaker preference for living together. Taken together, these results
contrast with, but do not contradict, the ﬁndings of the qualitative studies. Previous
studies of long-distance relationships have identiﬁed participants using non-random
sampling methods. Consequently, they have not estimated predictors of living apart
for the population  or a known sub-population  of dual-career couples. To the extent
that the snowball sampling methods employed by these studies identiﬁed the most
successful and enduring long-distance relationships, they may have overrepresented
couples who were committed and happy in their relationships.
Role of children
Couples are likely to place a higher value on living together when they have
children. Qualitative studies of long-distance marriages have found that couples with
young children ﬁnd living apart more stressful than couples without children. In
addition, couples who anticipate having children report that they will not continue
living apart when they become parents (Gerstel and Gross , 1982).
The Job Seekers data includes measures of current parental status and expecta-
tions of future fertility. We identify respondents who already had children by the
time of the job-market year, and we ask all respondents what they think is the per-
cent chance that they will have a child in the next year and the next ﬁve years.
In addition to these measures, the surveys contain several items designed to assess
the child-related costs of living apart. Speciﬁcally, we ask respondents to rate their
agreement with the following statements: (1) I would consider having a child while
living apart from my [husband/wife/signiﬁcant other], (2) Living apart from my
[husband/wife/signiﬁcant other] over the next year would prevent us from having as
large a family as we would like, (3) "Living apart from my [husband/wife/signiﬁcant
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other] over the next ﬁve years would prevent us from having as large a family as
we would like, (4) My children would live with me if my [husband/wife/signiﬁcant
other] and I were living apart, and (5) I could have a very good relationship with
my children even if they were not living with me.
Table 3.16 presents results from regressions of the subjective probability of living
apart on parental status, fertility expectations, and other child-related costs of living
apart. Column 1 shows that, as expected, parenthood is associated with a lower
likelihood of living apart. Parents believed they were 15 percentage points less likely
to live apart than non-parents.
Column 2 shows that the expectation of having children is also associated with
a lower likelihood of living apart. An inspection of the distributions of subjective
probabilities of having children indicated that they were tri-modal, with responses
clustering near 0, 0.5, and 1. To assess the role of fertility expectations on decisions
about living arrangements, we regressed the expected probability of living apart on
dummy variables corresponding to subjective probabilities of less than 0.25, probabil-
ities between 0.25 and 0.75, and probabilities greater than 0.75. Estimates from this
regression model are small in magnitude and, with one exception, are not statistically
diﬀerent from zero. The exception is a strong expectation of having children within
ﬁve years. Economists who thought that they would probably have a child in the
next ﬁve years believed they were 10 percentage points less likely to live apart than
economists who were less sure that they would have children.
Results from Column 3 suggest that, consistent with the ﬁndings of qualitative
studies of long-distance marriages, some couples will not consider living apart while
growing their families. Economists who disagreed that they would consider having a
child while living apart from their partner believed they were 18 percentage points
less likely to live apart than economists who viewed long-distance relationships and
parenting as compatible. With one exception, the estimated coeﬃcients for the re-
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maining child-related cost measures are of the expected signs. None, however, are
statistically diﬀerent from zero. Notably, while we ﬁnd suggestive evidence that re-
spondents who would bear the burden of daily caretaking for their children are less
likely to live apart, and that respondents who could maintain good relationships with
their children are more likely to live apart, these results are not statistically signiﬁ-
cant.
Column 4 presents estimates from a regression model that includes all of the child-
related cost measures. The estimates in this column are comparable to the estimates
in Columns 1 through 3. Like the qualitative studies of long-distance relationships,
we ﬁnd consistent evidence that children increase the cost of living apart and deter
couples from adopting the arrangement.
3.5 Conclusions
The job market for PhD economists may be more robust than other job markets
for new PhDs. It seems likely, for example, that job candidates in less robust aca-
demic markets may be more aﬀected by migration ties than our study of economists
might imply. While the results from this study may not be informative about the
prevalence and magnitude of migration ties in weaker academic markets, our results
may generalize well to other strong national markets for specialized workers, such as
lawyers and business executives.
Findings from the Job Seekers project show that some of the new economists
we surveyed rejected desirable career outcomes in order to live with their partner.
Surprisingly, however, given that many economists are members of highly educated
dual-career couples  precisely the sort of couples most vulnerable to severe migration
ties  the career sacriﬁces they described were not large. Just 14 percent of Job
Seekers respondents rejected their individually preferred job for the beneﬁt of their
relationship. Among respondents who rejected their individually preferred job, the
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diﬀerences between that job and the job they accepted were moderate.
We argue that the gap between the substantial career sacriﬁces we expected based
on the Mincer model and the relatively minor career sacriﬁces we observe is explained,
in part, by the availability of an option Mincer never considered: living apart. Stud-
ies using non-probability samples have found that living apart allows some couples
with severe migration ties to avoid both career sacriﬁces and relationship dissolu-
tion. Our study corroborates that ﬁnding using representative data from a known
sub-population of dual-career couples. Sixteen percent of the new economists we sur-
veyed expected to be living apart from their partner in the year after they entered
the job market, and economists whose careers stood to gain most from living apart
were the most likely to adopt the arrangement.
Previous research on the migration decisions of dual-career couples has assessed
the impact of migration ties on their employment status and earnings. Our results
suggest that this focus is too narrow. Of the eight speciﬁc career outcomes we con-
sidered as likely components of new economists' assessments of their overall career
prospects, expected lifetime income was one of just two outcomes that did not signif-
icantly inﬂuence the living arrangements of new economists. Instead, the economists
we surveyed were motivated to live apart when they believed that the arrangement
would improve their research productivity and facilitate their future career mobil-
ity. To the extent that these ﬁndings are representative of dual-career couples more
generally, studies that focus exclusively on earnings and employment status neglect
important costs that migration ties impose on highly educated workers.
Finally, results from the Job Seekers project suggest that living apart is a more vi-
able option for some couples than others. While severe migration ties can induce even
happy couples to live apart, relationship commitment and satisfaction are deterrents
to long-distance relationships. Children and the expectation of having children are
also deterrents. In light of these ﬁndings, we posit that the impact of migration ties
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on the professional outcomes of dual-career couples is conditioned by their personal
circumstances. Couples who are deeply engaged in family life ﬁnd it more diﬃcult
than other couples to protect their careers when their locational preferences diverge.
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3.6 Tables
Table 3.1: Relationship status
All
respondents
Male
respondents
Female
respondents
In relationship 73% 76% 67%
Married 48% 51% 40%
Marriage-like 8% 8% 10%
Committed 12% 12% 12%
Dating 5% 5% 5%
Not in relationship 27% 24% 33%
Observations 1,503 707 503
Notes: Table includes respondents from the 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10 job-market
cohorts who gave relationship information in the post-market survey. In relation-
ship and Not in relationship indicate whether the respondent was partnered in
November of the job-market year. Relationship status is the most committed status
the respondent ever reported with respect to that relationship.
Table 3.2: Partner education
All
respondents
Male
respondents
Female
respondents
Bachelor's degree or less 24% 27% 18%
Master's or professional degree 36% 41% 25%
PhD 40% 32% 57%
Observations 1,057 730 327
Notes: Table includes data from 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10 cohort respondents
who were in a relationship in November of the job-market year and responded to
questions about the educational attainment of their partner. Educational attainment
is the highest degree the partner had earned or was pursuing during the job-market
year.
143
Table 3.3: Did respondents choose their individually-preferred job outcomes?
Percent
Chose preferred outcome 86.4%
Rejected preferred outcome 13.6%
Observations 631
Notes: The individually preferred job outcome is the outcome the respondent would
have preferred in the absence of constraints imposed by thee partner's preferences
or career. It may refer to a particular job oﬀer or to a preference to reject all job
oﬀers. Sample includes respondents from 2007-10 who were in relationships at least
from November until March of the job-market year (2007-09 cohorts), or through the
post-market survey (2009-10 cohort).
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Table 3.4: Expected career outcome ratings of individually preferred (IP) and jointly
preferred (JP) jobs (7-point scale)
Expected career outcome Meanb Obs
Constraint group IP JP
Tenure at a research university
Not constrained 3.76 143
Constrained, accepted IP job 4.43 3.57 7
Constrained, rejected IP job 4.10 3.90 21
Tenure at a four-year college
Not constrained 3.14 139
Constrained, accepted IP job 3.29 3.14 7
Constrained, rejected IP job 3.35 3.15 20
Regular publication in top journals
Not constrained 3.76 144
Constrained, accepted IP job 4.14 3.14 7
Constrained, rejected IP job 4.10 3.95 21
Opportunities to move to more prestigious
jobs
Not constrained 4.04 143
Constrained, accepted IP job 4.20 3.20 5
Constrained, rejected IP job 4.38 4.29 21
Opportunities to move to diﬀerent kinds of
jobs
Not constrained 4.26 143
Constrained, accepted IP job 4.57 3.71 7
Constrained, rejected IP job 4.24 4.52 21
Higher-than-average lifetime income for ﬁeld
Not constrained 3.93 144
Constrained, accepted IP job 3.71 3.57 7
Constrained, rejected IP job 4.19 4.00 21
Satisfying everyday work
Not constrained 4.95 144
Constrained, accepted IP job 4.83 3.83 6
Constrained, rejected IP job 5.00 4.67 21
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Expected career outcome Meanb Obs
Constraint group IP JP
Plenty of time for life outside of work
Not constrained 4.48 143
Constrained, accepted IP job 3.71 3.57 7
Constrained, rejected IP job 4.43 4.52 21
Rating of overall career prospects at IP job,
relative to JP joba
Not constrained  
Constrained, accepted IP job 2.00 10
Constrained, rejected IP job 2.39 28
Notes: Observations are from coupled respondents from the 2009-10 cohort only,
since these questions were not asked before 2009-10. Respondents rated the like-
lihood of each outcome for both the individually preferred and jointly preferred
jobs on a six-point scale, where 1 is extremely unlikely, 2 is very unlikely, 3 is
somewhat unlikely, 4 is somewhat likely, 5 is very likely, and 6 is extremely
likely. Not constrained indicates that respondent's individually preferred choice
coincided with couple's jointly preferred choice. For those who were constrained,
accepted individually preferred job indicates that the respondent accepted the
individually preferred job and rejected individually preferred job indicates that
the respondent accepted the jointly preferred job.
a Respondents rated the overall quality of the individually preferred job relative
to the jointly preferred job on a ﬁve-point scale, where 1 is "much better," 2
is "somewhat better," 3 is "about the same," 4 is "somewhat worse," and 5 is
"much worse." Mean ratings below 3 indicate that, on average, respondents felt
that the individually preferred job was more likely to yield better long-term career
prospects than the jointly preferred job.
b The ratings we summarize in this table are ordinal data. We present means rather
than ordinal measures of central tendency, such as medians or modes, because the
ratings for most outcomes cluster at the high end of the scale, and the ordinal
measures obscure important variation within that range.
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Table 3.5: Career costs experienced by respondents rejecting individually preferred
job oﬀer
Number of
respondents rating ...
Sign test
(p)
Chance respondent will... IP > AJ IP < AJ
Earn tenure at a research university 6 3 0.254
Earn tenure at a four-year college 5 5 0.623
Publish regularly in top journals 5 2 0.226
Have opportunities to move to more presti-
gious jobs
6 2 0.145
Have opportunities to move to diﬀerent
kinds of jobs
3 4 0.773
Have higher-than-average lifetime income
for ﬁeld
6 4 0.377
Have everyday work that is satisfying 8 3 0.113
Have plenty of time for life outside of work 5 5 0.623
Observations: 21
Overall career prospectsa 14 2 0.002
Observations: 28
Notes: Observations represent partnered respondents from the 2009-10 job-market
cohort who rejected the individually preferred job (IP) and accepted an alternative
job (AJ). The middle two columns in the table present the frequencies of ratings
indicating that the individually preferred job is more likely than the accepted job to
yield a particular outcome (IP > AJ) or that the individually preferred job is less
likely to yield the outcome (IP < AJ). The excluded category is IP = AJ. The sign test
column presents one-sided p-values based on the probability of observing the given
frequencies of positive signs on the diﬀerences between ratings of the individually
preferred job and the accepted job from a binomial distribution with mean 0.5. For
the eight speciﬁc outcomes, respondents rated the likelihood of realizing the outcome
on a six-point scale, where 1 is extremely unlikely, and 6 is extremely likely.
a Respondents rated their overall career prospects with the individually preferred job
relative to their prospects with the accepted job on a ﬁve-point scale, where 1 is "much
better," 2 is "somewhat better," 3 is "about the same," 4 is "somewhat worse," and
5 is "much worse." Ratings below 3 indicate that the individually preferred job is
better than the accepted job, while ratings above 3 that the accepted job is better
than the individually preferred job.
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Table 3.6: Career costs avoided by respondents accepting individually preferred job
over jointly preferred job
Number of
respondents rating ...
Sign test
(p)
Chance respondent will... IP > JP IP < JP
Earn tenure at a research university 5 0 0.031
Earn tenure at a four-year college 3 2 0.500
Publish regularly in top journals 5 0 0.031
Have opportunities to move to more presti-
gious jobs
4 0 0.063
Have opportunities to move to diﬀerent
kinds of jobs
5 0 0.031
Have higher-than-average lifetime income
for ﬁeld
2 1 0.500
Have everyday work that is satisfying 4 0 0.063
Have plenty of time for life outside of work 1 2 0.875
Observations: 7
Overall career prospectsa 8 0 0.004
Observations: 10
Notes: Observations represent partnered respondents from the 2009-10 job-market
cohort who faced a choice between an individually preferred job (IP) and a jointly
preferred alternative (JP), and who chose to accept the individually preferred job.
The middle two columns in the table present the frequencies of ratings indicating
that the individually preferred job is more likely than the jointly preferred job to yield
a particular outcome (IP > JP) or that the individually preferred job is less likely
to yield the outcome (IP < JP). The excluded category is IP = JP. The sign test
column presents one-sided p-values based on the probability of observing the above
frequencies of positive signs on the diﬀerences between ratings of the individually
preferred job and the jointly preferred job from a binomial distribution with mean
0.5. For the eight speciﬁc outcomes, respondents rated the likelihood of realizing
the outcome on a six-point response scale, where 1 is extremely unlikely, and 6 is
extremely likely.
a Respondents rated their overall career prospects with the individually preferred job
relative to their prospects with the jointly preferred job on a ﬁve-point scale, where 1 is
"much better," 2 is "somewhat better," 3 is "about the same," 4 is "somewhat worse,"
and 5 is "much worse." Ratings below 3 indicate that the individually preferred job is
better than the jointly preferred job, while ratings above 3 that the jointly preferred
job is better than the individually preferred job.
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Table 3.8: Probit regressions: Impact of migration ties and gender on job-market
choices
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Altered
job
choice
Altered
earlier
choice
Altered
any
choice
Female 0.041 0.095** 0.057
(0.030) (0.048) (0.049)
Relationship status
Married   
  
Marriage-like −0.035 −0.084 −0.062
(0.040) (0.067) (0.068)
Committed −0.074** −0.094 −0.109*
(0.033) (0.064) (0.064)
Dating 0.006 −0.346*** −0.254**
(0.072) (0.085) (0.102)
Partner education
Bachelor's degree or less   
  
Master's or professional degree 0.072** 0.017 0.042
(0.033) (0.056) (0.056)
PhD 0.059* 0.069 0.074
(0.032) (0.056) (0.057)
Observations 613 537 537
Notes: Sample includes partnered respondents from all cohorts. Standard errors in
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regression samples include observa-
tions from partnered respondents from all cohorts. Column 1 requires at least one job
oﬀer, while Columns 2 and 3 also require that respondents provided information about
the impact of migration ties at application, interview and ﬂy-out stages. Dependent
variables are dummy variables for rejecting the individually preferred job (Column
1), for altering the application, interview, or ﬂy-outs set in response to migration ties
(Column 2), or for doing either of these (Column 3). Partner education is highest
degree completed or in progress.
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Table 3.9: Relationship outcomes in March after the job-market year
Likely relationship outcome Percent
Live together 77.8%
Live apart 16.1%
Break up 6.2%
Observations 454
Notes: Sample includes respondents from 2008-10 who were in relationships from
November until March of the job-market year. Expected relationship outcomes are the
expected outcomes in March of the year after the job-market year, asked at the time
of the post-market survey. Live together refers to sharing a primary residence or living
close enough that the partners can see each other on weeknights; live apart refers to
not living close enough that the partners can see each other on weeknights. Outcomes
are coded as the most likely outcome based on respondents' subjective probabilities
of each outcome; respondents were also coded as break up if their relationship had
already ended by the time of the post-market survey.
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Table 3.11: Determinants of living apart: Career outcome trade-oﬀs
(1) (2)
Coef Obs Adj R2 Coef
IP > JP with respect to chance
respondent will...
Regressors: Single regressor All
Have better job prospects overall 0.246*** 176 0.089 
(0.060) 
Earn tenure at a research
university
0.228*** 171 0.049 −0.135
(0.073) (0.124)
Earn tenure at a four-year college 0.163* 166 0.016 0.087
(0.084) (0.130)
Publish regularly in top journals 0.326*** 172 0.083 0.423***
(0.080) (0.157)
Have opportunities to move to
more prestigious jobs
0.261*** 169 0.057 −0.177
(0.078) (0.148)
Have opportunities to move to
diﬀerent kinds of jobs
0.446*** 171 0.117 0.346**
(0.092) (0.141)
Have higher than average income
for ﬁeld
0.139 172 0.006 0.068
(0.097) (0.167)
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Table 3.11: Determinants of living apart: Career outcome trade-oﬀs (continued)
(1) (2)
Coef Obs Adj R2 Coef
IP > JP with respect to chance
respondent will...
Have satisfying everyday work 0.169** 171 0.025 −0.124
(0.072) (0.136)
Have plenty of time for life outside
of work
0.041 171 −0.005 −0.128
(0.112) (0.129)
Observations    160
Adjusted R2    0.085
Notes: Sample is restricted to 2008-09 and 2009-10 cohorts. Standard errors in paren-
theses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is the subjective prob-
ability of living apart in the year after the job market. For overall career prospects,
counts are based on a direct counterfactual question with a 1 to 5 response scale, where
1 indicates that "IP is much better than AJ" and 5 indicates that "IP is much worse
than AJ." For each of the eight speciﬁc career outcomes, respondents rated the like-
lihood of each outcome on a six-point scale where 1 was extremely unlikely, 2 was
very unlikely, 3 was somewhat unlikely, 4 was somewhat likely, 5 was very likely,
and 6 was extremely likely. Regressors for all regressions are dummy variables in-
dicating that respondent thought the individually preferred job was better than the
jointly preferred job. Column 1 reports estimates from regressions in which the dummy
variable for each outcome enters as the sole regressor. Column 2 reports estimates from
a regression in which all of the dummy variables enter together.
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Appendix to Chapter 2: The Impact of the Great
Recession on the Retirement Plans of Older
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A.1 Model of optimal retirement choice
Underlying the simple Modigliani model is a more complicated model of retirement
and consumption choice. A simpliﬁed version of a model of optimal consumption and
retirement timing from Miles Kimball and Matthew Shapiro (2003) posits that, at
any point in time τ each individual chooses future consumption path, Ct, and labor
market participation path, χt, from time τ until known time of death, T, according
to
max
Ct,χt
Tˆ
τ
{
e−ρ(T−t)
(
C
1− 1
θ
t
1− 1
θ
− (eα−ζt)χt
)}
dt (A.1)
subject to
A˙ = rAt + ωtχt − Ct (A.2)
where
χt =

0 if working at time t
1 if not working at time t
(A.3)
and ρ is the rate of time preference, θ is the coeﬃcient (or inverse?) of relative
risk aversion, and α and ς are disutility of work parameters, all individual-speciﬁc.
Additionally, At denotes assets at time t and ωt is wage at time t. Deﬁning λt as the
shadow value of wealth, the current-value Hamiltonian is
H = C
1− 1
θ
t
1− 1
θ
− eα−ζtχt + λt [rAt + ωtχt − Ct] (A.4)
- check margins seems in wrong rows (see m's comments)which implies the following
ﬁrst-order conditions:
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hc = 0⇔ C−1/θt = λt (A.5)
hA = ρλt − λ˙t ⇔ rλt = ρλt − λ˙t (A.6)
A˙ = rAt + ωtχt − Ct (A.7)
Letting χ, the decision to work, be characterized by
χt =

0 if λtωt ≥ eα+ζt
1 if λtωt ≤ eα+ζt
(A.8)
it must be that the optimal time of retirement, R, solves
ωRλR = e
α+ζt (A.9)
Now, given the ﬁrst-order condition for assets, hA, it can be shown that
λR = λte
(ρ−r)(R−t) (A.10)
Plugging this into the equation for ωRλR from above,
ωRλte
(ρ−r)(R−t) = eα+ζt (A.11)
gives the result that an individual is indiﬀerent between working and not working
when the marginal disutility of continuing to work is equal to the marginal utility
gained from continuing to work.
Taking logs of both sides and solving for R yields the equation for the optimal
169
retirement time,
R =
ln(λt) + ln(ωR)− (ρ− r)t− α
ς − ρ+ r (A.12)
Note that ∂R/∂ln(λt) > 0. This implies that the higher the marginal increase in
current utility from relaxing the budget constraint, the later a person will retire. In
the context of this paper, I expect that a negative shock to accumulated assets, such
as losses from a stock or housing market bust, or losses in future income ﬂows, will
cause an increase in an individual's optimal retirement age.
A.2 Imputation of deﬁned beneﬁt pension wealth for CogEcon
I impute deﬁned beneﬁt pension wealth estimates for the CogEcon respondents
based on deﬁned beneﬁt pension wealth information in the HRS dataset Imputations
for Pension-Related Variables (Final, Version 1.0), according to the following:
1. For CogEcon respondents who indicated that they (and their spouse/partner,
if in a relationship) do not have a deﬁned beneﬁt pension, I assign a deﬁned
beneﬁt pension value of $0.
2. For single CogEcon respondents who indicated that they do have a deﬁned
beneﬁt pension, I assign the inﬂation-adjusted cell mean (age group by sex by
occupation group) of deﬁned beneﬁt plan wealth, using the deﬁned beneﬁt plan
value calculated using the HRS respondents' expected retirement age. I match
the cell means to CogEcon respondents who were in the age range in 2009
that the HRS respondents were in in 2004. So, for example, a female CogEcon
respondent in an Education, Training and Library occupation who was aged
between 45 and 49 in 2009 would be assigned the inﬂation-adjusted cell mean
deﬁned beneﬁt pension wealth of female HRS respondents with deﬁned beneﬁt
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pensions in an Education, Training and Library occupation who were aged
between 45 and 49 in 2004.
3. For coupled CogEcon respondents who indicated that they or their partner have
a deﬁned beneﬁt pension, but for whom the CogEcon data don't contain the
information about the spouse or partner's occupation or age, I assume only
the respondent has a deﬁned beneﬁt pension, and assign an estimated deﬁned
beneﬁt pension value using the same method as that used for single CogEcon
respondents.
4. For coupled CogEcon respondents who indicated that they or their partner
have a deﬁned beneﬁt pension, and for whom I have occupation and age data
for both members of the couple, I calculate the age group by sex by occupation
probabilities that each person has a deﬁned beneﬁt pension (the number with
non-zero deﬁned beneﬁt wealth values over the total number of respondents in
that sex by age by occupation group in the 2004 core HRS data). Then, I use
the same method as described in items 2 and 3 to match CogEcon respondents
to the cell means of deﬁned beneﬁt pensions from comparable HRS respondents.
Next, I multiply each partner's cell mean by his or her probability of having a
deﬁned beneﬁt pension and sum across both individuals in the household.
A.3 Derivation of expected retirement age in HRS sample
Unfortunately, the expected age of retirement is not asked directly of all HRS re-
spondents. Instead, I derive this age by combining information from several variables,
as follows:
1. If a respondent's retirement plans include stopping work altogether, I use the
planned age for stopping work as the expected age of retirement.
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2. If there is no planned age of retirement, I predict retirement age from a linear
regression of the expected age of retirement on the probabilities of full-time
work after age 62 and age 65 given by the respondent in 2006 and 2008, plus the
respondent's age and labor force status (full-time, part-time or partly retired)
at the 2008 interview. The adjusted r-squared from this regression is 0.424.
3. If there is still no expected age of retirement, I predicted retirement age from
a regression of expected age of retirement on the probabilities of full-time work
after age 65 given by the respondent in 2006 and 2008, and on the respondent's
age and labor force status at the 2008 interview. The adjusted r-squared from
this regression is 0.361.
4. If there is still no expected age of retirement, I predicted retirement age from
a similar regression to (b), using 2008 data only. The adjusted r-squared from
this regression is 0.385.
5. If there is still no expected age of retirement, I predicted retirement age from
a regression of expected age of retirement on the probabilities of full-time work
after age 62 and 65 given by the respondent in 2006, and on the respondent's
age and labor force status at the 2008 interview. The adjusted r-squared from
this regression is 0.262. (10 observations)
6. If there is still no expected age of retirement, I use age 65 as the expected
retirement age for these individuals. Age 65 is the mean, median and mode of
the expected retirement age for individuals under age 65 in 2008 who expected
to completely stop working, and thus seems like a reasonable estimate for those
who do not give enough information to allow for an estimated retirement age.
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A.4 Regression estimates used in comparisons of CogEcon and
HRS results
Using the ﬁnal HRS dataset, I regressed the change in reported retirement age
between Core 2006 and Core 2008, R08 − R06, on the change in the probabilities
of full-time work reported in 2006 and 2008, 08409Pr(FT62) and 08409Pr(FT65).
These regressions only include those respondents who actually reported planned or
expected age of retirement in both the 2006 and 2008 surveys, so the sample size is
quite small. The results from these regressions are shown below. To calculate the
expected change in retirement age for a one percentage point change in the probability
of full-time work, I multiplied each estimated coeﬃcient by 365.25, the number of days
in a year. For the subset of individuals in my ﬁnal regression sample, these regressions
yield estimates of an 8.5 day increase in retirement age for a one percentage point
increase in the probability of full-time work after age 62, and a 6.7 day increase in
retirement age for a one percentage point increase in the probability of full-time work
after age 65.
Table A.1: Regression estimates used in comparisons between CogEcon and HRS
results
(1) (2)
08409Pr(FT62) 0.0232
(0.02)
08409Pr(FT65) 0.0183***
(0.01)
Constant 0.367 0.3
(0.23) (0.21)
Observations 71 83
R-squared 0.069 0.094
Implied change per 1 p.p. increase: 8.5 days 6.7 days
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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A.5 Speciﬁcation comparison results without sampling weights
The following tables present the regression results on which the likelihood ratio
tests discussed in Section 2.6.2.4 are based. In each table, the samples have been
restricted to include only observations that are also included in my preferred regression
speciﬁcations that I present in the main portion of this study.
Table A.2: Comparison of Tobit, probit and Cragg models (CogEcon sample)
(1) (2) (3)
Speciﬁcation: Tobit Probit Truncated
Dependent variable: 4R I4R>0 4R
Rsc −R0 0.231* 0.034 0.522
(0.133) (0.024) (0.412)
(Rsc −R0)2 -0.009 -0.002 -0.015
(0.006) (0.001) (0.016)
Constant -1.863*** -0.299*** -2.288
(0.550) (0.088) (3.203)
Sigma 5.809*** 5.606***
(0.412) (1.067)
Observations 320 320 128
Log-Likelihood -519.5 -213.6 -305.0
Notes: Dependent variable in Tobit and truncated normal speciﬁcations is re-
ported change in retirement age. In probit speciﬁcation, dependent variable is
an indicator that is equal to one if retirement age increased, and zero other-
wise. Censoring point for Tobit and truncated regressions is 0. Standard errors
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. LR Test statistic (∼ χ2(4)),
−2(LLTobit − (LLProbit + LLTruncated)), is 1.78 (p-value 0.78).
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A.6 Estimating expected bequests in the HRS
To generate point estimates of expected bequests, I ﬁrst averaged responses from
2004, 2006 and 2008 for each individual to reduce measurement error (this calculation
yielded Pr(B ≥ $10k)avg and Pr(B ≥ $100k)avg). Next, I calculated each individual's
total bequeathable wealth (beq w) as the sum of ﬁnancial wealth, real estate and
business assets (future earnings, Social Security wealth, and deﬁned beneﬁt pension
wealth were excluded from the bequeathable wealth calculation).
I then took the average of (1−Pr(B ≥ $10k)avg) across all individuals to get the
population average probability of leaving less than $10,000 in wealth, 1 − Pr(B ≥
$10k)pop. Next, I took the average of (Pr(B ≥ $10k)avg-Pr(B ≥ $100k)avg) across
all individuals with at least $10,000 in wealth to get the population average prob-
ability of leaving between $10,000 and $100,000 in wealth, (Pr(B ≥ $100k))pop100
for individuals with more than $100,000 but less than $500,000 in bequeathable
wealth. Next, I estimated a linear regression of (Pr(B ≥ $500k)) on the 2009 values
of Pr(B ≥ $10k) and Pr(B ≥ $100k), bequeathable wealth in 2009, plus the square
of each of these, for individuals with at least $500,000 in bequeathable wealth in 2009,
and applied the estimated equation to Pr(B ≥ $10k)avg, Pr(B ≥ $100k)avg, and 2008
wealth to predict (Pr(B ≥ $500k))08. Then, I applied these predictions to calculate
(Pr(B ≥ $100k) − Pr(B ≥ $500k))pop for individuals with more than $500,000 in
bequeathable wealth.
Finally, I used the following equation to create point estimates that were plausi-
ble, given bequeathable wealth, and also increasing with the subjective probability
measures of leaving a bequest:
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E(bequest) =

(
1−Pr(B≥$10k)avg
1−Pr(B≥$10k)pop
)
× beq w if beq w < $10k(
(Pr(B≥$10k)−Pr(B≥$100k))avg
(Pr(B≥$10k)−Pr(B≥$100k))pop
)
× beq w if beq w ∈ [$10k, $100k)(
(Pr(B≥$100k))avg
(Pr(B≥$100k))pop
)
× beq w if beq w ∈ [$100k, $500k)(
(Pr(B≥$500k))avg
(Pr(B≥$500k))pop
)
× beq w if beq w ∈ [$500k, inf)
The estimated values of E(bequest) have a mean of $368,000 and a median of
$140,000. The 25th percentile observation is $36,000, and the 75th percentile obser-
vation is $322,000. These estimates seem reasonably in line with Hurd and Smith
(2002) and Hurd and Rohwedder (2010b), but each individual's expected bequest is
feasible given his or her own wealth. These other studies were interested in popu-
lation statistics, so feasibility of the individual estimates was not important to their
estimation strategy.
The standard deviation is $1,601,000. (All rounded to the nearest $1,000.) These
range from 20 percent of total wealth at the 25th percentile to 67 percent of total
wealth at the 75th percentile. The mean is 46 percent of bequeathable wealth, and
the median is 43 percent. In terms of bequeathable wealth, the inter-quartile range
is from 20 percent to 100%, with mean 59 percent and median 67 percent.
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APPENDIX B
Appendix to Chapter 3: Moving Out to Move Up?
New Economists Sacriﬁce Job Opportunities for
Proximity to Signiﬁcant Others and Vice Versa
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